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 Beyond Clinical Reduction:  
Levinas, the Ethics of Wonder and the Practice of Autoethnography in 
Community Mental Health Care 
 




The central claim of this thesis is that wonder has the capacity to interrupt the institutional 
entrancement of the clinician to exert a gravitational pull on her awareness. This can 
“awaken” her from the normalized perspective of clinical praxis, and a clinical environment 
that defiles the vulnerable help seeker while contributing to the clinician’s moral 
disengagement or paralysis. In making this claim, our inquiry revisits many well-rehearsed 
ethical questions about the therapeutic relationship, the construct of mental illness and its 
care, the politics of power within the institution of community mental health care, and the 
supposed and real dangers of emotional intimacy in the clinical relationship. These 
questions also point uncomfortably—devastatingly—back to why and how the ethics of 
educated and dedicated clinicians can be diluted, for which the possible “cure” of wonder is 
being sought here. 
Wonder represents but one aspect of our ethical analysis in this interdisciplinary study. We 
turn in equal measure to an emerging strand of moral research, called autoethnography, and 
to the radical ethical vision of Emmanuel Levinas who informs our final understanding of 
wonder. In this inquiry, autoethnography takes the form of a short story in chapter 2 and as 
a series of personal epiphanic vignettes thereafter. Autoethnography affectively illuminates 
the theory being presented here and evokes the horrifying imperative of our ethical quest 
that calls for radical institutional change, albeit enigmatically. It is in Levinas’ ethical vision, 
however, that the clinician may discover the astonishing holiness and relationality at the 
heart of the clinical relationship and all this implies. This perfection, apprehended through 
the stunning approach of the vulnerable help seeker, extends an ethical invitation to the 
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The event in the Nitobe Garden presented a dilemma that emerged from an awe-full sense of 
presence, a third thing that was shocking but devastatingly tender and familiar. It was an 
overflowing rapture that made me yearn to offer I-knew-not-what to a near stranger in paltry 
exchange for all that was being given—had been given—apparently from the beginning, from 
forever.1  
1.1 Introduction  
The central claim of this thesis is that wonder has the capacity to interrupt the institutional 
entrancement of the clinician to exert a gravitational pull on her awareness. One that is 
sufficient to “awaken” her from normalized perspectives of clinical praxis and the clinical 
environment that defile the vulnerable help seeker and contribute to the clinician’s moral 
disengagement or paralysis.2 This claim revisits many well-rehearsed ethical questions about 
the therapeutic relationship, the construct of mental illness and its care, the politics of power 
within the institution of community mental health care, and the dangers of emotional 
intimacy in the clinical relationship. These questions also point uncomfortably—
devastatingly—back to why and how the ethics of educated and dedicated clinicians become 
diluted within the context of their work, for which we are seeking the possible “cure” of 
wonder. We wish to understand to what extent wonder may affect the clinician’s capacity to 
recognize and resist her culturally informed understanding of “mental illness,” and the 
praxis of “mental health care” within the institution. 
Can an orientation to wonder increase the ethical sensitivity and capacity of community 
mental health clinicians? In what ways might we expect wonder to act on the awareness and 
behaviour of the clinician? How does one orient one’s self to wonder? Can wonder be 
learned and taught? If our ability to see the world with wonder connects us to the 
imagination and creativity, how might this affect the clinician’s perception of the other 
person? What is wonder and how does it work? Is it an emotion, a state, an experience, an 
external phenomenon, a relationship or, is it a linguistic construct as close to us as the air we 
breathe? Is it a type of consciousness or quality of enlightenment? Is wonder the same as 
                                                     
1 See: The Nitobe Garden (5.1.2) 
2 O.S. Haque and A. Waytz, 'Dehumanization in Medicine Causes, Solutions, and Functions', Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7 (2012), pp. 179-80.  
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awe? Is it embodied, transcendent or both? Most of all, is wonder capable of elevating the 
vulnerable other to a position of such importance and meaning that the likely response of 
the clinician is one of reverence, esteem and love that might be demonstrated through 
ethical action? 
I intend to show how the “approach”3 of wonder confronts and disturbs the clinician with 
evidence of her engagement in an indefensible clinical enterprise underscored by legal 
authority and the many privileges it bestows.  
1.2 The origins of this study 
My academic involvement with this question began almost 20 years ago while completing a 
Master’s degree in counselling psychology. My dissertation focussed on what I then 
identified as a “mystical experience,” following a remarkable event alluded to in the 
epigraph of this introduction.4   
From early in my MA studies I could see the troubling social inequalities within an overly 
simplistic and idealistic counselling model that locked into larger conversations about 
pathology and institutionalized—culturalized—norms and controls. These intersected 
disturbingly with the difficult and painful circumstances of people’s lives, which despite the 
predictable emotional distress they caused still resulted in diagnoses of mental illness.5 The 
cracks in the arguments of praxis, the medicalization of oppression and the real horror and 
history of mental health care, while not new, came into sharp focus. It was the event 
described in The Nitobe Garden, however, that confirmed beyond doubt my moral uneasiness 
for it illuminated the vulnerable help seeker as the answer to my greatest yearning as a 
clinician. This changed everything but then again, only to a point.   
Aspects of this phenomenal encounter have recurred throughout my years of working in the 
field of mental health care although never with the raw force described in The Nitobe Garden.6 
The encounter was so life altering that months afterwards it appeared that something had 
changed. I recognized myself one day in an offhand remark made by a stranger who 
                                                     
3 The term “approach” is used throughout the work of Emmanuel Levinas to qualify his notion of the Face and 
the Other. I use it here to allude to the Levinasian definition of wonder I claim in chapter 5.  
4 C. Racine, 'Mystical Experience of a Counsellor: An Autobiographical Journey', (University of British Columbia, 
1996). 
5 For a thoughtful argument on this matter see: S. Williams, 'Reason, Emotion and Embodiment: Is ‘Mental’health 
a Contradiction in Terms?', Sociology of Health & Illness, 22 (2000). 
6 See: The Nitobe Garden (5.1.2). 
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suggested that I seemed to have had a “conversion experience”.7 I felt deeply in love and 
loved in return with an ultimacy and intimacy I have never recaptured with the same 
intensity or for that duration of time.  
In significant ways, this event and my study of it ended my education in counselling 
psychology before its completion, and my career before it began for I no longer believed in 
what I was doing. The lengthy education I was completing failed to address the glaring 
issues of disenfranchisement, injustice and loneliness that too often formed the baseline of 
those I would earn a living helping. My Master’s dissertation concluded that unless I was 
actively engaged in community building and justice making for those who came for help 
with their stories of abuse, oppression and abandonment, I too would be contributing to 
their burden. But this still did not dissuade me from the best part of fifteen years of front line 
work with the “mentally ill” that has been rewarding and traumatizing as well as morally 
distressing, leaving my initial conclusions intact. For, there can be little doubt that the 
mental health professional, not the vulnerable help seeker, is by far the primary beneficiary 
of the therapeutic relationship.  
I might be accused of pursuing an academic question that my education and clinical work 
would seem to have already answered. Yet the question driving this thesis still stands and 
the imperative remains unanswered: What must I do, can I do, in the light of this wonder-full 
other? This question floats in the wake of individual, professional and systemic failure, and 
in the indifference and violence born of the reductive clinical environment and my collusion 
in it. My failure, this failure to respond adequately to the ethical call of wonder must not 
preclude an attempt to discern its greater meaning, and to radically challenge and change 
the status quo and to go further.  
1.3 From the mystical to the wonder-full 
Two years into this thesis, I shifted my focus from the mystical to the wonder-full, having 
originally planned to continue the work I had started in my Master’s dissertation.8 This was 
not a simple shift but it has allowed me to trace the development of my work over time and 
                                                     
7 William James discussed conversion and offered descriptive and analytic narratives to account for this 
experience. Of interest is the notion of “self-surrender” as opposed to a “volitional” approach to this 
extraordinary event. See: W. James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), pp. 228-39.  
8 See: C. Racine, 'Loving in the Context of Community Mental Health Practice: A Clinical Case Study and 
Reflection on Mystical Experience', Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 17 (2014). 
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to defend my original construal of this “opening” as a mystical experience. As we shall see, 
the “mystical” is arguably already colonized in clinical praxis and unable, or less able, to 
reflect the focus of this study on the ethical relationship. 
1.3.1 Naming the event in the Nitobe Garden 
The event in the Nitobe Garden had no name within the sphere of counselling practice. I 
called it the “third thing” until Walter Stace’s Mysticism and Philosophy identified it as an 
“extrovertive mystical experience”. 9 This “type” is emotional, typically spontaneous, 
experienced through the senses—or in more contemporary terms, “embodied”— where, as 
Stace observes, a unity is “seen through a multiplicity”.10 By which he means that opposites 
appear identical to each other while maintaining their own substance and individual identity. 
This description confirmed my own experience of seeing another as my self not just as “a 
series of words,” by which Stace presumably means not as an illusion or metaphor, but as 
something I “physically saw” which had been “shocking”.11 In contrast is the intellectual or 
speculative “introvertive” type, acquired “calmly” through spiritual practice and inward 
looking, “in the darkness and silence,” where “the One” is perceived and is “united with it”. 
Although these “types” are differently apprehended, either one enables an individual to 
realize the “Unity of the One”.12  
The issue of self-authentication is still controversial, however, even among mystical 
scholars.13 Yet, The Nitobe Garden certainly describes a “wonder-full” event in terms defined 
by philosopher Martyn Evans,14 or feminist theologian Mary-Jane Rubenstein, whose work 
we will discuss later in this inquiry. It could also qualify as a “peak experience” defined by 
                                                     
9 The extrovertive and introvertive types, defined by Stace, generally conform to kataphatic or apophatic 
mysticism respectively. The former refers to an emotional or spontaneous type, the latter to an intellectual or 
cultivated type. See: W.T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1961), pp. 44-65.   
10 Ibid. p. 61.  
11 Ibid. p. 65.  
12 Amy Hollywood contends that separating the apophatic and kataphatic types pits the rational intellect against 
the subjective and affective, which are better understood as a continuum along which an individual may move in 
either direction. Stace’s own bias for the “calm” more evolved expression of extrovertive mystical experience 
reflects the ongoing pre-eminence of scientific rationalism. See: A.M. Hollywood, 'Beauvoir, Irigaray, and the 
Mystical', Hypatia, 9 (1994). 
13 For a description of four current theoretical approaches to mysticism see: L. Nelstrop, K. Magill, and B.B. 
Onishi, Christian Mysticism: An Introduction to Contemporary Theoretical Approaches (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 
2009), pp. 1-20.   
14 H.M. Evans, 'Wonder and the Clinical Encounter', Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 33 (2012 ). 
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humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow15 or conversely, as some kind of pathology or 
dissociative state.16 What is certain is that this coup-de-foudre has no simple niche or 
definition within the clinical encounter.  
1.3.2 Dumbing down the mystical 
Evelyn Underhill’s seminal work on mysticism17 and William James’ analysis of religious 
experience18 further corroborated my original construal of The Nitobe Garden as a “mystical” 
experience. These were among the first contemporary works on mysticism produced mainly 
between 1890 and 1970, a period that coincided with the emergence of the psychology of 
Freud, Jung, and James himself.19 As I was to appreciate only much later, these pioneering 
authors had distilled and interpreted but a fraction of the literature emerging from the 
Christian mystical tradition. This left our contemporary understanding of the mystical 
stripped of much of its historical and political significance, leaving it all too predictably and 
worryingly reduced to an anomaly for one’s private enjoyment.20  
The focus on the mystical as “experience” remains problematic in clinical literature because 
this kind of apprehension was often understated—or not even mentioned—in the accounts 
of early mystics. The origins of mysticism emerge from the work of an unknown writer 
named Dionysius the Areopagite, who produced a body of texts composed in the fifth or 
sixth century that continues to inform our interest in mysticism today. Dionysius is 
wrongfully accused, Mark McIntosh asserts, of moving the early practice of mystical 
theology to our more modern understanding of an individual ecstatic experience we call 
“mystical”. This is not to be confused with the real meaning of ekstasis (ecstasy), which was 
“a standing outside oneself to be all the more available to the beloved”.21 The rapturous 
                                                     
15 A.H. Maslow, Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences (Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1964), pp. 59-68, 
84-96. 
16 The concern about mis-diagnosing religious or spiritual states as pathology, was addressed by a group of 
researchers who called for greater sensitivity and training for “spiritual emergencies”. See: D. Lukoff, F. Lu, and 
R. Turner, 'From Spiritual Emergency to Spiritual Problem: The Transpersonal Roots of the New DSM-IV 
Category', Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 38 (1998). 
17 E. Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness 5th edn. (London: 
Methuen, 1914). 
18 W. James, 'The Varieties of Religious Experience', pp. 413-68.  
19 D. Cupitt, Mysticism after Modernity (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1998), p. 26. 
20 Grace Jantzen takes particular exception to James’ approach to mysticism as an “experience” and criticises his 
work for its lack of depth and context. See: G. Jantzen, 'Mysticism and Experience', Religious Studies, 25 (1989), 
295-302.  
21 M.A. McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and Theology (Oxford: Blackwell 1998), p. 49.  
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beauty of Dionysius’ language still offers a clue to the remarkable appeal of the mystical to 
psychology and the project of mental health:  
The divine longing (theios erõs) is Good seeking good for the sake of good. That 
yearning (erõs) which creates all the goodness of the world preexisted 
superabundantly within the Good and did not allow it to remain without issue…this 
divine yearning brings ecstasy so that the lover belongs not to the self but to the 
beloved.22 
Mysticism was, however, part of a larger, communal and coherent context and focussed on a 
life-long commitment to rigorous spiritual practice and asceticism. The path to the 
knowledge of God was through the arduous journey of purgation, illumination and 
contemplation, or union, with God. A more accurate description of “mysticism” might be 
understood as “contemplation,” which “in earlier eras referred to the most intimate and 
transforming encounter with God,” while the term “mysticism” is described as “something 
of an academic invention”23. Other accounts describe mysticism as “a part or element of 
religion…as a process or way of life…an attempt to express a direct consciousness of the 
presence of God”.24 Mysticism also describes a quality of consciousness that “allows us to 
see the mystical element of religion as a process, a form of life, and not merely as a matter of 
raw experience, even of some special kind”.25 Another scholar adds that affective mysticism 
represents “a particular form of discourse…a source for doing theology…a certain type of 
knowing…a kind of intersubjectivity, and a set of texts from a variety of traditions requiring 
a complex hermeneutics”.26  
1.3.3 Misappropriating the mystical in clinical praxis 
In stark contrast is the clinical perspective of those researchers who deserve considerable 
credit for attempting to negotiate mystical experience into clinical literature in order to 
address their own concerns about its reduction in praxis. These are also early days in the 
development of such scholarship, consequently, we find mystical “experience” being 
                                                     
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. p. 11.  
24 B. McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991). pp. xv-xvi. 
25 B. McGinn, 'Mystical Consciousness: A Modest Proposal', Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality, 8    
   (2008).p.50. 
26 J.K. Ruffing, in Mysticism and Social Transformation, ed. by J.K. Ruffing (New York: Syracuse University Press,     
   2001). p. 1. 
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“operationalized”27 by researchers who unwittingly, if not unwillingly, continue to dilute 
and decontextualize this one aspect of mysticism.28 Such is the case in Ralph Hood’s 
mysticism scale, based on Stace’s work,29 and in newer versions of similar scales where 
researchers use words like “exceptional” to describe this experience.30 Other clinical 
literature still uses William James’ four main characteristics31 to identify mystical experience 
in individuals who might otherwise be at risk of being mis-diagnosed,32 nor is this an 
insignificant concern when the larger community is deprived of such a vision.33   
Still other research shows the divided and polemical scholarship on the issue that tends to 
fall roughly into three camps: Those who do not recognise any overlap between the 
pathological and the spiritual, those who pathologize any spiritual experience, and those 
who tend to see all pathology as spiritually based.34 The latter would include proponents 
like psychiatrist R. D. Laing and others like him connected to the anti-psychiatry movement. 
The problem is that neither spiritual experience nor its psychopathology or even 
“psychosis,” as these researchers contend, are sufficiently well defined. Indeed, these terms 
change in significance and meaning from one context to another.35  
                                                     
27 This is a term used “[i]n research design, especially in psychology, social sciences, life sciences, and physics” to 
define “a fuzzy concept…to make the theoretical concept clearly distinguishable or measurable…in terms of 
empirical observations“. See: <http.//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operationalization.> [accessed 30 July 2016], (para. 1 
of 14). This term is also disparaged by Martyn Evans. See: H.M. Evans, 'Reflections on the Humanities in Medical 
Education', Medical Education, 36 (2002). p. 509. 
28 The constraints imposed on such research by the dominant research paradigm are discussed by researchers 
who appear to bend over backwards to defend their use of any qualitative measures in their “scientific” work. 
See: N. Kohls, A. Hack, and H. Walach, 'Measuring the Unmeasurable by Ticking Boxes and Opening Pandora's 
Box? Mixed Methods Research as a Useful Tool for Investigating Exceptional and Spiritual Experiences', Archive 
for the Psychology of Religion/Archiv für Religionspychologie, 30 (2008). 
29 See: R.W. Hood, Jr., 'The Construction and Preliminary Validation of a Measure of Reported Mystical 
Experience', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 14 (1975). For an example of literature informed by this 
measure see: K.R. Byrd, D. Lear, and S. Schwenka, 'Mysticism as a Predictor of Subjective Well-Being', The 
International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 10 (2000). 
30 N. Kohls and H. Walach, 'Exceptional Experiences and Spiritual Practice: A New Measurement Approach', 
Spirituality and Health International, 7 (2006). 
31 Ineffability, noesis, transiency and passivity. 
32 See for example: F. Ng, 'The Interface between Religion and Psychosis', Australasian Psychiatry, 15 (2007); 
C.C.H. Cook, 'Psychiatry and Mysticism', Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 7 (2004). Also: S. Mohr and others, 
'The Assessment of Spirituality and Religiousness in Schizophrenia', The Journal of nervous and mental disease, 195 
(2007). For more discussion and literature on this subject see also: S.J. Ziguras and G.W. Stuart, 'A Meta-Analysis 
of the Effectiveness of Mental Health Case Management over 20 Years', Psychiatric services, 51 (2000), 110-11. 
33 C.C.H. Cook, 'Psychiatry and Mysticism', p. 154.  
34 The terms “spiritual” and “mystical” are often used interchangeably in the literature. 
35 M. Jackson and K. Fulford, 'Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology', Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 4 
(1997). 
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Psychological research on mysticism also fails to recognize the political analyses of those 
postmodern philosophers whose interest in early mysticism pointedly explores an 
apprehension capable of transcending the subject-object distinction.36 This distinction is one 
we wish to address in our inquiry, for it concerns the seemingly intractable issue of how to 
extricate the “object” from the reductions of the “subject”. In this case, the object is the 
vulnerable help seeker and the subject is the clinician who observes, distances, labels, 
objectifies and in some real ways owns the object of her scrutiny.  
I am suggesting that the cataclysm described in The Nitobe Garden was, twenty years ago, 
reasonably construed within psychological praxis as a “mystical experience”. An emerging 
thread of “transpersonal” psychology,37 investigating the nature of consciousness as it 
relates to “self-discovery and transformation,”38 further corroborated my understanding. At 
that time, several researchers in this field were also attempting to introduce “mystical 
experience with psychotic features” (MEPF)39 into the DSM IV40 to stop this “experience” 
from being pathologized.41 Transpersonal psychology now appears to have been assimilated 
by the current explosion of research on spirituality, religion and health—including mental 
health—by a growing legion of researchers worldwide.42  
Divested of its religious historical context, social and culture roots and spiritual practice 
connected to community life, our notion of the mystical has been significantly eroded and 
reduced. Equally, the canon left behind by those wanting to put their “mystical” 
apprehensions into language is conspicuously absent in the clinical literature. Consequently, 
                                                     
36 This is analysed by theologian Grace Jantzen, whose feminist analysis draws on a number of post-modern 
thinkers, especially Luce Irigaray, to formulate an argument for the divinization of the immanent and embodied 
that is relevant to our concerns about the vulnerable-help seeker. See: G. Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Towards a 
Feminist Philosophy of Religion (Manchester University Press, 1998). 
37 For a good synthesis of this field, see: D. Raab, 'Transpersonal Approaches to Autoethnographic Research and 
Writing', Qualitative Report, 18 (2013), p. 2.  
38 Ibid. p. 17.  
39 D. Lukoff, F. Lu, and R. Turner, 'From Spiritual Emergency to Spiritual Problem: The Transpersonal Roots of 
the New DSM-IV Category', p. 26. See also: D. Lukoff, 'The Diagnosis of Mystical Experiences with Psychotic 
Features', Journal of transpersonal psychology, 17 (1985), pp. 160-66.  
40 The DSM is The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) and is the diagnostic “bible” of psychiatry. 
41 D. Lukoff, F. Lu, and R. Turner, 'From Spiritual Emergency to Spiritual Problem: The Transpersonal Roots of 
the New DSM-IV Category', p. 26.   
42 American psychiatrist Harold Koenig’s phenomenal contribution to the classification and meta-analyses of 
hundreds of studies of research related to the field of spirituality, religion and mental health has undoubtedly 
put this field of endeavour on the map. H.G. Koenig, D.E. King, and V.B. Carson, Handbook of Religion and Health 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); H.G. Koenig, M.E. McCullough, and D.B. Larson, Handbook of 
Religion and Health (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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the focus on mystical “experience” in psychological literature is exceptionally problematic. 
Ever more tightly tied to the patient and pathology, or its absence, mysticism’s vital ethical 
and political implications have been lost to us.  
1.3.4 The possibilities of wonder  
By relinquishing the mystical in favour of wonder, I hope to avoid any interpretation of the 
“event” under consideration as a self-centred consumable or even an anomalous 
“experience” of interest to the help seeker or the clinician. I also hope to sidestep the 
contentious discussion connecting mystical experience with pathology now occurring in the 
burgeoning field of spirituality, theology and mental health. Other related debates I wish to 
avoid include the turf wars between clinicians and clerics engaged in territorial disputes 
about spirituality and religion. Where, for example, such questions as to who may or may 
not pray with or for a patient are creating a furore.43 These issues are important but have no 
place in our study, for the interests of that field are largely focussed on recognizing and 
mobilizing the impact of spirituality and religion on the well-being of the help seeker. In 
contrast, this study comprises an ethical inquiry arguing against the legitimacy of 
community mental health care as an institution. This is an argument that calls for a radical 
re-ordering of the construct of mental illness and the urgent need for the clinician to 
recognize and resist the profound injustice in which she colludes. 
The work of philosopher Martyn Evans also influenced my decision to shift from the 
mystical towards wonder, for I discovered my own concerns and argument for mysticism 
reflected in his work on Wonder and the Clinical Encounter.44 Informed by clinical ethics and 
philosophy allied to the medical humanities and my own interests, Evans’ scholarship and 
his compelling invitation offered another way forward:  
No one has attempted any sustained analytic discussion on the clinical relevance of 
wonder, nor exploration of the ethical or aesthetic aspect of wonder in relation to 
medical practice from the perspective of either the clinician or the patient.45   
The work of physician and specialist in narrative medicine, Rachel Remen, further 
supported my shift from mysticism to wonder.46 Remen has written on wonder and 
                                                     
43 At one conference I attended, an irate mental health chaplain informed a psychiatric nurse that if she could 
administer spiritual care, then hospital chaplains should be allowed to administer hypodermic medication.   
44 H.M. Evans, 'Wonder and the Clinical Encounter'. 
45 Ibid. p. 124.  
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contributed to the development of values-based medical curricula for American doctors. Her 
work clearly supports an investigation of wonder as something of specific value to mental 
health professionals’ practice and ethical education.47  
The challenges of developing a definition for wonder with clinical and ethical relevance are 
still complex, but even if—like “mystical experience”--the notion of wonder has become 
banal in contemporary vernacular, it is also less arcane. Moreover, wonder is gaining 
traction in the medical humanities at the University of Durham, which additionally reflects 
and supports the ethical, political and autoethnographic interests of this study.48 Of 
particular benefit to our study is that unlike the mystical, wonder appears – for now – to 
have eluded the defilement of science’s reductive grip, while hopefully remaining enigmatic 
enough for our purposes.49 
1.4 The body of this inquiry 
I have divided the thesis into two sections. The first half illustrates and grounds the ethical 
issues of concern and defends the autoethnographic approach taken in the thesis. The 
second half offers an ethical analysis of these concerns through a discussion of wonder and 
the work of Emmanuel Levinas. The following sections offer a brief synthesis of each of the 
eight chapters. 
1.4.1 Chapter 2.  James’ Story 
The occurrence narrated in The Nitobe Garden reached its moral culmination many years later 
through a career-altering clinical relationship with a troubled youth whose story takes up 
the whole of chapter 2. James’ circumstances and my response to him allowed me to finally 
“see” the extent to which I was—or had become—morally hobbled in fearing, fleeing, 
oppressing and reducing a defenseless youth.  
James’ story provides the bridge between my Master’s work and this thesis by introducing 
the main themes related to social justice, the transcendent, love in clinical care and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
46 Remen writes movingly about her own wonder-full experience as a woman living with Crohn’s disease. See: 
The Holy Shadow in: R.N. Remen, Kitchen Table Wisdom: Stories That Heal 10th edn. (New York: Riverhead Books, 
2006), pp. 245-51. 
47 B. Kligler and others, 'Core Competencies in Integrative Medicine for Medical School Curricula: A Proposal', 
Academic Medicine, 79 (2004), 523-24.  
48 See website: <https://www.dur.ac.uk/cmh/> [accessed 30 July 2016].  
49 I am grateful to Professor Martyn Evans for suggesting the term defilement to describe the outcome of scientific 
reduction on the ineffable and the vulnerable help seeker. 
Chapter One – Introduction 
11 
 
responsibility for the help seeker. The narrative was developed over a period of several 
years, first as a conference paper and later as a published article.50 In terms of Michael 
Taussig’s brilliant Marxist deconstruction of mental health care, the transformation of theory 
to reality, of human to commodity, of oppression to pathology, and suffering to symptom, is 
fully illuminated in James’ story.51 
1.4.2 Chapter 3.  Three opponents of wonder 
There are many ethical obstacles in the practice of community mental health care and I focus 
on three in chapter 2 to highlight what I perceive as the most prominent. The first, 
medicalization, describes the eroding boundaries of psychological normalcy and well-being 
that are becoming increasingly reduced and subsequently manufactured and imposed as 
illness and pathology. The second, asymmetry, describes the fundamental inequality of the 
clinical relationship that subordinates the vulnerable help seeker to the clinician and the 
institution. Lastly, dehumanization, describes the types of institutional and social 
discrimination suffered by the vulnerable help seeker in every facet of her life.   
These three factors also contributed to my decision to employ the term “vulnerable help 
seeker” that is used throughout this study to identify the person who might be variously 
identified as the patient, the client, the service user, the mental health consumer or even the 
stakeholder. This term acknowledges the work of theorists, like Frank Reissman, who 
argued persuasively for a reconfiguration of the services paradigm to address the problem 
of asymmetry and its “sequelae”. This would certainly include the sobering concern of 
“iatrogenic difficulties” to which the help seeker is predictably exposed.52  Reissman claimed 
that resistance to change is great because an industry like community mental health care is 
“based on systemic knowledge and scientific methodology”. Hence, professional help 
becomes “a commodity to be bought, sold, promoted and marketed,” evidence of which is “always 
there—and typically ignored”.53 This leaves the help seeker vulnerable not only to the 
emotional suffering and circumstances of her life, but to the clinical environment to which 
she must turn for help.   
                                                     
50 C. Racine, 'Loving in the Context of Community Mental Health'. 
51 See: M.T. Taussig, 'Reification and the Consciousness of the Patient', Social Science & Medicine. Part B: Medical 
Anthropology 14 (1980). 
52 F. Riessman, 'Restructuring Help: A Human Services Paradigm for the 1990s', American Journal of Community 
Psychology, 18 (1990), p. 222.  
53 Ibid. p. 226.  
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1.4.3 Chapter 4.  Autoethnography: An invitation behind the mask 
A clinician may not easily admit that the relationship considered so essential to the 
“therapeutic alliance” and the interests of the vulnerable help seeker is equally, or possibly 
more, important to her in terms generally related to ideas of kinship, tenderness, intimacy, 
cherishing—love. Not, that is, without impugning her ethics and judgement, or risking her 
position and professional entitlement. This, however, is precisely what I propose may be 
best examined through the autoethnographic lens employed throughout this inquiry.  
In re-orienting this inquiry towards the wonder-full, I turn to memoir and narrative to 
examine the sense of professional guilt that emerged so predominantly in James’ story. 
Professor Martyn Evans’ use of personal vignette in his work also supported my decision to 
employ this approach, as did the increasing legitimacy of narrative in ethical research, given 
the power of self-reflexivity to mediate the problems of representation.54 It was 
autoethnography’s unapologetically political and moral orientation, however, that finalized 
my choice. 
1.4.4 Chapter 5.  Wonder and the turn towards the divine 
The chapter on wonder initially appeared to demand a daunting synthesis of 2000 years to 
trace the origins of European philosophical thought through the rise of religion, the origins 
of mysticism, the enlightenment and finally the domination of the scientific. I have reduced 
my ambitions to five sections that examine the notion of wonder from various angles. The 
chapter begins with a brief introduction to wonder’s genealogy before moving on to its 
etymology and the examination of a limited number of emerging themes. These are 
analysed in a section on praxis and wonder that explores the congruence of wonder to the 
therapeutic relationship. I also consider a number of definitions forwarded by contemporary 
scholars who are attempting to revive and re-define wonder, although their perspectives 
also diverge significantly. The chapter concludes with a preliminary clinical definition for 
wonder that critically engages with the work of Martyn Evans.   
1.4.5 Chapter 6.  Levinas and the wholly/holy other 
In Emmanuel Levinas, I have found a teacher whose ethical vision confirms the value of this 
study and my own lived experience. Levinas raises our understanding of responsibility to a 
                                                     
54 A defense of the vignette as a legitimate form of autoethnography is examined in: M. Humphreys, 'Getting 
Personal: Reflexivity and Autoethnographic Vignettes', Qualitative Inquiry, 11 (2005). 
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level previously unconsidered, the accuracy and power of which are astonishing. This 
responsibility does not constitute the imposition of a morality argued through the logic of 
justice, fairness and mutuality. Instead, it “approaches” through the tender and imperious 
call of desire from this vulnerable “other” that overwhelms me. Levinas himself remains 
empty-handed on how to implement his ethics of first philosophy. Yet, his vision confirms a 
perspective of the vulnerable help seeker as infinitely elevated beyond the objectifying grasp 
of the clinician.  
Here, then, is the final justification of an argument for wonder that Levinas helps us claim 
and which confirms what it can mean to be rendered incapable of referring to the self and its 
self-interested project, if only briefly. Levinas evokes the thrall of wonder that interrupts the 
“I” in its acquisitive and appetitive pursuit of knowledge and its own self-project. He does 
so by confronting—in this case—the clinician with the ultimate paradox of the vulnerable 
help seeker who incredibly and disarmingly welcomes her, serves her, heals her.    
1.4.6 Chapter 7.  The possible or impossible of Levinasian praxis 
It is ironic that mental health professionals, not infrequently and with considerable 
frustration, may wind up trying to convince the distressed and inwardly focussed help 
seeker that her symptoms and diagnoses—no matter how dire—are actually secondary in 
importance to living her life. Thus, the help seeker can be admonished for failing to take 
adequate responsibility for learning and adhering to sensible and consistent regimes of self-
care including, of course, compliance to medication. Such is the institutional sleight-of-hand 
that re-creates an individual in its own image only to reprimand her for being inadequate.  
In this penultimate chapter, we examine a number of approaches to consider what Levinas’ 
project might look like “in practice”. We begin with an analysis of the work of Canadian 
humanitarian Jean Vanier and his life-long engagement in living with and supporting the 
interests of intellectually disabled adults. I also explore the overlap between Vanier’s and 
Levinas’ vision to illustrate an approach to care that recognizes the enormous significance of 
the vulnerable help seeker to the helper.  
The last half of this chapter focuses on the emergence of Levinasian thought in the 
therapeutic dialogue and explores the salience of his work for this purpose. Some of these 
approaches show promise, but the problem of theorizing Levinas’ ethical formulation and 
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the ongoing debate of how we can adequately interpret his ethical vision, leaves the 
successful application of his thought in some question. 
1.4.7 Chapter 8.  The politics of need and desire 
The earnest search for a solution to the problem of clinical reduction and the issues of 
asymmetry, medicalization and dehumanization is an intriguing one. All the more so when 
it leaves the clinician believing that her ability to show the vulnerable help seeker more 
authentic kindness, compassion or, in Rogers’ terms, empathy, is sufficient to the task. Yet, 
any attempt to bridge the disturbing gap between the clinician and the help seeker appears 
to be consistently and resolutely beyond reach.  
In our concluding chapter, I examine and interpret this issue in some detail by casting back 
through our inquiry to discover the presence of a fascinating artefact. It attests to the 
apparently indomitable resilience of clinical reduction that ethicists and researchers continue 
to oppose and subvert, although still unsuccessfully. This is the artefact discovered in the 
conflation of abuse with even the possibility of intimacy which leaves the clinician forever 
thwarted. For, as we shall see, even the culture of community mental health care that argues 
so fluently for the ethical protection of the vulnerable help seeker must inevitably put its 
own considerable interests first.
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Chapter 2.   
James’ Story 
Vulnerability doesn’t mean that anything personal goes. The exposure of the self who is also a 
spectator has to take us somewhere we couldn’t otherwise get to. It has to be essential to the 
argument, not a decorative flourish, not exposure for its own sake.1 
When we met, James was almost 19 and profoundly suicidal. He had been hospitalized 
when he told his father his fantasy of killing both his parents and then himself. He watched 
violent films, played violent video games with his friends, slept half the day and abused 
marijuana. Unable to concentrate or cope, he dropped out of a computer program at a local 
technical college, and was unemployed and living at home with his father and brother. By 
the time our work began, he had spent twenty days in the adult psychiatric ward of a large 
local hospital. This is a long time for a young man to spend watching adults play out the 
shattering consequences of the kind of future one might prefer to avoid. He had also 
experienced his first coercive treatment when he was sedated and placed in isolation at the 
beginning of his hospital stay.2  
I remembered the room well from a visit to the emergency psychiatric department of the 
same hospital. A colleague had taken me to meet one of the referring psychiatrists as part of 
my orientation when I started working in community mental health. The psychiatrist had 
shown me the “quiet room” with a single hospital bed mattress lying forlornly on the bare 
floor of a small, dim, windowless room that locked. Not long after our tour, it was apparent 
that the “quiet room” now occupied a distressed woman, and she screamed for the duration 
of our interview. She screamed as though she was being tortured. I startled slightly in my 
chair with each fresh explosion of harrowing sound that filtered through the door of the 
office where we sat, while the psychiatrist continued talking as though nothing was 
happening and my colleague suppressed a small smile. It was a whiff of Bedlam I will never 
forget. Not infrequently, people I worked with who had spent time in that room expressed 
                                                     
1 R. Behar, The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology That Breaks Your Heart (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996), pp. 13-14.  
2 The human rights violations of the “mentally ill,” according to some, include the issues of forced 
hospitalization, isolation and physical or chemical restraints. For arguments supporting these practices see: S. 
Klag, F. O'Callaghan, and P. Creed, 'The Use of Legal Coercion in the Treatment of Substance Abusers: An 
Overview and Critical Analysis of Thirty Years of Research', Substance Use & Misuse, 40 (2005). For arguments 
opposing these practices see: M. Sjöstrand and G. Helgesson, 'Coercive Treatment and Autonomy in Psychiatry', 
Bioethics, 22 (2008). 
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such horror at the possibility of being sent back there that they would refuse hospital 
assistance.3 Of course, they were not always given a choice. 
Clinical files were doled out at team meetings twice a week when new cases were presented 
by intake nurses and, sometimes under duress, assigned to clinical staff already staggering 
under caseloads beyond their capacity.4 I had established a minor reputation for taking cases 
no one else wanted and offered to take James’ following the long silence in the room after 
his file was presented—no one wanted it and it was a very difficult file. There were many 
reasons for my magnanimity, especially my relief at being back in the role of therapist and 
my desire to prove my legitimacy by working with those among the least favoured in 
clinical practice.5  
My first job in this community mental health centre had been intake. It was demanding 
work and essentially a triaging position that required I separate out those who qualified for 
service from those who didn’t. The reality was much more complicated and deeply fraught 
because the primary task of intake was essentially that of gatekeeper. The intake clinician 
stood between those desperate souls trying to be accepted for service and the various, and 
often fluid, “mandates” of the various teams within the Centre that had to be constantly 
negotiated.  
Further complicating the picture was the priority given those who were being discharged 
from hospital to our community mental health centre. The demand for care far exceeded our 
capacity. My intake colleague and I were refusing up to seventy percent and more of all 
requests for service while attempting to support those we turned away, either by 
counselling them on the phone or seeing them if they showed up in person at our door. 
                                                     
3 Many more were discharged directly from psychiatric emergency to our centre than were admitted for 
hospitalization. Not infrequently, clinicians urged patients to return to hospital if, in the opinion of the clinician, 
they had been prematurely discharged from hospital.  
4 For an analysis of the response of health workers to trauma see: S. Collins and A. Long, 'Too Tired to Care? The 
Psychological Effects of Working with Trauma', Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing, 10 (2003). Two 
types of burnout are identified as emotional exhaustion and depersonalization, the latter being related to “feeling 
cynical about clients’ success”. See: S.W. Kraus and C.H. Stein, 'Recovery-Oriented Services for Individuals with 
Mental Illness and Case Managers’ Experience of Professional Burnout', Community mental health journal, 49 
(2013), p. 8. See also: C.H. Stein and S.A. Craft, 'Case Managers’ Experiences of Personal Growth: Learning from 
Consumers', Community mental health journal, 43 (2007), p. 184.  
5 See: D. Markham, 'Attitudes Towards Patients with a Diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder': Social 
Rejection and Dangerousness', Journal of mental health, 12 (2003). For a brief description of epidemiology, 
diagnosis and causal factors see: K. Lieb and others, 'Borderline Personality Disorder', The Lancet, 364 (2004), pp. 
453-55.  
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Suggestions would be given, resources and phone numbers offered and some kind of plan 
suggested, which would be carefully documented. If the individual showed up again or 
deteriorated and came back through their physician’s office or the hospital, or if they 
complained to the manager about being refused service, there had to be a paper trail. This 
would confirm that the institution and clinician were not responsible, or irresponsible, and 
had done what was legally defensible despite the refusal of service.  
Intake was traditionally a nursing stronghold that had been challenged by a maverick 
manager at our Centre who believed a change of the old guard was needed. He had hired 
me as clinical counsellor along with a social worker to take over the two intake positions 
shortly before his retirement. The backlash was brutal and the rift between nursing staff and 
other clinical professionals became ever more acrimonious. It was a situation for which my 
intake colleague and I were scapegoated for being in positions we—apparently—had no 
right to hold.6  
Three months after later, the day my probation period was over, I wanted to bring a cake to 
work to celebrate with my new colleagues but thankfully never did. That was the day I read 
with incredulity an email that the nurses had circulated to every staff member concerning a 
meeting to discuss their collective outrage about the recent intake hires—my social worker 
colleague and myself—to which they had invited the head of their nursing union. The 
meeting room was jammed the afternoon of the meeting, the door closed, the halls empty, 
while the two-woman intake team got on with a job that would have been better managed 
with an additional staff member. The meeting and the cries of incompetence about a non-
nursing intake team failed to move the manager and he dug in his heels. A number of the 
nurses later suggested he was so out of touch he was likely dementing. Dementing? What 
were they saying about me? I knew what some of them were saying about the patients I 
presented at intake meetings, and not only the nurses, other clinical staff as well.  
                                                     
6 Literature investigating conflict within multidisciplinary teams shows how professional groups assert and 
protect their professional identities and theoretical approaches. See: B. Brown, P. Crawford, and J. Darongkamas, 
'Blurred Roles and Permeable Boundaries: The Experience of Multidisciplinary Working in Community Mental 
Health', Health & Social Care in the Community, 8 (2000). Given the preponderance of nursing staff in mental health 
teams, other professionals may report feeling isolated or silenced because they are outnumbered. According to 
one study: “An intriguing finding is the readiness for some clinicians to establish for themselves a mandate to 
critique their colleagues ... by exploiting a perceived position of power to expose these perceived faults in 
practice”. See: A. Jones, 'Multidisciplinary Team Working: Collaboration and Conflict', International Journal of 
Mental Health Nursing, 15 (2006), p. 26.  
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Coming into a government paid job from the non-profit sector had almost doubled my 
salary over-night but the price was steep. I ruefully remembered my joy a few weeks in 
when I approached the manager to express my pleasure with the work and the fascinating 
challenges it provided. His measured smile and quizzical response, “Wait a while,” had 
proved all too prophetic. Several years later I was finally given a counselling job on the 
ASTAT team, and two nurses were moved back into their “rightful” positions on intake.7 My 
social worker colleague had long since moved on to safer pastures in another team within 
our centre. It was an immense relief for me and a reclamation victory for the nurses. Even 
the messiest cases failed to daunt me after that and I may well have aligned myself with the 
most unwanted, having made it through the fire of my own professional ostracization. 
James himself was nothing if not an outsider. 
During his hospitalization, James had been assessed by a psychiatrist, tested by a 
psychologist and been later referred to the outpatient Early Psychosis Intervention (EPI) 
program, for yet another psychiatric assessment with a specialist in psychotic illness. James 
met the mandate for the program, having never been prescribed antipsychotic medication, 
and was sent for follow-up with the EPI social worker who worked on our team. The 
hospital work-up he had received was intensive and extensive but ultimately vague. The 
sheer volume of documentation, filled with conflicting assessments and narratives 
speculating about an 18 year-old young man with no previous history of mental illness, was 
bewildering. This psychiatric hash would follow him the rest of his life and be damning 
should he ever need to defend himself legally or find himself dealing with any number of 
situations requiring evidence of a mental health history. Beyond that, what would it do to 
his sense of self?8 
When James was discharged from hospital he had been advised to go home and monitor 
himself for signs of psychosis. This is remarkable advice given the assumption that a labile 
18 year-old using recreational drugs, and suicidal, would be capable of determining such 
                                                     
7 ASTAT: Adult Short Term Assessment and Treatment (Team). 
<http.//www.health.gov.bc.ca/library/publications/year/misc/Continuum_Community MHAServices.pdf,> 
p. 5. [accessed 30 July 2016]. 
8 The mental health consumer/survivor movement identifies the traumatic impact of being “treated” as a mental 
patient as so damaging that there can be no “return to a pre-illness state”. L. Davidson and others, 'Recovery in 
Serious Mental Illness: A New Wine or Just a New Bottle?', Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 36 (2005), 
p. 481.  
Chapter Two – James’ Story 
19 
 
symptoms let alone responding to them responsibly by seeking out medical help. When we 
met, James still had no idea what he should be looking for symptomatically. I remember the 
shadow of fear on his face when he asked me what he should be looking for and I outlined 
my own understanding of psychosis, especially its connection to marijuana abuse in youth.9  
The combined diagnoses from the three respected specialists who had assessed him were all 
but meaningless. They ranged widely from major depression and anxiety to prodromal or 
early psychosis through to borderline or possibly antisocial personality disorder or features, 
complicated by marijuana abuse. His interest in speaking about philosophical matters had 
also been duly noted, and patronized, as intellectual posturing. Following his hospital stay 
James never did follow up with the EPI clinician on our team. Instead, he stopped his 
medications and dropped out of a system too overwhelmed to notice or care, only to re-
emerge three months later when he became suicidal once again. This brought him back to 
hospital and to our mental health centre where he was assigned to me. By then he had also 
started to use LSD regularly with his girlfriend, a fact he willingly shared to my enormous 
chagrin for it added more risk to this already suicidal youth and his predisposition to 
psychosis.  
James intimidated me from our first handshake. He was tall, raw boned, ashen, unkempt. 
He was aloof, emotionally flat and answered questions in monosyllables with a fixed gaze 
and glacial disdain. James had felt neither understood nor valued from his first encounter 
with the mental health system. Our initial meeting was another opportunity for him to 
confirm what he already knew about a chaotic and ineffective service. He’d been asked the 
same questions too often by too many people and invaded, observed, assessed, judged, 
labeled and incarcerated with too few results. He scoffed at questions about how homicidal 
he might actually be and denied a history of self-harm but admitted spending time as a boy 
                                                     
9 A meta-analysis of research on cannabis as a risk factor for schizophrenia, or schizophrenia-like symptoms, 
indicates a “three-fold” increase in pathology. See: D.M. Semple, A.M. McIntosh, and S.M. Lawrie, 'Cannabis as a 
Risk Factor for Psychosis: Systematic Review', Journal of Psychopharmacology, 19 (2005), p. 191. One study of 216 
people showed that, three months following discharge from hospital for psychotic illness, one fifth of the cohort 
was non-compliant with medication, the strongest predictor being substance misuse. See: M. Olfson and others, 
'Predicting Medication Noncompliance after Hospital Discharge among Patients with Schizophrenia', Psychiatric 
Services, 51 (2000), p. 221.  
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tearing the wings off bees to watch their behaviour. He blandly claimed his suicidality was 
insignificant which alarmed me greatly given the deadly statistics.10 I hoped he was bluffing.  
Halfway through our first meeting I knew beyond all doubt that I did not want to work with 
James. He scared me half to death but finding someone else to work with him would be 
tricky. He was a hot potato given the lack of follow-up he’d received that had enabled him 
to slip away only to be brought back through our doors via the hospital for a second time, 
and now he was really high-profile. Not just because he was at such high risk but because 
our centre had failed to keep tabs on him and there was no more margin for error—we 
would be liable if anything happened to this kid.  
A community mental health centre can be likened to a M.A.S.H. unit with limited resources 
and staffing, and incoming wounded attended by whoever can handle the next casualty.11 If 
a help seeker didn’t like the clinician she had been assigned she would be likely 
pathologized, viewed as demanding or shown the door but never offered the luxury of 
another choice. Nor could a clinician easily pass on a file. It simply wasn’t done and I had 
never attempted to negotiate such a manoeuvre, but this was different. Being afraid of a 
client would be a frank admission of professional inadequacy, although the “danger card” 
could be played but not easily in this case as James had not actually done anything, yet.   
There was little love lost between the line manager and a great many of us who reported to 
her. She was in over her head and might have thrived as a bedside nurse but was not well 
suited to her job in this pressure-cooker and managed her anxiety by micromanaging the 
rest of us. I approached her and casually explained my wish to transfer the file. Without 
missing a beat she looked up coolly from her desk and told me I was welcome to trade the 
                                                     
10 Following accidental death, suicide is the leading cause of death among young men worldwide, the numbers 
being likely “substantially underestimated”. See: A. Pitman and others, 'Suicide in Young Men', The Lancet, 379 
(2012), p. 2383-84. Interestingly, “psychiatric diagnosis is a weak predictor of suicide,” although attempts by 
psychiatric patients are generally “interpreted as irrational” and related to their clinical profile. Attempts in non-
clinical populations are differently interpreted; a “temporary imbalance of mind” being only one of many 
possibilities. These authors also suggest that, “psychiatric patients might, for very good (rational) reasons, feel 
devalued and disabled”. They also claim that attributing suicide to mental illness hides the larger social issues 
and the responsibility for “a range of public policy factors…in relation to primary prevention”. This includes the 
need to address “the lax prescribing of psychiatric drugs by the medical profession [that] increases suicide rates”. 
See: A. Rogers and D. Pilgrim, A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness (Maidenhead, England: Open University 
Press, 2010), p. 208. Suicide among borderline patients may be as much as 50% higher than in the general 
population. See: K. Lieb and others 'Borderline Personality Disorder', p. 453. 
11 MASH designates the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital; an allusion to the film and popular American television 
series based on a novel of the same title: R. Hooker, Mash: A Novel About Three Army Doctors (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1997). 
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file with whoever on the team might be willing pick it up. Checkmate. I tried half-heartedly 
to talk to a couple of colleagues about a trade but knew it wouldn’t fly. Everyone was maxed 
out and nobody was going to pick up a file like this. I talked to two trusted colleagues about 
the matter and decided to try again, there remained one faint hope.   
Typically, psychiatric nurses were assigned people with a history of schizophrenia or 
bipolar disorder with mania—those who were or had been floridly psychotic. Such patients 
were higher up the ladder of pathological legitimacy as opposed to those dealing with 
“acute situational stressors” who were generally seen by the counsellors. 12 I pressed my 
advantage and informed my line-manager that James’ case was not a good fit because it 
meant “working outside of my scope of practice”. This was double-speak intended to 
remind her of those professional limitations of the institutional hierarchy from which she 
benefitted more as “medical” staff than I did and that were to my ethical credit to respect. To 
disregard them placed her in an ethically compromising bind.  
I stood in my line-manager’s office looking over her shoulder while she flipped through 
James’ file. “It’s a dog’s breakfast,” she said, and grudgingly agreed to pass the file on to a 
nurse who unexpectedly left the following week for another position. The file bounced back 
to me, there was nothing to be done, but psychosis was the least of my worries. Here was an 
unknown teenager with no previous psychiatric history and an inconclusive diagnosis 
following a lengthy stay in hospital. Against his will, he had been certified and hospitalized 
for expressing an interest in killing his family and himself and according to one assessment, 
might have an “anti-social or borderline personality disorder”. 13  
James was now using LSD in addition to having a long-standing marijuana habit and could 
deadpan a seasoned professional for an hour with spine-tingling effect. He knew exactly 
                                                     
12 The ranking of mental illness in order of importance and legitimacy is complex and a key issue concerns 
personal control. Psychosis, for example, is viewed as beyond an individual’s control and consequently more 
legitimate than even the most devastating emotional fall-out suffered by those dealing with acute situational 
stressors—including historical trauma and loss. This legitimacy is further supported by the “medical” nature of 
“serious and persistent mental illness” (SPMI) and its treatment with anti-psychotic medication.   
13 Anti-social personality disorder is one of the best predictors of violence, particularly when diagnosed with 
substance abuse. Even then, “accurate prediction is impossible” especially in the case of a poorly defined 
diagnosis likes James,’ while psychosis itself is not a strong predictor of violence. These authors also note the 
spectacular inaccuracy of mental health professionals in predicting dangerousness. The possibility of human 
rights infringement is a given with such predictions along with the implications of social control and policing 
that “some professionals worry… is incompatible with a caring and therapeutic role”. See: A. Rogers and D. 
Pilgrim, 'A Sociology of Mental Health and Illness', pp. 205-12.  
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how to express in few words a brooding ambivalence towards a system of care that, far from 
helping, had wasted his time and diminished him as a human being. He was a loose cannon 
I had done everything possible to avoid for fear that he might be a danger to me, find out 
where I lived, come to my home or kill himself on my watch.14 There was no choice but to 
confront this spooky kid who was young enough to be my grandson.  
James had no good reason to like me given my failed attempt to have his file transferred. I 
soft-pedalled my embarrassment the day I invited him into my office for our second meeting 
to explain that the nurse who was to have taken over his case had actually left our Centre. 
James eyed me levelly, silently. He had been passed around from one professional to 
another since his first contact with the system. Everyone had listened for there is nothing 
quite like a homicidal and suicidal youth to capture professional attention but he had not 
been heard. He stonewalled for the first several sessions and resisted my every attempt to 
leverage a connection. It was a standoff and the tension was palpable.  
The day I dropped all pretence of professional equanimity and reached out to James to 
reveal myself I felt utterly reckless. I acknowledged my part in the mismanagement of his 
case as someone who represented the gross inadequacy of a system that sustained me at his 
expense. I confirmed his experience, and apologized sincerely for what he had been through 
and confessed I was deeply concerned he would kill himself. I admitted I had no idea how 
to proceed in the face of his impassive defense. I appealed to him to tell me what he needed, 
or thought he needed, and talked for a long time until I felt he could really see me. 
My attempt had the desired effect of thawing his façade. But what was I really inviting him 
to do? Trust me? To what end and for whose purpose? Almost immediately, his flat-eyed 
impassivity fell away. I was unprepared for the speed with which he met my appeal in his 
eagerness to get on with the project he wanted so badly to share. Soon his sessions were 
saturated with references to his search for the ultimate meaning or essence of life, his 
growing interest in Buddhist practice and his aspirations to greatness. He wanted to be a 
                                                     
14 The death of a counsellor murdered in the parking lot of his workplace by a former client in the Vancouver 
area in 2005 shocked the clinical community. While such incidents are very rare, they stoke the historical and still 
widespread fear of people with mental illness, especially psychotic illness, as dangerous, even among clinicians. 
See: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/mental-health-worker-killed-1.532535> [accessed 30 July 
2016]. 
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philosopher, a mathematician, a physicist, a linguist, a musician, but could hardly get out of 
bed in the afternoon.  
His journals revealed his thoughts at that time.  
I think the reason everything is so visually appealing is because I’m seeing 
everything in my patterns. Life is an infinite amount of continuous patterns being 
projected onto our brains at the speed of light. Is there a negative infinity? If I stay 
alive I will eventually discover the secret of the universe because I see the patterns.  
He also documented his self-loathing, rage, terror, and his desire to share his unique 
perspective with someone who could understand. “Is it too late for me… [w]ill uncertainty 
claim my mind as it has the uncertain world?”  
James wasn’t interested in talking about how he “felt” about symptoms or suicide, about 
what may or may not have been troubling him or even the story of how he had come to be 
where he was now. He was not interested in falling into line, playing the patient role or 
talking about his suffering and he didn’t complain, ever. When he did speak of such things, 
it was always in the service of his larger interest, his obsession to know. My appeal to James 
had not so much resulted in increasing his trust in me as a therapist but according to his 
purpose, in recognizing me as possible mentor or colleague. I was someone who presumably 
had greater knowledge by virtue of my age and profession, someone who might support his 
quest because it was the only one of possible interest or merit. James was without pretense, 
undefended and unwilling to hide for any reason. His candor combined thoughtful maturity 
with innocence and urgency. It unsettled me for he never sought the advantage and he 
addressed me as an equal. His transparency contrasted with the opacity of the shield behind 
which I hid and sometimes cowered. If he was guileless, he was also intellectually and 
emotionally subtle, profoundly interested in his own psychological process and in sharing it 
with someone who might help him decode his experience.  
James attended his first psychiatric interview at our Centre carrying a book by Kant, which 
he lacked the concentration to read. The psychiatrist was a sixty-year-old man and veteran 
in the field. He asked James to extemporize on his reading and waited a long time for James 
to answer, while I witnessed the humiliation of a fragile youth who sat dumbly in his chair 
looking at his feet. Only minutes before he had been animatedly describing to me his 
passion for philosophy. At the end of this assessment, the psychiatrist put James on a high 
dose of anti-depressant and a modest dose of antipsychotic.  
Chapter Two – James’ Story 
24 
 
Previous assessments from the hospital had alluded to the “pseudo-intellectuality” of this 
eighteen year-old youth but it was a stunning indictment of one so young whose vocational 
orientation, it seemed to me, spoke through his desire. From my perspective, he was 
earnestly seeking answers to big questions with no immediate means of finding them let 
alone the concentration to do so. No one had considered that he might be following the first 
inarticulate murmurings of a calling to philosophy or theology or psychology. Or, as 
Jungian therapist James Hillman might suggest, that he was practicing what he might later 
become.15 James’ wish to be identified as someone interested in philosophy had not been 
considered as a possible way out of his suffering or an innate gift that might be productively 
fostered.16 Instead, it was interpreted as something phoney and insincere that needed to be 
rooted out, labelled and justifiably shamed. Within such an environment James’ attempts to 
connect with something greater than himself could only be seen as suspicious, transitory or 
incidental, hardly life-affirming or transformative. No one had championed his impassioned 
inclination towards the wonder-full but it seemed his relentless pursuit of something 
beyond himself or its pursuit of him had been his saving grace.  
I sat and witnessed James’ humiliation by the psychiatrist that day without a murmur, 
watched his intellectual and spiritual blistering at the hands of a man three times his age. 
After the consultation, we walked back to my office to finish the session. I did not tell him 
the psychiatrist had been wrong, disgraceful, to treat him that way. I smoothed it over, only 
implying as much without actually holding the psychiatrist accountable in the name of 
professionalism lest James tell him, sometime later, what I had said.  
While intrigued by James’ outpouring I was still guarded. Was he expressing grandiose 
ideas, experiencing psychotic delusions, or was this the spiritual outpouring of a troubled 
youth on a spiritual quest? James ardently sought an answer in Buddhism and early in our 
work together told me that he had gone to a Buddhist temple close to my home to explore 
meditation. I fervently hoped he did not know that this was my neighborhood or that I lived 
in a ground floor apartment and slept with the window open. Yet, I could not discount that 
this gray-faced youth, so incapacitated by “mental illness,” was prepared to spend five 
                                                     
15 J. Hillman, The Soul's Code: In Search of Character and Calling (Warner Books New York, 1997), p. 35.  
16 Chris Cook claims that “the relevance…of mysticism to psychiatry extends beyond issues of diagnosis and 
treatment” and that “[w]here this is denied, and where psychiatry colludes in pathologizing such experiences, 
the whole community is the poorer as a result”. See: C.C.H. Cook, 'Psychiatry and Mysticism', p. 160.  
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hours alone on a return bus trip to engage in conversations about consciousness and 
meditation with Buddhist monks he had never met.  
James had no formal religious background but knew that what he was pursuing involved an 
ultimate revelation of love. He called it by many names—cosmology, metaphysical passion, 
the essence of life, God, and preferred not to label it too closely. I wondered if his experience 
met the criteria for extrovertive mystical experience17 or possibly exceptional experience.18 
His obsession drove him, gave his life direction and purpose.19 Burdened as he was, James 
also seemed remarkably free, immune to the cultural and symptomatic evidence of his own 
pathology in his flight towards something greater than himself. It was as if he had walked 
through the wrong door looking for help with something else but having nowhere else to 
go, and finding something of possible benefit to forward his project, he stayed and asked for 
further direction. 
James asked pointed and personal questions about my own spiritual practice, experience, 
reading and beliefs for clues to his next step and I felt self-conscious responding to his 
queries, afraid of influencing him and of revealing my own ragged spiritual history. It was a 
two-faced timidity, given my clinical carte blanche to interrogate him on the most intimate 
details of his life—his past, his thoughts and habits, and to influence him unequivocally in 
staying the course on a “treatment plan” over which he could have very little say. That plan, 
however, was to provide guidance on issues related to symptom management and future 
“functionality,” not the possibility of a spiritual awakening. I evaded James’ forthright 
questions, counselling him instead to look for spiritual mentors and communities of 
practice. I printed out a long list of Buddhist communities in the city and gave it to him. I 
urged him to move in the direction of higher education believing as I still do that he was 
gifted and would excel academically despite his problems with concentration and his own 
                                                     
17 For an analysis of “extrovertive” and “introvertive” mystical experience, see: W.T. Stace, 'Mysticism and 
Philosophy', pp. 49-66. For a clinical perspective of Stace’s theory detailed in a measure for “mystical 
experience,” see: R.W. Hood, Jr., 'The Construction and Preliminary Validation of a Measure of Reported 
Mystical Experience', pp. 31-32.  
18 More recent work on such experience is found in: N. Kohls and H. Walach, 'Exceptional Experiences and 
Spiritual Practice: A New Measurement Approach'. 
19 These authors examine the positive impact of mysticism that arguably fits into the much larger body of 
research on spirituality, religion and mental health. See: K.R. Byrd, D. Lear, and S. Schwenka, 'Mysticism as a 
Predictor of Subjective Well-Being'. 
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vocational moratorium. But, moving too closely to his spiritual search, immersing myself in 
his quest made me uneasy. Why?  
It would mean stepping beyond the boundaries of my professional role. Although, I was 
well aware of the emerging literature on spirituality, religion and mental health and the 
benefits it was claiming,20 the questions it was raising and the controversies it was igniting.21 
Yet, I doubted my ability or my right to engage with James honestly and deeply about 
spiritual matters. Beyond that, how could I even be sure I would not be feeding into his 
illness22 or engaging with some darkness knit permanently into his psychological make-up 
that he might be using to manipulate me?23 He was enigmatic, difficult to read despite his 
candour and had a very particular way of expressing himself verbally.  
Within my work, I balked constantly at the pathologizing machine of the institution that 
defeated unusual or untypical ways of being or perceiving. Yet, this machine mesmerized 
me and justified my vigilance given the possibility of danger, which I could never entirely 
discount. This machine justified my collusion with medical protocols that not infrequently 
appalled me and endorsed a professional façade meant to reassure and support, but that hid 
my vulnerability and outrage. I was protected from the need to speak or act against the 
                                                     
20 Harold Koenig highlights the strong positive correlation between “religiosity and spirituality” and mental 
health regarding the many emotional benefits suggested by such research. See: H.G. Koenig, 'Research on 
Religion, Spirituality, and Mental Health: A Review', Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 54 (2009). A contentious 
debate, initiated by Koenig, suggests it is appropriate and desirable for a psychiatrist to pray with his patients if 
requested to do so. H.G. Koenig, 'Religion and Mental Health: What Should Psychiatrists Do?', Psychiatric 
Bulletin, 32 (2008), p. 203.  
21 My reticence was informed by many factors, including the kinds of ethical questions raised in the prayer 
debate and a fear of transgressing professional boundaries. Nonetheless, the humanist focus of my counselling 
education had emphasized the almost sacred intimacy of the client-counsellor relationship and examined ideas 
about the transcendent. See: G. Egan, The Skilled Helper: A Systematic Approach to Effective Helping 4th edn. 
(Belmont, CA: Thomson Brooks/Cole Publishing 1990). See also: A.H. Maslow, 'Religions, Values, and Peak-
Experiences'. 
22 The presence of spiritual and religious content in psychotic delusions is well established and of interest to 
researchers attempting to differentiate between legitimate religious or mystical experience and pathology. 
Jackson and Fulford suggest three current schools of thought representing both pro and anti-psychiatry biases 
identifying those who do not recognise any overlap between the pathological and the spiritual, those who 
pathologise any spiritual experience and those who see all pathology as being spiritually based. M. Jackson and 
K. Fulford, 'Spiritual Experience and Psychopathology'. See also: C.P. Heriot-Maitland, 'Mysticism and Madness: 
Different Aspects of the Same Human Experience?', Mental Health, Religion & Culture, 11 (2008).  
23 See: M. Zimmerman, L. Rothschild, and I. Chelminski, 'The Prevalence of DSM-IV Personality Disorders in 
Psychiatric Outpatients', American Journal of Psychiatry, 162 (2005). 
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system in which James was now caught, and guilty of safeguarding my professional 
position and hiding my private self.24 
James’ process intrigued me at first but eventually it thrilled me, given the profundity of his 
insight and my own interests in the clinical implications of mysticism – of actually “seeing” 
the help seeker in the special way James appeared to be apprehending his own world. It felt 
exploitative to mine his perspective, yet to ignore, downplay or pathologize his process 
denied him the most life-affirming theme in his story that I also counted on to help keep him 
alive. Caught within the machine of mental health care, James’ plight confirmed what I had 
long believed was the brutalizing and assimilating folly of our institutional approach to 
emotional suffering. More distressingly, it denied James’ wonderful vision and the 
implications of what I was then calling “mystical experience” as a larger possibility for our 
approach to psychological distress.  
With our work now underway, James agreed to take the prescribed medication25 and 
attended his appointments with me promptly if not eagerly, as if what was on offer might 
actually help him in his quest of spiritual discernment. “Yes, and the sooner the better,” was 
his standard reply to my inquiry about his interest in coming back the following week to 
talk some more. I experienced that answer with a sting of shame because he was offering so 
much more than I could return. He was ablaze and I was warming my bloodless hands at 
his fire. 
I asked him to report on his suicidal feelings each time we met, which to my chronic 
apprehension did not abate for several months. “Are you suicidal James? Is it better or 
worse than last week? Please tell me. Have you got a plan? Come on James, give. A place? A 
time? Don’t look at me like that, this is serious. Do you know the risk of using LSD and 
being suicidal and mildly psychotic? Do you? Are you taking the antidepressants? Do you 
think they’re helping? What about the anti-psychotics? No, stay on them, don’t mess with 
                                                     
24 The need for greater mutuality and honesty on the part of clinicians regarding their own “roadblocks to 
change” is discussed in: S. Mead and M.E. Copeland, 'What Recovery Means to Us: Consumers' Perspectives', 
Community Mental Health Journal, 36 (2000), pp. 320-21. The issue of mutuality is not easily resolved within an 
unequal power structure despite Rogers’ claim to the contrary. See: Reciprocity and mutuality (5.6.3). See also: C. 
Racine, 'Loving in the Context of Community Mental Health', p. 116.  
25 Patients with a good “therapeutic alliance” with their clinician are much more likely to remain medication 
compliant, which ironically may compromise a person’s health and well-being. See: M. Olfson and others, 
'Relationship between Antidepressant Medication Treatment and Suicide in Adolescents', Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 60 (2003), p. 219.  
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them. This is not funny. Yes, it does matter. On a scale of one to ten, tell me James, tell me”. 
It was the same mantra I repeated for weeks. “If you think you’re getting close you can tell 
your dad, or call your mom, or call me, or go to Emergency, or call Afterhours, or call 911 or 
just get in a cab and get to the hospital. Ok? Promise me. PROMISE me!” 
I wanted to be there to catch him should he ever fall out of that tree but there was no 
guarantee. He would not die, I hoped. I worried about the medication hurting him, 
worsening his suicidal feelings,26 numbing him, contributing to his suffering, but said 
nothing. How could I? These were a doctor’s orders. My ambivalence to James’ medication 
was also driven by my own self-protective fear. I really couldn’t tell if I wanted him to live 
as much – or more – for my sake as for his. If the drugs kept him alive, even if everything 
else about them was wrong, they could be justified.  
As our relationship developed, it became apparent that James had found a place where he 
could discuss his “metaphysical passion” and be himself. This situation rewarded but also 
haunted me because James felt so isolated. Though socially well connected to a group of 
childhood friends, he felt his consuming interest in “cosmology” contributed to his 
loneliness and his ability to connect meaningfully with others his age. He could not speak 
easily about his inner world to his contemporaries who lacked his perspective and who did 
not share his values. He played along wishing to belong, but saw through the game and had 
little heart for it. He was comfortable talking to adults and described himself as a freak, as 
someone who needed to hide to fit in, which seemed manipulative and troubled him.  
While relieved and somewhat puzzled to witness James’ imperviousness to clinical 
indoctrination I was discomfited by his lack of guile that made him look like an innocent 
treading trustingly through an institutional minefield about which he had no 
understanding. Protecting him from this environment was no simple matter. While 
attempting to straddle the diverging mandates of professional and personal ethics, I found 
                                                     
26 The question of SSRIs (Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors) contributing to an increase in completed 
suicides among youth remains contentious and inconclusive. One study found “there was no statistical 
difference in crude suicide rates among patients assigned to SSRIs, other antidepressants, or placebo”. See: A. 
Khan and others, 'Suicide Rates in Clinical Trials of Ssris, Other Antidepressants, and Placebo: Analysis of Fda 
Reports', American Journal of Psychiatry, 160 (2003), p. 791. Another study looking exclusively at youth, funded by 
major pharmaceutical companies, highlights the difficulty of determining to what extent antidepressant 
medications can even reduce suicidality. See: M. Olfson and others 'Relationship between Antidepressant 
Medication Treatment and Suicide in Adolescents', p. 980.  
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small comfort in recognizing I could do neither well. It was confusing to feel so ethically 
compromised by stepping even slightly outside my professional role. I resisted the constant 
urge to tell him to trust no one, including me. But as our conversations evolved I became 
increasingly aware of the disquieting joy I felt in my growing recognition of James as a 
spiritual friend on a journey not dissimilar to my own.   
The day James arrived in my office with religious tracts given to him by one of the monks at 
the Buddhist temple, my wariness of this young seeker suddenly seemed grotesque. He 
handed the literature over for me to look at and solicit my advice. James’ fragility and 
terrifying proximity to suicide contrasted with the immensity of his wholeheartedness, his 
raw courage and determination to find answers he knew must be out there. His 
defenselessness was flawless; a deep mirror that finally, that day, captured and exposed my 
fraudulence as I confronted what appeared to be the superior moral integrity of this boy.  
Clumsily, fearfully, I began to share what knowledge I had of spirituality and mental health, 
of Buddhism, of my own fragmented meditation practice and religious uncertainty, 
knowing I was leaving behind a familiar approach to therapy that left me sitting on the edge 
of my chair. It was a tipping point that stripped away the final vestiges of a professional 
identity I had questioned for years and would never reclaim. There was no sense of elation, 
freedom or even appropriateness in this choice that felt more like letting-go than a decision. 
I could not do it anymore. If this move was intended, even partially, to shield James from 
the risk of harm by the system, it also shifted the risk to me alone. I was still afraid for him 
and myself, only now I was the main threat.  
From then on, the focus of our conversation was his pursuit of the wonder-full and my 
attempt to remove any impediments from his trajectory. I sought to help him plan his future 
and encouraged him to explore his experience and purpose during our sessions. I constantly 
urged him to think about higher education. I also urged him to join a meditation community 
rather than practice on his own, concerned as I was that solo practice could put him at 
further emotional risk,27 but he disregarded my direction. Soon after, I decided that the 
                                                     
27 The literature examining the benefits of mindfulness meditation as an adjunct treatment for physical and 
psychological dis-ease is extensive and well established. See: J. Kabat-Zinn, 'Mindfulness-Based Interventions in 
Context: Past, Present, and Future', Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10 (2003); J. Kabat-Zinn, Full 
Catastrophe Living: Using the Wisdom of Your Body and Mind to Face Stress, Pain, and Illness (New York: Dell, 1990). 
Two recent studies suggest evidence supporting the therapeutic use of mindfulness training with people dealing 
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benefits of introducing him to the Buddhist community to which I belonged outweighed the 
dangers of the professional boundary violation.28 I spoke to him about attending a weekend 
retreat with me and ensured his father knew where he would be and we exchanged home 
phone numbers, another taboo. I also knew I would never chart the event, nor did I.  
The night I drove James to his first Buddhist meditation retreat at the local university in the 
hopes of helping him find a spiritual community, another significant professional boundary 
was crossed. His pallor and the flatness of his affect worried me. He asked if he could put 
the car seat back so he could rest. He was exhausted for reasons I did not understand. He 
looked so unwell. I reflected on the legal implications of transporting a “patient” in a vehicle 
un-insured for such purposes and drove with not a little fear. We arrived at the meditation 
hall where I shepherded him through the registration process before we settled for the 
evening into the cavernous space of the University of British Columbia’s Asian Centre. 
Meditators sitting on the floor or in chairs, some already with their eyes closed, surrounded 
us. James sat down beside me in lotus position with the ease of a skilled practitioner. When 
the meditation teacher walked by the following day I eagerly introduced James to him and 
explained that I had brought James to connect with the community, hoping this world-
renowned teacher29 would confirm the importance of James practicing with others. 
Meditators as young as James are valued and supported in this community. Instead of 
agreeing with me, this man smiled kindly at James and assured him that he had much to 
gain by meditating alone.  
As we left the retreat, I asked James if he was experiencing hallucinations and he calmly 
described how the sidewalk seemed to undulate and break up before him as he walked on it. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
with psychosis. See: P. Chadwick and others, 'Mindfulness Groups for Distressing Voices and Paranoia: A 
Replication and Randomized Feasibility Trial', Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 37 (2009); P. Chadwick, 
K.N. Taylor, and N. Abba, 'Mindfulness Groups for People with Psychosis', Behavioural and Cognitive 
Psychotherapy, 33 (2005). 
28 A.A. Lazarus, 'How Certain Boundaries and Ethics Diminish Therapeutic Effectiveness', Ethics & behavior, 4 
(1994). A thoughtful argument on the difference between dual relationships and exploitation is found in: K. 
Tomm, 'The Ethics of Dual Relationships', The California Therapist, 5 (1993). A literature review on the subject of 
dual relationships examined the complexity and ambiguity of this issue and concluded that: “[w]hat one 
professional may deem as appropriate behaviour, another professional may view as a boundary violation”. See: 
S.M. Moleski and M.S. Kiselica, 'Dual Relationships: A Continuum Ranging from the Destructive to the 
Therapeutic', Journal of Counseling & Development, 83 (2005), p. 8.  
29 Joseph Goldstein is one of the founders of an influential Buddhist teaching centre, the Insight Meditation 
Society that operates out of Barre, Massachusetts. See: <http://www.dharma.org/meditation-retreats/retreat-
center> [accessed 30 July 2016]. 
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It was not what I wanted to hear. Months later he explained how the meditation had helped 
him learn to observe and recognize his own delusional thinking which reduced his fear 
when such experiences occurred. He also believed the marijuana and LSD had been 
primarily responsible for altering his mind and for opening it to a source of understanding 
he now craved.  
Throughout that weekend, I was vigilant and unsettled about my decision, about James’ 
wellbeing and how far beyond the boundaries of my institution I had strayed. I felt 
awkward engaging with James outside the confines of my professional role that left me 
feeling strangely alienated from him. Who was this young man to me outside my 
counselling cell? What did I owe him? Why was I doing this? How could I see him, 
adequately or at all, beyond the organizing principle of our therapeutic relationship? What 
was the benefit to me? I was risking so much for what? I felt more like an anxious parent 
than an experienced therapist. Yet, I knew I wanted to protect him and help him. I saw the 
awe-full beauty of his quest, of his pursuit of the transcendent, of his own transparent 
nature, of his physical being and his goodness. In that seeing was such love and a wrenching 
sense of responsibility that I owed this young man, this boy, something that I could neither 
fully determine or pay.  
Despite our rocky start, James made astonishing progress in the first several months of our 
work together. He stopped using cannabis and LSD. He stopped watching violent videos 
and began spending more time outside on his bicycle. He was amenable to participating for 
a while in a college preparation course. He began to change physically, the colour in his face 
returned, his skin took on a youthful lustre, his interest in killing himself eased and he found 
part-time work. Wanting to be sure he was experiencing no further thought disorder, I had 
him assessed by the staff psychologist who agreed that while James had a unique 
perspective and way of expressing himself verbally, there appeared to be no evidence of any 
psychotic process. During that time, James also maintained a meditation practice but 
preferred to meditate alone.  
Remarkably, the significant gains James made in such a short time were never lost. There is 
no way of knowing how the many variables involved contributed to his rapid improvement. 
His recovery was even more astonishing given the stolid reality of the institutional 
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environment and the truth of Hillman’s observation that, “[of] all of psychology’s sins, the 
most mortal is its neglect of beauty”.30 Nonetheless, James’ relentless search flourished and 
with it, the many decisions he made to turn his life around. Through his struggle, he 
emerged like a young Atlas carrying the weight of his addicted, disconnected, materialistic 
culture, his parents’ broken marriage, his vocational uncertainty and a profound loneliness 
not easily understood or addressed within our community-riven culture. He stood in my 
doorway illuminating the destitution of my professional world, revealing the enormity of 
my privilege, including my relationship with him, and the paucity of what I had to offer 
within my professional role.  
Ultimately, it seemed to me that my most important task was to help James recognize and 
reclaim his place in the human community. I wanted him to grasp that we—the world 
around him—needed him to join us for his own benefit, certainly, but even more pressingly 
for ours. In one of our final meetings logic spun on its head the day I carefully explained to 
James that the very system he had approached for help was the same one that created and 
maintained his sense of exile – both inside and outside institutional walls. He listened 
carefully, quietly, the day I played that card, placed the final revelation of institutional 
complicity in his hand. “Do you understand me, James? Do you understand what I’m 
saying?” He was so young. Yet, even with this confession, I could not sidestep my personal 
role in his alienation despite what had been my best intentions and many attempts to 
subvert and resist the institution. Paradoxically and painfully, my sense of guilt was further 
complicated by the very love that had emerged and driven my desire to keep him safe and 
help him understand and touch the transcendence he sought.  
I had walked—or tried to walk—a tightrope between my fear of oppressing him 
professionally or exploiting him personally. The joy of witnessing the lovely arc of this 
young man’s repeated attempts at flight towards something beyond—from which I 
profoundly benefitted— had called forth my love, the fierce desire to protect him, and the 
stinging recognition of my own loneliness. It was only much later that I would grieve, 
turning to a mentor to help me unpack this thing. I had done nothing wrong had I? Had I? I 
was not comforted by the reassuring words. I know what the path to hell is paved with and 
                                                     
30 J. Hillman, 'The Soul's Code: In Search of Character and Calling', p. 35.  
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that within my institutional and professional roles I would always be culpable of keeping 
the best for myself, no matter what I did. How could it be otherwise? From whatever angle I 
tried to “protect” James, I would always come out on top.  
About a year after our initial meeting, I transferred to another community mental health 
centre to work part-time while I grieved the death of my mother and began preparations to 
pursue PhD studies at Durham. I asked a trusted colleague on my team to work with James 
in my absence. When I returned to my position months later, I resumed my connection with 
James for another few months. My colleague informed me that James had approached a 
Buddhist community and requested admission to train as a monk but had been refused by 
temple staff as he was still under the care of mental health and on medication.  
James was transformed. He had matured and was more self-contained, and bore himself 
with immense dignity. He was even more articulate than the last time we had met and I 
could see how well he was. James was now 21 years old. His suicidality had resolved but 
remained, in his words, “ideologically interesting”. The diagnosis of early psychosis never 
manifested into schizophrenia. When he was finally weaned off his medications and his file 
closed, the psychiatrist who had first treated James with such disdain seemed deeply 
impressed with James’ quiet confidence during the final consultation. He later commented 
with amazement that James appeared to have the poise of a man twice his age. By then 
James was well enough to move out of his father’s home and was living for the first time on 
his own. He was eager “to be of value to his employer,” he said, despite the superficiality of 
his work environment in a restaurant and the indifference of his manager. He said he was 
“practicing confidence,” working on his anger, trying to learn gratitude. He explained that 
he wanted to stay open and undefended when someone was mean to him. He was 
intentional in his efforts to cultivate himself and presented with the equanimity of a 
Buddhist monk, relaxed, easily moved to laughter and quick witted.  
James also talked about his loneliness, how it embarrassed him, and his wish to understand 
it better. As for his future, he explained that “the essence of life” that he pursued so ardently 
was all he wanted to do with his life. But he had no idea how to translate this into practical 
action, or a career path, and he still struggled with what he perceived as the freakishness of 
this passion. “No James you’re wrong,” I countered. “This is a great gift, and you must 
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cultivate it, there are many things you can and must do with this. Many people have built 
their lives writing and teaching about this very thing. Go to school and study anything – 
math, philosophy, physics, music, languages. Any of those paths can get you there, but you 
must study”. I told him that keeping this passion to himself was like hiding his light under a 
bushel. He had no real sense that his knowledge, his courage and his quest might be of 
benefit to someone else or that it had already been of tremendous benefit to me, although I 
had told him so more than once. He also knew that I had written a paper about him and 
presented it in Durham shortly before my final departure to the United Kingdom to begin 
PhD studies. After the conference and my return to Canada, we sat in my office and I read 
the paper aloud to him while he listened. It was not enough, but it was something and I was 
overjoyed to give it to him. I think he understood the homage. 
Whether James might be described as a young mystic or simply a young man whose porous 
nature and experimentation with drugs facilitated his profound apprehensions of something 
beyond, his emergence within my Centre and my practice was epic. James’ overwhelming 
desire to know and to love and his keen sense of being onto something of great import had 
immunized him against the influences that so easily entrap individuals connected with 
community mental health care away from their sense of agency and potential. Equally, his 
vision and courage in reaching for the transcendent had illuminated how far I had strayed 
from my most cherished values as someone who had wanted to be a healer.  
When we met again for the first time after my year’s absence from the Centre, shortly before 
his final discharge, I teasingly asked James if he was still passionately committed to finding 
the essence of life. He had looked at me with some impatience and said with utter 
conviction, “C’mon Catherine, we’re all looking for that”. 
2.1  Conclusion 
Through the alchemy of my relationship with James, I saw not for the first time but at last, 
that no amount of “professional” or “clinical” compassion or empathy could ethically 
balance the injustice at the core of my clinical work. Nor, could it begin to address the many 
spurious arguments in which the massive structure of community mental health care is so 
deeply entrenched.  
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The autoethnographic approach I have employed in this chapter and throughout the rest of 
this inquiry, speaks to the epiphanies evoked by wonder in clinical care and to the 
complexity and messiness of the many ethical issues it raises. Most of all, this narrative 
approach has helped illuminate my own active role in perpetuating the suffering and 
oppression of those seeking community mental health care. This is the suffering related to 
the disadvantaged lives of a large portion of the cohort “served” by community mental 
health, and amplified by the type of “care” offered there. This is also the suffering, which 
over the course of more than two decades I have witnessed, benefitted from, colluded in and 
endured as a professional and a student. 
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Chapter 3.   
Three opponents of wonder: 
Medicalization, asymmetry and dehumanization 
[T]he doctor’s ten-thousandth patient needs and deserves the same recognition of his 
common humanity and the same hushed acknowledgement of his tender fragility as 
does her first patient. These needs inhere in all patients equally, regardless of their 
personal qualities.1  
3.1  Introduction  
The importance of reverencing the vulnerable person who reaches out to 
community mental health care for help in understanding and healing the chaos and 
anguish of her life may not be overstated. But what does this reverence comprise? 
For reverence is not easily found or expressed in the clinical bustle of a large 
community mental health centre, given the relentless pressures and competing 
ethical demands exerted on the work-lives of clinicians. These pressures, as we shall 
see, are morally eroding, traumatizing, exhausting and put clinicians at considerable 
risk of harming the very people they are there to help.  
In this chapter, three impediments—opponents—to ethical care will be examined 
both narratively and theoretically to analyse how they shape the assumptions and 
behaviours of clinicians. We wish to understand their contribution to the de-
moralization of the clinician, to the proliferation, misunderstanding and 
mismanagement of “mental illness” and, most importantly, to the global 
dehumanization of the person labelled in this way.  
We begin with an examination of medicalization and a provocative debate on 
“medical imperialism” forwarded by sociologist Philip Strong. In reflecting on the 
concerns of such imperialism, Strong took his own field to task for speaking out of 
both sides of its mouth, for criticizing medicine while enjoying the status that 
medicine conferred. This debate has implications for the critique I am attempting as 
a professional in the “allied health field” of counselling psychology, given its 
connection to medicine and the medical model within community mental health 
                                                     
1 H.M. Evans, 'Wonder and the Clinical Encounter', p. 128.  
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care. The examination of medicalization will be followed by an analysis of 
asymmetry and the unresolved problem of institutional hierarchy. This, of course, 
describes not only the imbalance of power between the clinician and the vulnerable 
help seeker, but also among professionals within the mental health team. Finally, we 
will consider the prevalence and meaning of dehumanization by examining the 
problems of infra-humanization, stigmatization and the “heart-sink” patient before 
concluding with a reflection on the dehumanized clinician.  
To begin, however, I will provide a brief overview of the system of community 
mental health care and the influences that have helped move psychiatric care from 
the asylum to the community.  
3.2  What is Community Mental Health Care? 
In British Columbia, Canada, community mental health care is a provincial service 
employing a case management model within freestanding day clinics, or outpatient 
clinics attached to hospitals.2 Case management, has been described as “an attempt 
to overcome deficiencies in community care…due to fragmented service systems 
and lack of continuity of care”.3 People attending community mental health services 
are often multiply disadvantaged and in need of many services, from life-skills 
coaching and dentistry to housing and employment, all of which extend far beyond 
the treatment of their psychological issues. Others are referred directly from the 
hospital psychiatric ward, and a primary function of community mental health 
centres is to keep people out of hospital. While there are various types and styles of 
case management, what they typically share in common is a multidisciplinary team 
approach.4 According to one dated account, this approach appears to have changed 
very little in the past 45 years, although there has been a significant increase in para-
                                                     
2 This discussion is confined to the systems and issues related to my own work environment. It would 
be fair to say that provincially funded community mental health facilities employing a case 
management model would share many commonalities represented and problematized in this inquiry. 
3 S.J. Ziguras and G.W. Stuart, 'A Meta-Analysis of the Effectiveness of Mental Health Case 
Management over 20 Years', p. 1410.  
4 S. Ziguras, G. Stuart, and A. Jackson, 'Assessing the Evidence on Case Management', The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 181 (2002), p. 20.  
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medical staff.5 In contemporary community mental health settings, psychiatrists, 
general practitioners, psychologists, clinical counsellors, social workers, 
occupational therapists, psychiatric nurses, mental health support staff, 
administrative staff and others, typically work as a “team” under one roof.  
The “case manager” is the clinician who over-sees and co-ordinates the care of any 
given individual receiving service and is typically a psychologist, a clinical 
counsellor, a social worker or a psychiatric nurse, as was the case in my community 
mental health centre. The case manager is responsible for assessing the help seeker’s 
psychosocial needs, for individual care planning, and for making referrals and 
linking the help seeker to appropriate services or supports. This includes 
monitoring the help seeker’s progress with respect to the established care-plan, her 
mental state and her compliance with medication and its side effects. The case 
manager is also responsible for advocacy, for establishing and maintaining the 
therapeutic relationship and, depending on her education, for offering therapy.6  
Although caseloads may vary from one community mental health centre to the next, 
case managers in my Centre carried caseloads of 30 to 40 files or more of varying 
acuity and complexity. Often, help seekers were already connected to multiple 
services within the community. Depending on her education and role within the 
team, a case manager might also provide one-on-one or group therapy, psychiatric 
follow-up and community outreach.  
Mental health centres provide many services including adult community 
support, adult short-term assessment and treatment, community residential 
programs, geriatric programs, crisis intervention, day and outpatient 
programs, addictions counselling, concurrent disorders services7, group 
therapy, peer support and after-hours mental health support.8  
                                                     
5 B. Kenny and T. Whitehead, Insight: A Guide to Psychiatry and Psychiatric Services (London: Crom 
Helm, 1973), pp. 161-67. 
6 S. Ziguras, G. Stuart, and A. Jackson, 'Assessing the Evidence on Case Management', p. 17.  
7 Concurrent disorders are those that include an addiction. A diagnosis of major depression combined 
with the misuse of alcohol would constitute a concurrent disorder. These diagnoses are highly 
prevalent in community mental health and complicate the process of diagnosis and treatment. 
8 This description of service provision in community mental health care is from a web page of the 
Fraser Health Authority of British Columbia. See: <http://www.fraserhealth.ca/your-
community/hope/> [accessed 30 July 2016]. 
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Community mental health care employs a medical perspective focussed primarily, 
although not exclusively, on underlying pathology.9 The pathologizing of mental 
distress, of course, gives primacy to the function of the doctor, the psychiatric 
“team” and psychiatric medicine itself. Every person accepted for care in my Centre 
was assessed by a psychiatrist or general practitioner, diagnosed, prescribed 
medication and followed-up.10 Only doctors and nurses are involved in prescribing 
and managing medications, monitoring their effects, or giving injections. This is 
another reason why psychiatric nurses are near the apex of the team hierarchy, 
despite having considerably fewer years of education than their colleagues who had 
Masters’ degrees in social work, counselling, and occupational therapy. The 
significant difference in education, training and professional orientation between 
medical staff and other team members also creates inter-team conflict and alienation 
but the primacy of medicine is unequivocal.  
Strong’s suggestion, that the rise of para-professionals has enabled doctors to 
“expand their empire while … severely restricting the production of new doctors” 
was confirmed by the chronic shortage of psychiatric hours available in my 
institution.11 Severe doctor shortages in the community also meant it was difficult to 
find general practitioners to accept people labelled with mental illness as new 
patients or to find private psychiatrists for those refused service by our Centre. 
                                                     
9 Early and current critics have argued against psychiatry’s focus on the “symptom,” as do many 
counselling theories and other therapeutic approaches to emotional suffering. Of relevance are the 
socio-political dimensions of emotional distress examined, for example, by: I. Prilleltensky, 'The Role of 
Power in Wellness, Oppression, and Liberation: The Promise of Psychopolitical Validity', Journal of 
Community Psychology, 36 (2008). Similarly, feminist therapy seeks to educate and empower the help 
seeker by focussing on an analysis of power that views symptoms as evidence of resistance to the abuse 
of power, rather than pathology. Consequently, “posttraumatic symptoms are explicitly framed as 
coping strategies and evidence of clients’ attempts to manage intolerable affects and knowledge arising 
from the trauma”. See: L.S. Brown, 'Feminist Paradigms of Trauma Treatment', Psychotherapy: Theory, 
research, practice, training, 41 (2004), p. 465.  
10 Psychotropic prescription drugs are deeply tied to medicalization. Help seekers refusing medication 
were typically refused service at my Centre given the unstated but clear assumption that if an 
individual was not sufficiently “ill” to require medication then she, or he, did not require service. The 
work of prescribing is further complicated by: a) the high incidence of drug and alcohol addiction 
among the client population, b) the need to re-evaluate and re-calibrate medication initiated by other 
physicians less experienced with psychotropic drugs and, 3) the help seeker’s addiction to anxiolytics 
or narcotics, which not infrequently begins during a hospital stay and requires clinical intervention.    
11 P.M. Strong, 'Sociological Imperialism and the Profession of Medicine a Critical Examination of the 
Thesis of Medical Imperialism', Social Science & Medicine. Part A: Medical Psychology & Medical Sociology, 
13 (1979), p. 210.   
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While it may be true that para-professionals now fulfil tasks that were formerly 
under the jurisdiction of the doctor, they remain “firmly under medical control”.12  
3.2.1 The shift from the asylum 
The shift from the asylum to community-run clinics is significant and briefly 
discussed here to offer an historical context. The closure of mental institutions 
occurred with the emergence of the anti-psychiatry movement. Its chief proponents 
were vocal, prolific and political in their ambitions to reform mental health care. 
This movement was represented, among others, by critic Thomas Szasz, an 
indefatigable intellectual who denied the existence of mental illness over five 
decades.13 Although Szasz is criticised for his provocative and flamboyant 
argumentation, Mark Cresswell underscores the staying power of a thinker who 
continues to influence contemporary critics of psychiatry.14 R. D. Laing, another 
psychiatrist, famously argued that, “paranoid delusions were not signs of an illness 
but an understandable reaction to an inescapable and persecutory social order”.15 
Both Szasz and Laing spoke out against psychiatry, the medicalization of social 
issues and the abuse of professional power, although from different perspectives16.  
A third psychiatrist and social reformer, Franco Basaglia, was enormously 
influential in changing the culture of the mental institution.17 Basaglia’s work led to 
the passing of the Italian National Reform Bill of 1978 that resulted in the 
dismantling of psychiatric hospitals and the rise of community mental health 
services in Italy. At the same time, hundreds of psychiatric institutions closed 
“throughout Europe, New Zealand, and Australia, including many in Ireland and 
Finland where the highest number of asylum beds were located”.18 Another major 
                                                     
12 Ibid.  
13 T. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1974). T. Szasz, 'The Myth of Mental Illness: 50 Years Later', The Psychiatrist, 35 (2011 ). 
14 M. Cresswell, 'Szasz and His Interlocutors: Reconsidering Thomas Szasz's “Myth of Mental Illness” 
Thesis', Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 38 (2008). 
15 D. Rissmiller and J. Rissmiller, 'Open Forum: Evolution of the Antipsychiatry Movement into Mental 
Health Consumerism', Psychiatric Services 57 (2006), p. 864.  
16 D. Double, 'The Limits of Psychiatry', BMJ: British Medical Journal, 324 (2002), p. 900.  
17 D. Rissmiller and J. Rissmiller, 'Open Forum: Evolution of the Antipsychiatry Movement into Mental 
Health Consumerism', pp. 863-64.  
18 Ibid. p. 864.  
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critic, Michel Foucault,19 was the only non-psychiatrist whose work still drives the 
arguments of the most recent wave of psychiatric critics in the Critical Psychiatry 
Network.20 All four of these critics, “championed the notion that personal reality 
was independent from any hegemonic definition of normalcy imposed by organized 
psychiatry”.21  
Interestingly, psychiatry continues to be challenged by its own and, as Bracken and 
Thomas ironically note, by the implausibility of an “anti-paediatrics” or “anti-
anaesthetics” movement. Meanwhile, the on-going influences of the antipsychiatry 
and critical psychiatry movements, as well as the movement towards post-
psychiatry, continue to assert themselves.22  
Professionals like psychiatrist Joanna Moncrieff, further endorse the validity of the 
claims against psychiatry. As Senior Lecturer at University College London and a 
leading figure in the critical psychiatry network, Moncrieff has spoken out and 
published widely on the “myth” of a chemical cure for psychiatric symptoms, 
warning of the limitations and dangers of psychotropic medications.23 She is but one 
in an impressive line of psychiatrists who have challenged the institution over many 
decades. Moncrieff and those who have preceded her may not yet have eliminated a 
role for psychiatry, but they have certainly, and strenuously, called it into question. 
The considerable concerns raised and addressed by these reformers and activists, 
are sobering. They unanimously point to assumptions and practices that still place 
the vulnerable help seeker at the mercy of a medical machine and the unilateral 
authority of clinicians who uphold its regime.  
3.3  Medicalization 
[A]cademic psychiatry has helped the industry to colonize more and more 
areas of modern life…Persuading people to understand their problems as 
                                                     
19 P. Bracken and P. Thomas, 'From Szasz to Foucault: On the Role of Critical Psychiatry', Philosophy, 
Psychiatry, & Psychology, 17 (2010), pp. 219-20, 23-27. 
20 D. Double, 'The Limits of Psychiatry', pp. 903-04.  
21 D. Rissmiller and J. Rissmiller, 'Open Forum: Evolution of the Antipsychiatry Movement into Mental 
Health Consumerism', pp. 863-64.  
22 P. Bracken and P. Thomas, 'Postpsychiatry: A New Direction for Mental Health', BMJ: British Medical 
Journal, 322 (2001), p. 724.  
23 See Moncrieff’s lecture: The myth of the chemical cure: The politics of psychiatric drug treatment, at: 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=IV1S5zw096U> [accessed 30 July 2016]. 
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biological deficiencies obscures the social origin and context of distress and 
prevents people from seeking social or political solutions…Psychiatry with 
its medical credentials and associated respectability, and the financial power 
of the industry represents a formidable combination.24 
Sociologist, Peter Conrad, who has written about medicalization and social control, 
describes medicalization as “a process by which non-medical problems become 
defined and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of illness or disorders”.25 
He also notes that there is “strong evidence for expansion rather than contraction of 
medical jurisdiction”.26 Because of “complex social forces” and “market interests,” 
medicalization now seems less influenced by medical imperialism and the control of 
physicians, than it was in the 1970s.27 These forces and interests include aggressive 
strategies used by drug manufacturers to increase profits and influence the rise of 
individual consumerism. The latter are enhanced by the internet where people can 
now diagnose themselves, communicate with others on chat lines and instruct their 
doctors on what medications to prescribe. It is a construct that goes “far beyond 
psychiatry”.28  
Marketing diseases, and selling drugs to treat those diseases, is now 
common in the “post-Prozac era” … GlaxoSmithKline has spent millions to 
raise the public visibility of SAD (seasonal affective disorder) and GAD 
(generalized anxiety disorder) through sophisticated marketing 
campaigns…The tag line was “Imagine being allergic to people”…Paxil 
internet sites offer consumers self-tests to assess if they have SAD or GAD 
(www.paxil.com). The campaign successfully defined these diagnostic 
categories as both common and abnormal, thus needing treatment.29 
                                                     
24 J. Moncrieff, 'Co-Opting Psychiatry: The Alliance between Academic Psychiatry and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry', Epidemiologia e Psichiatria Sociale, 16 (2007), pp. 192-93.  
25 P. Conrad, 'Medicalization and Social Control', Annual review of Sociology, 18 (1992), p. 209.  
26 P. Conrad, 'The Shifting Engines of Medicalization', Journal of health and social behavior, 46 (2005), p. 3. 
For other allusions to medical jurisdiction, see also: pp. 4, 12.  
27 For a thoughtful critique of the levels of medicalization that emerge and operate beyond the control 
of physicians, see: P. Conrad and J.W. Schneider, 'Looking at Levels of Medicalization: A Comment on 
Strong's Critique of the Thesis of Medical Imperialism', Social Science & Medicine. Part A: Medical 
Psychology & Medical Sociology, 14 (1980). 
28 See: P. Conrad, 'The Shifting Engines of Medicalization', p. 3.  
29 Ibid. p. 6. Conrad also references the work of journalist, Brendan Koerner, who offers a biting 
account on the making and selling of mental illness. See: B.I. Koerner, 'Disorders Made to Order', 
Mother Jones, 27 (2002). 
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3.3.1  Spinning the illness of grief 
One recent and contentious example is the medicalization is grief, which almost 
found its way into the newest and fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM V); the primary tool used in psychiatric diagnosis.30 
Described as “complicated grief” or CG, the anticipation of this diagnosis provoked 
much criticism.31 Yet, clinical supporters claimed that CG’s inclusion in the DSM V 
would help many who are crippled by its debilitating symptoms. Not surprisingly, 
the “hallmark” of CG is sadness and yearning. According to one source, the only 
potential harm for this diagnosis would have been primarily related to labelling and 
stigma,” which these authors nonetheless felt was outweighed by the benefits, “as 
long as the diagnosis was applied appropriately”.32 Given the ease with which 
bereavement could be misdiagnosed, and treated as depression, we might 
reasonably assume this diagnosis would be all too likely misapplied. Particularly, 
since the level of medicalization within our cultural consciousness could reasonably 
propel anyone dealing with the wrenching anguish of bereavement to seek clinical 
help. A brief extract from an article that supported the recognition of CG as a 
distinct mental illness illustrates how we pathologize yearning: 
Intense yearning or longing for the deceased is common in CG. There are 
strong feelings of wanting to be reunited with the lost loved one, associated 
with behaviours to feel close to the deceased, frequent intrusive or 
preoccupying thoughts of the deceased and efforts to avoid experiences that 
trigger reminders of the loss…[W]ell studied treatment for depression and 
medication studies suggest that improvement in depression can occur with 
only modest changes in CG symptoms. Overall, while symptoms can 
overlap, there is strong evidence that CG is distinct from major depression.33  
                                                     
30 There are two diagnostic manuals of psychiatry, the DSM and the ICD, the International 
Classification of Diseases published by the World Health Organization. The DSM is published by the 
American Psychiatric Association. Despite their similarities, the DSM is the most widely used in North 
America and I have never seen or used the ICD in the course of my studies or my work as a clinician. 
See: G. Andrews, T. Slade, and L. Peters, 'Classification in Psychiatry: ICD-10 Versus DSM-IV', British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 174 (1999). 
31 See: L.J. Breen and M. O'Connor, 'The Fundamental Paradox in the Grief Literature: A Critical 
Reflection', OMEGA: Journal of death & dying, 55 (2007). 
32 M.K. Shear and others, 'Complicated Grief and Related Bereavement Issues for DSM‐V', Depression 
and anxiety, 28 (2011), 107. See also: K. Lamb, R. Pies, and S. Zisook, 'The Bereavement Exclusion for the 
Diagnosis of Major Depression: To Be, or Not to Be', Psychiatry (Edgmont), 7 (2010), p. 20.  
33 M.K. Shear and others 'Complicated Grief and Related Bereavement Issues for DSM‐V', p. 106. 
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Medicalization is nowhere more hauntingly illustrated than in the repackaging of 
the heart-wrenching human reality of bereavement and yearning as an “illness” that 
is justified as medically sound and ethically defensible. Such is the tide of 
medicalization that scholars and clinicians, past and present, have resisted while 
watching the spectrum of “normalcy,” dwindle to a thread. Fortunately, for now, 
this diagnosis appears in the appendix of the DSM V, as a condition for further 
study described as “persistent complex bereavement disorder”.34 
3.3.2 The thesis of medical imperialism  
Medicalization has been tied to the “thesis of medical imperialism” and prompted 
debate over two decades following a provocative essay by sociologist, Philip Strong, 
who lampooned his own field for its own imperialist motives.35 Concerned with the 
implications of medical imperialism, Strong argued that this problem was actually 
rivalled by the imperialism of medical sociology itself. The following identifies a 
number of significant concerns claiming that the problem of medical imperialism:   
(i) has led to social problems being “professionalized” which in turn has 
increased the number of professions, professionals and bureaucracies 
who stand to benefit  
(ii) has promoted a monopoly in service provision that generally 
excludes the involvement, or the legitimacy of involvement, by other 
types of professionals or lay people 
(iii) has resulted in “services,” and the criteria by which such services are 
judged, being almost entirely controlled by the professional rather 
than by the vulnerable help seeker 
(iv) has led to “empire building” and the redefinition of existing 
problems as well as the discovery of wholly new ones that 
medicalization would have us believe is the job of medicine to solve 
(v) has created a seemingly indefinite expansion of needs and problems 
based on human definition and a growing awareness that illness has 
not, in fact, been conquered by the creation of a national health 
service. On the contrary, the very agencies dealing with these 
                                                     
34 For a balanced analysis, see: R.A. Bryant, 'Prolonged Grief in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 5th Edition', Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 27 (2014). 
35 For a thoughtful critique of the levels of medicalization that emerge and operate beyond the control 
of physicians themselves, see: P. Conrad and J.W. Schneider, 'Looking at Levels of Medicalization: A 
Comment on Strong's Critique of the Thesis of Medical Imperialism'. 
Chapter Three – Three opponents of wonder 
45 
 
problems have played, and still play, a central role in their discovery 
and development  
(vi) has contributed to the possibility of the limitless expansion of any 
one profession, given the relative nature of need and the flexible 
nature of professions 
(vii) has informed the perception of aetiology as something to be 
understood in individualistic terms rather than something related to 
a social problem. Hence, “symptoms” are separated from the culture 
in which they emerge which consequently leads to the 
“depoliticisation” of social problems 
(viii) has resulted in such problems being primarily expressed in medical 
terms, with the emphasis being placed on science, and those 
professionals dealing with matters related to the sciences, including 
psychologists, psychiatrists, biologists, doctors. Even where such 
professionals do not directly manage or “treat” the help seeker, their 
doctrines inform the professions that do. 
(ix) has ultimately resulted in the construal and handling of 
contemporary social problems in predominantly “medical” terms  
(x) has contributed to the belief that effective prevention of disease must 
necessarily involve major social change rather than professional 
‘tinkering’ at the individual level 
(xi) has developed the perception of the help seeker as someone who is 
ultimately “addicted” to and “dependent” on professionals, medical 
or otherwise.36  
In his argument, Strong does not discount the “illegitimate medicalization of the 
social world,” which Simon Williams agrees is a well-rehearsed issue. Instead, he 
uses the thesis of medical imperialism to excoriate sociology’s covetousness of 
medicine’s power and territory. Strong claims, for example, that sociology has only 
prospered through its critique of medicine while attempting to capture some of its 
status in the process. “Sociologists may be said to play a double game, seeking the 
support of the less powerful on occasion but in turn using this alliance to foster its 
                                                     
36 These points have been synthesised from Strong’s work and summarized by Williams as well. See: 
P.M. Strong, 'Sociological Imperialism and the Profession of Medicine a Critical Examination of the 
Thesis of Medical Imperialism', pp. 199-200; S. Williams, 'Sociological Imperialism and the Profession 
of Medicine Revisited: Where Are We Now?', Sociology of Health & Illness, 23 (2001), p. 137.   
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other alliances with those in power”.37 Such an accusation might appear to hobble 
even the most legitimate sociological critique of medicine, psychiatry or any other 
area of human concern, leaving the most vulnerable at even greater risk of 
exploitation. Yet, Strong’s claim has merit, even (or perhaps especially) for those 
para-professionals like myself, who find themselves embroiled to their benefit and 
ethical discomfiture in the cachet and trap of “the medical”. His coup-de-grace 
makes clear that sociology might ultimately create even greater problems than the 
ones it seeks to challenge. 
The critics of the "medical model" tend to forget that its use, however 
barbarous on some occasions, has been liberating in others. In an alienated 
world, the sick role, far from having the entirely conservative implications 
which some ascribe to it may serve as an individual defence and refuge. A 
fully social model, because it reintroduces human agency into health and 
illness, can serve, in a context where the state has still to wither away, as a 
means for an even more systematic oppression than is offered by organic 
medicine.38  
The acceptance of any barbarity in exchange for the “luxury” of being identified as 
“mentally ill” would seem to have little to recommend it. As Williams reminds us, 
however, Strong did not wholly discount the thesis of medical imperialism when he 
cautioned sociology against its own naivety and hubris. He acknowledged:  
          medicine’s own complex, multi-dimensional, multi-factorial knowledge base;                        
          its heterogeneous, if not faction riven, nature and internally contested  
          boundaries, and … the positive (as well as negative) contribution which  
          modern medicine makes”.39  
If the problem of medical imperialism is a complex mix with no “one” to hold 
responsible, the threat to the help seeker in community mental health care is no less 
real on that account. For, no matter where she is situated within the hierarchy, every 
clinician controls power over every vulnerable help seeker she encounters within 
this system. Strong’s challenge to the thesis of medical imperialism speaks volumes 
                                                     
37 P.M. Strong, 'Sociological Imperialism and the Profession of Medicine a Critical Examination of the 
Thesis of Medical Imperialism', p. 203.  
38 Ibid. p. 212.  
39 S. Williams, 'Sociological Imperialism and the Profession of Medicine Revisited: Where Are We 
Now?', p. 152.  
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about the interests of medical sociology, and allied health professionals working 
under the protection of medical authority. This authority keeps clinicians compliant 
and morally disengaged in the face of questionable clinical practices, assumptions 
and behaviours in exchange for a cut of the action that medicine has to offer.  
It is power and authority over individuals under care with which mental 
health should be concerned. These are the tools used to legitimise 
assessments, diagnoses, prescriptions, and hospitalisations. These 
tools…allow clinicians to medicalize human emotion, facilitate the removal 
of children from family homes, and report at their discretion to the full roster 
of professionals including police, probation officers, social workers, and 
family doctors who are similarly endowed.40 
3.4  Asymmetry 
The prototypical example is of a patient who arrives at a doctor's office and 
presents a complaint. The doctor, largely by way of questioning strategies 
that require delimited responses, works the complaint into biomedical 
categories that lack sensitivity to the patient's psychosocial concerns, life 
world, and folk understandings.41   
Medical asymmetry refers to the inevitable imbalance of power between the 
clinician and the vulnerable help seeker in a hierarchy of care to which the help 
seeker must submit. This asymmetry describes the “knowledge and authority that 
allows doctors to promulgate a bio-medical model of disease and simultaneously 
undermine patients' own experience and understanding”.42 Such inequality, 
according to Douglas Maynard, is negotiated and “interactively achieved” with 
patient consent, by using “ordinary talk” to enlist the opinion of the patient, and 
over-ride her opinion, experience and knowledge. This is ostensibly to forward 
legitimate evidence based on tests, assessments and their objective findings. The 
“evidence” presented to the help seeker in specialist language is loaded with larger 
social and economic implications related to treatment options, privileges and 
services. Asymmetry is not only weighted in terms of power differentials but also in 
terms of the biomedical model and the opinion of the professional supporting it.43  
                                                     
40 C. Racine, 'Loving in the Context of Community Mental Health', p. 114.  
41 D.W. Maynard, 'Interaction and Asymmetry in Clinical Discourse', American Journal of Sociology, 97 
(1991), p. 450. 
42 Ibid. p. 448.  
43 Ibid. p. 449.  
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3.4.1 The entrancement of medical authority 
Maynard describes this transaction as the “Perspective Display Sequence” which 
involves the affiliative move of the clinician making an inquiry by appearing to 
solicit an opinion.44 This is not simply to gain information but to gain an advantage, 
albeit collaboratively, that will enable the medical professional to endorse and trump 
the patient’s experience. Maynard analysed this particular manoeuvre in verbal 
exchanges between a diagnosing physician and a cohort of parents and guardians 
whose infants and children were referred to a clinic for developmental delays.  
The physician’s strategy aims to confirm the patient’s point of view while essentially 
exploiting it “to reinforce or affirm the position in the inviter’s response”.45 This 
sequence is used where caution is needed, for example, in the delivery of “highly 
charged diagnoses”. A developmental delay would surely qualify, given the 
repercussions of such a diagnosis on every aspect of that child’s life for the rest of 
her life, and the life of her family. Interestingly, such verbal manipulation helps to 
sell an idea that is not only outside the help seeker’s experience but that may 
actually deny it. The clinician’s reformulation of the problem that diminishes or 
selectively ignores the content of the help seeker’s experience, “permeates [the] 
doctor-patient interaction” and is a well-established phenomenon, although the 
reasons are less clear. Maynard suggests a number of possibilities including 
technology itself, by which he presumably means the technology of assessment and 
diagnosis.46 However, asymmetry is underscored by the “surveillance” of 
computerized documentation, which must at least appear to uphold institutional 
norms and imperatives and, most importantly, its unassailability.  
This is a complex picture when we consider how embedded the clinician is in a web 
of corporate accountability to “schools, school systems [and] government agencies”. 
The “orientation to social structure” is exceptionally “clear and concrete” when the 
clinician is accountable to every member of the immediate and extended clinical 
                                                     
44 D.W. Maynard, 'Perspective‐Display Sequences in Conversation', Western Journal of Communication 53 
(1989), pp. 91-103.  
45 Ibid. pp. 100-01.  
46 D.W. Maynard, 'Interaction and Asymmetry in Clinical Discourse', p. 483.  
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team.47 She is also accountable to the help seeker’s employers, medical insurers, 
physician, lawyer, probation officer, financial worker, as well as the police, the 
Ministry of Children and Family Development, and the welfare office, among 
others. Within this “social safety net,” the help seeker becomes, in no small way, the 
common property of every professional within and beyond the walls of community 
mental health.  
There are checks and balances in this structure that are beneficial and detrimental to 
the clinician and the individual seeking help. However, the clinician within this 
corporate structure must learn to bend or skilfully manoeuvre around pressures 
exerted upon her if she values her employment and professional reputation.48 
Matters of individual ethical importance are sacrificed routinely in the interests of 
the hierarchy that maintains the integrity of the ruling structure and keeps workers 
in line.  
3.4.2 Tread lightly! 
I am in my office when the Centre manager and the line manager of my team both 
come in looking very serious and shut the door without asking permission. All 
clinical staff members are being subjected to this process—the auditing of their 
clinical files—and I am well prepared but suddenly feel invaded and wary. All 
clinical notes are computerized and mine have already been accessed and examined 
by these two. My notes tend to be extensive, neutral, observational and itemized 
with tasks to which I must attend on the client’s behalf or that need to be fulfilled by 
the client.  
The issue of confidentiality is discussed with each help seeker. At the beginning of 
“treatment,” his or her signature is requested as “proof” of the clinician’s due 
diligence, and the help seeker’s agreement to the “ethical” and “confidential” 
contract into which she is entering with the institution. But this is an invention 
within a system where every word documented about a given individual is stored 
within a computerized file. These files can be accessed by employees from other 
hospitals and other community mental health centres operating within an enormous 
jurisdiction, although admittedly, with some restrictions. Interestingly, the penalty 
for going into the system to look at one’s own personal medical file is immediate 
dismissal.  
                                                     
47 Ibid. pp. 478-80.  
48 K. Lamb, R. Pies, and S. Zisook, 'The Bereavement Exclusion for the Diagnosis of Major Depression: 
To Be, or Not to Be', p. 20.  
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Something is clearly wrong with my work. Without much preamble, the manager 
who is now sitting beside me in front of the computer monitor asks me to go a 
particular file to access a note he has me read as proof of my transgression. I have 
written something about a help seeker who, following recent surgery now breathes 
through a small hole, a stoma, in his neck. This man has had to re-learn to speak 
through this apparatus but also to blow his nose and cough through it, which is 
unsettling to witness and embarrassing for this man to do in the presence of others. 
He turns away when he coughs or removes phlegm from his throat with a Kleenex 
and apologises. Yet, he does so with some frequency as his condition causes him to 
suffer chronic lung infections. When he asks permission to put his Kleenex in my 
office waste paper basket, I typically pick it up and place it on the floor in front of 
him so he doesn’t have to reach.  
My apparent insurrection lies in a statement I have made about the distress he has 
expressed regarding his probation officer who prohibits him from putting his used 
Kleenex in the office wastepaper basket. This has occurred on several occasions and is 
a source of mortification and rage for my client. I have allowed myself one carefully 
worded sentence reporting my client’s experience in neutral terms. 
The Centre manager wants to know why I have written this. He is looking very 
intently at me, the arms of our chairs are touching, the file is open on the screen 
before us and my mind goes completely blank. An unpleasant tingling begins to 
spread up my back from the base of my spine. The line manager, whose 
micromanagement I am constantly attempting to deflect, is in a chair behind us and 
pipes up that I could get into trouble for writing this. I coolly ask her what kind of 
trouble that might be but I feel the fear they want me to feel. She has no answer. 
They want to know if I am aware of having written something that could reflect 
badly on the team’s relationship with the probation office across the street from us, 
and imply that my own job could be at risk. I remonstrate but sound defensive. I 
have sinned against the hierarchy and it will not be tolerated for here deference to the 
system is law and one’s solidarity with a vulnerable help seeker is more wisely 
expressed in private or not at all. 
3.4.3 Hermeneutic injustice 
 Miranda Fricker’s work on hermeneutic injustice demonstrates the significance of 
the dynamic that Maynard has examined. Hermeneutic injustice is “the injustice of 
having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from collective 
understanding owing to a structural prejudice in the collective hermeneutical 
Chapter Three – Three opponents of wonder 
51 
 
resource”.49 Fricker has observed that in the gap of unidentified experience there is 
no description because the injustice is hidden, “un-languaged,” and therefore 
invisible to collective social awareness. Fricker illustrates this phenomenon in her 
analysis of a story found in Susan Brownmiller’s work on the rise of the American 
women’s liberation movement. This story documents the discovery of “sexual 
harassment” and the “aha” moment that revealed a truth that was finally and 
collectively recognized.50 Its “discovery” may not have eliminated the problem, but 
sexual harassment is now legitimized as unjust and illegal. The strength of Fricker’s 
work lies in her interest in naming this gap and in bringing it to collective awareness 
by singling out its essential, undeniable injustice. “For something to be an injustice it 
must be harmful but also wrongful, whether because discriminatory or otherwise 
unfair”.51  
If we return to the asymmetry in Maynard’s example of the diagnosing clinician, we 
can see that such injustice or even wrongfulness is not so easily assigned. What is 
wrong after all, with a concerned and over-extended paediatrician doing his best to 
relay difficult news to frightened parents about the developmental delay of their 
child? Fricker’s work, however, suggests that even if the physician was grieved to 
do so, the significance of the parents’ powerlessness is of greater concern. For, she is 
the one who is suffering the injustice and for that reason, is more disadvantaged 
whereas for the doctor “there is an obvious sense in which it suits his purpose”.52 
The clinician is not the one labouring to understand within this asymmetrical 
relationship. Nor will he have to live with the full implications of a diagnostic label, 
treatment plan and system of care that he is recommending. Thus, while both 
parties may be “cognitively handicapped by the hermeneutical lacuna,” only the 
patient is seriously disadvantaged.  
The cognitive disablement prevents her from understanding an important 
patch of her experience; that is, a patch of experience which is strongly in her 
interests to understand, for without that understanding she is left deeply 
                                                     
49 M. Fricker, 'Powerlessness and Social Interpretation', Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 3 
(2007), p. 100.  
50 S. Brownmiller, In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution (London: Dial Press, 1999), pp. 279-94.  
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troubled, confused, and isolated, not to mention vulnerable to continued 
harassment. Her hermeneutical disadvantage renders her unable to make 
sense of her on-going mistreatment, and this in turn prevents her from 
protesting it, let alone securing effective measures to stop it.53  
Fricker’s work is coming under scrutiny by researchers examining its relevance to 
health care. Havi Carel and Ian Kidd employ Fricker’s work on testimonial injustice 
to explore the difficulties of communication between doctors and patients.54 The 
well-known complaint of people not being or feeling heard by their physicians is 
borne out by the evidence.  
“[T]he epistemic concerns of patients continue to be voiced through a vast 
body of pathographic literature, including online patient support groups, 
blogs, narratives, and listserves. These attest to patients’ persistent 
experiences of being ignored, marginalized, or epistemically excluded by 
those professions who are charged with their care”.55  
Carel and Kidd focus their analysis on the experience of people with chronic 
“somatic illness,” as opposed to mental illness, which I would suggest offers even 
greater opportunity for this type of injustice.  
Actual and potential testimonial injustice is endemic within mental health 
service delivery. For example, central to mental health legislation is the idea 
that some people lack the capacity to make decisions and it follows that what 
they might say, how they construe problems, their choices and preferences 
lack coherence, logic, or credibility. It is not surprising then that the 
testimony of all or most people who use mental health services might be 
considered suspect.56  
The global implications of such injustice are immense. Indeed, Richard Lakeman’s 
observation in the preceding quote confirms Fricker’s description of hermeneutical 
injustice as “a kind of structural discrimination”.57 This would suggest that 
testimonial injustice is part of the very framework of institutional mental health 
care. Carel and Kidd express the same concern a little differently.  
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Since the social and epistemic practices of giving information to others and 
interpreting our experiences is integral to our rationality, identity, agency, 
and dignity, it is evident that injustice which harm our testimonial and 
hermeneutical capacities will be sources of very deep harm.58  
The problem of asymmetry between the professional and the vulnerable help seeker 
can hardly be overstated. If Maynard’s work illustrates the profile and dynamic of 
asymmetry in action, Fricker’s work identifies two kinds of injustice within it. In 
clinical care, hermeneutic injustice identifies the help seeker’s lack of understanding 
within the asymmetrical clinical encounter but also within the system of care in 
which her life may become subsumed and harmed. Testimonial injustice occurs 
when a hearer discredits, diminishes, or disbelieves the testimony of another. 
Testimonial injustice provides additional evidence for the significance of 
hermeneutical injustice. It also describes the phenomenon underwritten in 
community mental health care that legitimizes the flagrant abuse of the help 
seeker’s trust. This injustice is well documented in literature examining the final 
barrier to ethical care that we will discuss in the following section.  
3.5  Dehumanization 
The ethical ideals of the medical profession are often and routinely unmet. 
One way this happens is when subtle forms of dehumanization enter 
hospital life. Specifically, care-givers may treat patients less like persons and 
more like objects or nonhuman animals—situations that physicians 
themselves often satirize.59 
The “essence of dehumanization” is a process that denies the “distinctly human 
mind” of another person. This includes the denial of a person’s experience or 
agency and her ability to feel the full spectrum of human emotion, including his or 
her capacity to choose and to act.60 When we deny the experience of others, we tend 
to treat and to see them as machines. When we deny the agency of others, we are 
more likely to treat them like animals, “dogs, pigs, rats, parasites, or insects…. At 
other times they are likened to children, their lack of rationality, shame and 
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sophistication seen patronizingly as innocence”.61 The most sobering form of 
dehumanization occurs when another human being is described as “vermin” or 
filth.62 While generally tied to the horrific violence of genocide like the Holocaust or 
the Rwandan massacre63 the anathema of dirtiness and infection is not limited to 
such extremes.  
3.5.1  Staff toilets only 
Discussions about the disgust that a number of mostly female clinicians felt about 
having “our” toilets used by patients, routinely occurred during staff meetings and 
the majority of the staff was female. Reasons given were that the toilets were left in a 
mess; they smelled bad and were not being flushed after use. Apparently used paper 
towels were not being placed in the bin but left on the sink and there was the 
possibility of catching something off the toilet seat or of finding the toilet seat wet or 
soiled. Dirtiness was a major theme of concern. A boundary of great propriety was 
seen to be crossed when a patient was allowed by a staff member to use “our” toilets, 
and always reflected poorly on the clinician who provided such access. 
Such dehumanization was generalized to the management of the patient toilet itself 
that was located in the waiting room area and which, for a number of years, had been 
available for the convenience of anyone waiting to be seen by a clinician. Later, the 
installation of a buzzer system required whoever needed to use the toilet to go to the 
reception window and ask to be let in. At which point the receptionist would press a 
loud buzzer announcing that the door to the toilet had been open for the individual 
to proceed. This alerted anyone else sitting in the waiting room that permission had 
been requested and granted. Part of the justification for these changes was that 
people off the street might be coming in to use drugs in the toilet, or were coming in 
off the street to use a toilet that was “reserved” only for registered patients.  
The issues of cleanliness, propriety, and territoriality were once again on the agenda 
when the old padded chairs in the waiting room were replaced with hard metal 
benches that were nailed to the floor. These were apparently installed to discourage 
walk-ins off the street from sitting or sleeping in the waiting room if it was cold or 
raining outside. They were also easier to “clean” with a quick spray of disinfectant 
and a wipe down with a paper towel. Similarly, a phone that had been formerly 
available without request for people in the waiting room was suddenly removed. 
Requests to use the phone then had to be made to the receptionist who would pass the 
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phone out through the reception window from where the call would be conducted 
within a few feet of the witnessing receptionist.  
All of these strategies designed for safety, hygiene and fairness were at the exclusive 
expense of those least able to maintain and manage their own lives—or to afford the 
luxury of a cell phone or even a bank account—including the homeless. 
Nick Haslam’s review of the literature reveals the presence of dehumanization in a 
surprising number of fields from medicine to modern art, reminding the reader that 
dehumanization is ubiquitous.64 Curiously, it is not a question of whether we 
dehumanize but only how and how much.  
3.6  Types of dehumanization 
Medical dehumanization expresses itself in various ways. Dissimilarity, for example, 
arises simply by virtue of a clinician’s perception of herself as different from the 
help seeker, based on the fact of his illness, his label, and the imbalance of power 
between them. Dissimilarity is tied to power and objectification where “the 
experience of power leads people to treat people as a means to an end rather than as 
ends in themselves”.65 Other research demonstrates the ranked nature of 
objectification predicted by the amount of power held by an individual. 
Objectification is “an instrument of subjugation whereby the needs, interests, and 
experiences of those with less power are subordinated to those of the powerful”.66 
These authors note that philosopher Martha Nussbaum underscores the importance 
of “instrumentality” where “the target is a tool for one’s own purpose”.67 One series 
of experiments, for example, showed that “high-power perceivers were more 
attracted to targets’ usefulness, defined in terms of the perceiver’s goals, than were 
perceivers in low-power and baseline conditions”.68 Those with the highest power 
tended to objectify subordinates and peers while people with lower power only 
objectified their subordinates.  
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There are many clinical practices contributing to objectification including de-
individuation, where a person’s identity is lost in the anonymity of the patient group. 
In contrast, mechanization appears to contribute to clinicians’ withdrawal of empathy 
and to their moral disengagement.69 Such observations are relevant to community 
mental health settings where, despite the purported collaboration of multi-
disciplinary team members, there is a clear demarcation of professional ranks—
likely unstated—and well-established chains of command. Within such a structure, 
everyone is at risk of being objectified by superiors or peers with the exception of the 
vulnerable help seeker who, in being the most subordinate of all, is objectified by 
definition.70 Nonetheless, a clinician’s ability to recognize that she is dehumanizing a 
help seeker may well elude her, even while she is being dehumanized herself.  
3.6.1  Infra-humanization 
Infra-humanization is an emerging phenomenon in the literature on dehumanization 
that has special relevance for clinicians because it is so difficult to detect.71 Its theory 
is concerned with the formation of in-groups and out-groups and the process by 
which in-group members assign themselves a greater share of “human essence”.72 
Infra-humanization does not reduce anyone to an animal or a machine but to 
something a little less human than “in-group” members. This human essence relates 
to what are defined as primary and secondary emotions. The primary emotions are 
those recognized as being shared by both in-group and out-group members as well 
as even animals. It is the secondary emotions that we apparently view as the most 
uniquely human which we, therefore, tend to assign only to members of our in-
group. For example, a number of studies have shown that a group tends to be infra-
humanized if they are considered to lack “intelligence, language, and uniquely 
human emotions”.73  
                                                     
69 O.S. Haque and A. Waytz, 'Dehumanization in Medicine Causes, Solutions, and Functions', pp. 177-
79.  
70 My italics. The authors state: “[W]e assume that subordinates are objectified almost by definition”. 
See: D.H. Gruenfeld and others, 'Power and the Objectification of Social Targets', p. 114.  
71 J.P. Leyens and others, 'Emotional Prejudice, Essentialism, and Nationalism: The 2002 Tajfel Lecture', 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 33 (2003), p. 703.  
72 S. Demoulin and others, 'The Role of in‐Group Identification in Infra‐Humanization', International 
Journal of Psychology, 44 (2009), p. 4.  
73 Ibid. p. 6.  
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Interestingly, infra-humanization operates regardless of group status, meaning that 
out-group members of higher or lower ranking groups may be similarly infra-
humanized. This can occur in the context of a community mental health team 
where, for example, clinicians infra-humanize managers, nurses infra-humanize 
counsellors, administrative staff infra-humanize the clinicians and the entire team 
infra-humanizes the patients. Infra-humanization combines “in-group favouritism 
and out-group derogation,” which cannot be understood as favouritism alone 
because infra-humanization is contingent on the difference between groups being 
meaningful.74   
One group of researchers has suggested that our need for significant others, and the 
importance of these relationships to us, necessitate the creation of out-group 
members.75 Indeed, “the more a group is perceived as essential and the more that 
people identify with their in-group, the higher the level of infra-humanization”.76  
Infra-humanization, like moral exclusion, delegitimization, and lesser-
perceived humanity, probably constitute a strong defence mechanism for 
those who want to live in a quiet environment. It explains how one can 
watch apartheid, wars, and genocide on TV without being too much 
disturbed, or having to be sent to a psychiatric hospital”.77  
Infra-humanization may help explain how clinicians can be involved with 
institutional practices and systems they recognize as morally wrong, and 
devastating for the vulnerable help seeker, without being sufficiently distressed to 
protest or protect. There is sufficient research to predict the occurrence of infra-
humanization but the mechanism is still not well understood.78 Most interestingly, 
this form of dehumanization “occurs in the absence of intergroup conflict and 
therefore extends the scope of dehumanization well beyond the context of cruelty 
and ethnic hatred,” which further contributes to its invisibility.79  
                                                     
74 J.P. Leyens and others 'Emotional Prejudice, Essentialism, and Nationalism: The 2002 Tajfel Lecture', 
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75 Ibid. p. 704.  
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79 N. Haslam, 'Dehumanization: An Integrative Review', p. 255.  




Another pernicious form of dehumanization is stigmatization. One group of 
researchers investigated five separate factors influencing the public’s interaction 
with those who have “mental health problems”. These included: 1) behaviour, 2) the 
reasons or causes of the behaviour, 3) perceived dangerousness of the person to 
others, 4) the pathologizing label and 5) the person’s socio-demographics. All of 
these factors appear to contribute to the avoidance and fear of the mentally ill. There 
is generally greater acceptance of problems related to “structural causes (e.g., stress 
or genetic/biological causes),” and less acceptance of problems associated with 
alcohol or drug misuse.80 The ranked nature of each of these variables suggests the 
complexity of out-group construction.  
The greatest concern is the prevalence and impact of stigmatization given the levels 
of aversion expressed towards people with mental health problems. We do not like 
the “mentally ill” coming into our homes or marrying into our families. We do not 
value having them as colleagues at work or as friends, neighbours or residents in 
nearby group homes.81 Other research on stigma, stereotyping and employment has 
shown that public stigma tends to be lower if someone with mental illness reports 
having worked in the past three months to a year, but is otherwise higher.82 Such 
stigma is further complicated by the difficulty involved in finding and keeping 
employment when one is labelled with a mental illness. Not surprisingly, such 
attributions appear to lead to social avoidance and segregation in the work place. It 
is self-stigma, however, which internalizes the devastating and isolating effects of 
public stigma. This may well be the form of stigma that results, poignantly, in so 
many help seekers being identified as having “low self-esteem”.  
As far back as the 1950s, research indicated that a mentally ill person would likely 
be perceived “with fear and dislike”. The strength of public aversion has, however, 
been tempered in recent years with a “sophistication” of understanding and social 
                                                     
80 J.K. Martin, B.A. Pescosolido, and S.A. Tuch, 'Of Fear and Loathing: The Role of 'Disturbing 
Behavior,' Labels, and Causal Attributions in Shaping Public Attitudes toward People with Mental 
Illness', Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 41 (2000), p. 208.  
81 Ibid. p. 219.  
82 P.W. Corrigan, K.J. Powell, and N. Rüsch, 'How Does Stigma Affect Work in People with Serious 
Mental Illnesses?', Psychiatric rehabilitation journal, 35 (2012), pp. 381-83.  
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tolerance brought about by campaigns to educate the public about mental health. 
These are “based on scientific research portraying mental illness as a “disease” 
rather than a “moral flaw”.83 This strategy also supports medicalization by 
legitimizing symptoms as “pathology” while denying or ignoring the larger social 
context of the distress, and stigma persists despite ongoing campaigns to address it. 
Help seekers, in sum, are almost inevitably dehumanized and stigmatized within 
the institution and beyond its walls. All of which contributes to the scourge of self-
stigmatization and damage to every aspect of a person’s private, social and work 
life. Yet, the case of the “heart-sink” patient illustrates that stigmatization can be 
even more grievously perpetuated.  
3.6.3 The heart-sink patient 
The heart-sink patient corresponds to a demographic that apparently causes a 
clinician’s heart to sink, and their numbers are legion in the halls of community 
mental health care.84 Help seekers labelled with a Borderline Personality disorder 
are especially vulnerable to this form of stigma.85 They are seen as using and 
abusing valuable resources and time that too often fail to provide significant change 
in the help seeker’s life.86 The homeless also belong to the heart-sink cohort because 
their needs are so extensive and complex. Homeless people are hard to reach, 
difficult to coax off the street and to treat effectively or consistently. Their diagnostic 
profile is made more complicated by alcohol and drug abuse and homelessness 
itself. 
A brief digression on the label of BPD illustrates just how destructive this type of 
stigma can be. People with this diagnosis can challenge the system given their 
tendency to self-harm, the chronicity of their crises, their serial hospitalizations and 
their typically lengthy connections to mental health facilities. Community mental 
                                                     
83 J.K. Martin, B.A. Pescosolido, and S.A. Tuch, 'Of Fear and Loathing: The Role of 'Disturbing 
Behavior,' Labels, and Causal Attributions in Shaping Public Attitudes toward People with Mental 
Illness', p. 209.  
84 C.C. Butler and M. Evans, 'The 'Heartsink' Patient Revisited', British Journal of General Practice, 49 
(1999). 
85 See: D. Markham, 'Attitudes Towards Patients with a Diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder': 
Social Rejection and Dangerousness'. 
86 R.E. Drake, F.C. Osher, and M.A. Wallach, 'Homelessness and Dual Diagnosis', American psychologist, 
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health care is poorly equipped, for many reasons, to provide the necessary care to 
this cohort. Yet, it is almost impossible to deny treatment to an individual dealing 
with this level of acuity during a period of crisis, on legal grounds alone.  
The sobering implications of “heart-sink” stigmatization captured in one study 
showed that a group of 50 mental health nurses were “the least optimistic about 
patients with a BPD label and…more negative about their experience of working 
with this group”.87 This diagnosis alone is so damning that it appears to contribute 
to the blame clinicians assign people with this diagnosis. Blame is highly correlated 
to the perceived control that people feel others have over their own behaviours. Not 
surprisingly, the contempt, fear and distrust experienced by clinicians who work 
with this cohort contribute to impoverished levels of care.  
In terms of general medicine, Christopher Butler and Martyn Evans note that:   
Several authors have associated psychopathology, depression, 
psychosomatic illness, lower social class, being female, having thick clinical 
records, being older, having more acute and chronic medical problems, and 
making greater use of health care services with ‘difficult’ patients.”.88  
Heart-sink patients can be referred to by clinicians as “black holes,” “difficult,” 
“hateful” and “health care abuser”.89 Where I worked they were also described as 
“cutters,” “resistant,” “combative,” “revolving doors,” “frequent flyers,” 
“privileged” and “non-compliant”. The sense of emotional disengagement that GPs 
have reported when dealing with heart-sink patients denies the legitimacy of the 
help seeker’s request as well as her humanity.  
Patients’ complaints were not legitimate demands on medical care, reflecting 
the absence of “real” illness; it was impossible to help them, or it was 
pointless to try, because they refused what GPs thought was necessary or 
they were unwilling to change. Denigratory language was common and a 
few GPs were explicit in their dislike.90  
                                                     
87 D. Markham, 'Attitudes Towards Patients with a Diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder': 
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89 Ibid. p. 231.  
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Such aversion arguably relates to a bias for bio-medical care and physicians’ 
tendency to undervalue the psychological or professional intolerance for 
uncertainty, and the failure of physicians to manage this population skilfully.91 Yet, 
in community mental health care, one might reasonably expect such aversion to be 
tamed—subdued. That is, by nature of the work, the great focus placed on the 
therapeutic relationship, and the clinician’s psychological education, training and 
skill. Yet, such is not the case. 
3.6.4 The blue file 
I don’t remember her name, only that she finally stopped calling. She was a 
Borderline, a woman not even forty with an adult daughter who lived in town, so 
she had someone. She’d had repeated suicide attempts, she’d used up the system, she 
had a two inch file, nothing helped, nothing worked, she expected too much and had 
been seen at the Centre too many times, so I was told. She was just another 
revolving door with a string of para-suicidal attempts behind her and another go-
round would change nothing. I’d never met her, didn’t even know what she looked 
like, but she called and called and badgered me to get her in. I was doing intake at the 
time—assessment and triage—and had already presented her case and been refused 
by the team. She didn’t meet the mandate, whatever that was, but she was 
overdrawn.  
By the time she stopped calling I felt fairly skillful at blowing her off and took small 
pride at having put out that little fire. What could I do? Her file would only be 
refused again. It was still on my desk sometime later—a month or more at least—
when I heard that she’d succeeded in killing herself. I can’t remember how I heard or 
how she did it. Pills probably, and alcohol, she abused alcohol. I vaguely remember 
someone asking me if I was alright, I must have looked upset. I wasn’t alright. I was 
not alright. I think I asked if I could go to the funeral but was discouraged from 
doing so. Someone suggested that my presence there could be interpreted as an act of 
culpability. But wouldn’t it have been? I didn’t go. Anyway, I carried that file in my 
arms, along with my other work, to and from the room where staff collected their 
armload of files from a cubicle in the morning and put them back at night. I carried 
that woman’s file for six months before I could finally put it away.  
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3.6.5 The dehumanized clinician 
The impact of dehumanizing a vulnerable help seeker or of colluding in such 
dehumanization can leave a clinician devastated by her work.92 It is widely 
recognized that indirect exposure to trauma involves an inherent risk of significant 
emotional, cognitive and behavioural changes in the clinician. This is a phenomenon 
described in such terms as vicarious traumatization (VT), secondary traumatic stress 
(STS) and compassion fatigue (CF), and is an occupational hazard of clinical work. It 
also constitutes a form of psychological trauma confirmed by a growing body of 
empirical research.93  
Vicarious trauma can be a daily fact of the clinician’s life in the routine processes of 
assessing and working with trauma survivors. This work also involves eliciting and 
witnessing the fine details of an individual’s trauma story and encouraging the 
repeated talking through of the story as part of the therapeutic process. One 
researcher suggests that through chronic exposure, clinicians “may show non-
recognition of the client’s experience, fragmented attention, limited empathy, 
intellectualization, or dehumanization”.94  
Very high levels of secondary traumatic stress (STS), and secondary traumatic stress 
disorder (STSD), affect from 17% to 64% of clinicians working with trauma. 
Interestingly STSD, much like PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder), is experienced 
by those—including clinicians—who are affected indirectly by the trauma 
experienced by the victim.95 Although many clinicians do not experience 
compassion fatigue, these statistics are relevant to clinicians in community mental 
health practice given the high incidence of trauma in the complex cases that 
                                                     
92 A significant portion of my caseload was weighted with individuals dealing with issues related to 
sexual, physical and emotional trauma, self-harming and suicide. 
93 B.E. Bride, M. Radey, and C.R. Figley, 'Measuring Compassion Fatigue', Clinical Social Work Journal, 
35 (2007), p. 155.  
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clinicians routinely handle.96 The impact of trauma on clinicians working with such 
cohorts may reach clinical levels of severity.97  
3.6.6 The insulin coma  
I am walking late at night around the fragrant garden of the apartment complex 
where I live in a seaside town outside Vancouver. I am crying while I walk, raging 
and thinking of the man whose story I heard today that had stolen my peace and I 
can’t sleep. He was dying of cancer and quietly distressed about what would happen 
to his sister when he was gone. She had been put into an insulin coma as a young 
woman decades previously. It was a barbaric, ill-informed psychiatric procedure that 
left her brain injured and incapacitated the whole of her adult life. This man, and 
now her only family member, had never married and had cared for her his whole life, 
at his own expense. His dignity was immense. There was no bitterness, only concern 
and sadness. He had no history of mental illness, was never unemployed and had no 
wish to hurt himself or anyone. It had simply made sense to him to contact an 
agency that was connected to the source of his problem, although he himself did not 
really know what he is asking for when we met.  
The needs of this man’s sister fall far outside the mandate of our Centre. But, he 
himself will be seen by a psychiatrist or doctor at our Centre and provided with 
counselling if only as a humanitarian gesture, given his story. From our standpoint, 
his acceptance for care is a privilege when the majority of all service requests are 
denied, especially since he has no history of mental illness, medication or previous 
hospitalization. But having made it through the front gate with my help, he will be 
diagnosed and medicated with an anti-depressant for his anguish and maybe 
something else for sleep. It is a supreme irony that I will be relieved to know that at 
least he will be seen by someone and will not be completely alone, even if his care 
requires a psychiatric diagnosis and medication to legitimize it. 
Dehumanization in community mental health presents as something of a closed 
loop. The clinical environment is oriented to a medicalizing, mechanistic approach 
to care that pathologises social ills and inequalities which, intentionally or not, co-
opts and disenfranchises the most vulnerable for its own purposes. Clinicians are 
also dehumanized through their on-going exposure to a profoundly distressed and 
socially isolated cohort whose life circumstances they have little or no means of 
ameliorating. The trauma stories of violence, abuse and injustice recounted by the 
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vulnerable help seeker can, and do, vicariously traumatize the clinician who is then 
at even greater risk of re-victimizing the vulnerable help seeker.  
3.7 Conclusion 
The implications of medicalization, asymmetry, and dehumanization are 
devastating and all encompassing. One might wonder what justification remains for 
labelling anyone with a mental illness beyond maintaining the machine it feeds. Yet, 
the depth and complexity of emotional suffering related to poverty, race, gender, 
violence and trauma, in all its forms, together with the immense financial burden of 
such suffering worldwide, may not be denied. Nor is the decline of community 
mental health care anywhere on the immediate horizon, given the ever-increasing 
call for the provision of more and better mental health care. At the same time, the 
need to humanize the vulnerable help seeker has never been greater.




Autoethnography: An invitation behind the mask 
Some ethnographers, now, desire their work to be both “scientific” and “literary”. I am one 
who does so desire. We recognize the historical split between scientific and literary writing 
that emerged in the 17th century as unstable and mutable”.1 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter examines an increasingly popular form of social research called evocative 
autoethnography and considers its relevance to our inquiry. Autoethnography is also called 
“auto-anthropology, autobiographical ethnography or sociology, or even personal self-
narrative research and writing, and combines ethnography and autobiography”. Simply 
stated this type of research is aimed at describing and analysing “(graphy)” the personal 
“(auto)” to illuminate the cultural “(ethno)”.2 A second type of autoethnography described 
as “analytic” differs significantly from evocative autoethnography in form and orientation 
and will be discussed shortly. However, “autoethnography” is generally associated with its 
evocative form, as it will be in this chapter.   
Autoethnography’s emergence in the past twenty-five years represents the fork in the road 
between old and new schools of ethnographers. Its performative approach focuses on the 
expression of emotion and a narrative style driven by the self-reflexive voice of the 
researcher/practitioner. It is characterized by a “postmodern scepticism” about the 
“generalization of knowledge claims”3 illustrated by a “minimalist” application of theory 
and criteria—for some autoethnographers more than others.4 Above all, autoethnography 
embraces a transparently moral and political agenda of particular relevance to this inquiry 
that takes aim at the anti-social and anti-socializing nature of the reductive worldview it 
opposes.  
Autoethnography is taking hold in the social sciences through the leadership of an 
influential group of mostly American scholars who are still refining and developing its form. 
                                                     
1 L. Richardson, 'Evaluating Ethnography', Qualitative Inquiry, 6 (2000), p. 253.   
2 C. Ellis, T.E. Adams, and A.P. Bochner, 'Autoethnography: An Overview', Historical Social Research/Historische 
Sozialforschung, 6 (2011), p. 273.   
3 L. Anderson, 'Analytic Autoethnography', Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 35 (2006), p. 373.   
4 A term used by Norman Denzin. See: N.K. Denzin, 'Moments, Mixed Methods, and Paradigm Dialogs', 
Qualitative Inquiry, 16 (2010), p. 424.  
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They include, among others, Carolyn Ellis, Arthur Bochner, Norman Denzin and Laurel 
Richardson.5 It is also gaining momentum in fields related to science education,6 medicine,7 
nursing and community mental health,8 psychology9 and counselling psychology.10  
In this inquiry, autoethnography plays a significant—but not quite central—role as we have 
already seen in James’ Story and elsewhere in the vignettes used throughout this inquiry. The 
vignette is a compelling narrative form which, like poetry, “makes another world accessible 
to the reader” by presenting “a lived experience” that is “emotionally and morally charged” 
because it is “felt”. Also like poetry, the vignette presents one single “candid photo” or 
“episode” of “epiphany” through which “[p]eople organize their sense of self.”11 Michael 
Humphreys describes the vignette as an approach that is explicitly reflexive.12  
Although the vignette’s epiphanic power lies in its reflexive potential, this epiphany can be 
stillborn as we see in one example of autoethnography written in a medical setting, where it 
is reduced to an acronym –“AEG ”.13 Here, the over-processed AEG lies dead on the page 
having been so contextualized, explained and graphically framed in black to separate it from 
the “real research,” that there is nothing left to see or feel. So intent are the authors on 
showing the reader the division between the “subjective” and the “objective,” that the 
narrative translates as the kind of “decorative flourish” Ruth Behar disparages. In failing to 
transgress or transform the reader’s perspective or—in Behar’s words—to add anything to 
the argument, the narrative cannot qualify as autoethnography.14 Yet, if mastery of execution 
is vital to its purpose, the question of excellence is less easily determined. 
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I have used autoethnography fluidly and intuitively in this inquiry to “perform” and 
problematize the moral issues rarely explored in clinical literature, and to illuminate the 
theory I am examining. As Norman Denzin observes, these “performance narratives do 
more than celebrate the lives and struggles of persons who have lived through violence and 
abuse”. They refer us back “to the structures that shape and produce the violence in 
question”.15 These are the structures that autoethnography has allowed me to infiltrate, 
illuminate and challenge as a clinician who struggled with and perpetuated this violence 
within her profession.  
This chapter consists of four main sections. The first of these is Ladies’ shoes and as the only 
narrative in this chapter, invites the reader behind the mask of this clinician into an affective 
process that describes an ethical morass. The story, indeed all autoethnography, invites the 
reader to appraise its narrative worth. To help with this task, we will briefly consider a 
number of fundamental “criteria” proposed by autoethnographer, Arthur Bochner.  
The second section situates autoethnography historically by analysing its recent emergence 
through the “paradigm wars” of the past 50 or more years. These wars essentially describe 
the fight for qualitative parity with quantitative research. As we shall see, the ongoing 
dominance of “scientific legitimacy” is entrenched in a positivist, quantifying, worldview 
despite the emergence of a good number of ideologies that refute its current authority. Our 
analysis will include examples of these ideologies to illustrate the ever-shifting backdrop of 
these wars and the ongoing struggle of qualitative researchers—and now 
autoethnographers—to resist the policing restrictions and interests of positivism.  
The third section examines four of the primary characteristics—or criteria—of 
autoethnography, including thick description, membership, self-reflexivity and narrative that we 
will examine along with the broader implications of their use. Finally, our chapter concludes 
with a brief synthesis and analysis of the most typical critiques levelled at autoethnography. 
These inevitably point back to the primacy of a “generalized” worldview and the 
unrelenting hold of “scientific” research still dominating the world stage. Our critique also 
considers the problem of power in research and the legitimate concerns of those who oppose 
autoethnography as well as its adherents. 
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4.2  Anatomy of an autoethnography 
[W]e need other forms of criticism, which are rigorous but not disinterested; forms of 
criticism which are not immune to catharsis; forms of criticism which can respond 
vulnerably, in ways we must begin to try to imagine.16 
4.2.1 Ladies’ Shoes 
It was my first few weeks on intake in community mental health. I had finally cinched a 
government job with the kind of salary and benefits package I’d waited too long to achieve. I 
wasn’t used to dealing with doctors and psychiatrists and nurses every day, it was foreign 
and everything moved fast. I only had a three-month contract and no back-up. I’d left a full-
time job I could no longer afford to keep, hoping that this might lead to something permanent. 
I could not fail. I’d lose the apartment if I couldn’t keep up the mortgage payments, my 
beautiful apartment with the little garden, south facing, and all mine.   
Besides the steep learning curve, the medical vibe of the place gave me an adrenaline rush 
with the onslaught of emergencies that came through the in-take phone lines or showed up at 
our door. The GP who called me that day was intense and wanted to know if he could get 
backing from a psychiatrist to force one of his patients to have dialysis who was suddenly 
refusing it. He needed a signature to certify his patient because this man needed dialysis right 
now. This man was one of “our” patients living uneventfully in a community housing 
situation with others who couldn’t manage on their own and who were taken care of by the 
state. They weren’t incarcerated or dangerous or locked up in a mental hospital. There was no 
psychiatric emergency, the resident had simply decided he’d had enough dialysis and made it 
clear—no thanks.  
But I got the hit, the drive of this doctor who would not be refused by his patient. I could hear 
the quaver of fear in his voice, could hear him breathing on the other end of the phone, the 
insistence, the urgency, and I could see it all made sense. Or did it? What was he afraid of, 
what was the panic after all? The GP knew this was not a standard practice, nor a clear-cut 
psychiatric matter, this was a physical illness and a personal choice. I had no idea how to 
proceed or what to say but I didn’t want him to know that and went to find out. It seemed like 
an important task and a murky situation. One of the staff psychiatrists I approached rolled his 
eyes wearily when he got the gist of the story and told me to leave it with him. A signature 
was found before the end of the day and the resident’s wishes were over-ridden. For his own 
good. It felt like a small victory for me, the newbie who’d helped finesse it all. 
I spoke a few days later to a staff member of this man’s residence. Had she called me to tell me 
or had I made a follow-up call to find out how things were going? I can’t remember. But I 
remember how it all happened in slow motion and unfolded like a film clip while we talked. 
Her words came slowly and deliberately, her voice was soft and tinged with sadness while she 
described this middle aged man as a character who’d always endeared himself to others with 
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his sweet ways and gentleness, his offbeat style and a penchant for wearing ladies’ shoes. He’d 
been known, seen, valued, possibly loved, if only by this staff member and then he was—gone. 
He’d reached some kind of endpoint, maybe he’d known he was about to die or simply wanted 
to, and had decided to claim this last act as his own, or tried. 
Neither of us said what was really on our minds, but that our hushed conversation belied. We, 
or someone, had brutally imposed his will—or hers—on another human being with the same 
rights as anyone but with no way to claim them in his vulnerable position. His sanctity and 
desecration were so surprising after all, emerging like this in his death. 
I didn’t want to think about the details but they arose while she kept talking in that slow, soft 
voice while I drifted away to wonder if they’d strapped him into a chair for this last, or almost 
last, dialysis. Maybe they’d restrained him in his bed or medicated him into submission 
beforehand. Or, had he finally acquiesced after a brow-beating from his doctor and the house 
staff, knowing there was no choice and doing it just to please them and get it over with? He 
died, anyway, a few days later.  
How could it be? The rush, the excitement, the mission I’d been on just days before of talking 
to that doctor, of discussing it with the psychiatrist. It had all worked out, only it hadn’t. 
There I was, sitting in a small, dimly lit, windowless consultation room bowed over the desk, 
holding the receiver tightly to my ear and looking blankly at the wood grain of the veneer on 
the desk while her voice trailed on. I was stunned, nauseous with the sense that I had this 
man’s blood on my hands. But why? I hadn’t done anything wrong. I’d only listened, I’d only 
asked, I’d only tried to help. I was only doing my job. Wasn’t I only doing my job?  
4.2.2  Appraising autoethnography 
Ladies’ shoe performs some of the major themes of our inquiry and invites the reader to 
appraise its narrative worth,17 but how is to be judged? Arthur Bochner provocatively 
suggests we should not use any criteria to judge an autoethnography as good or bad. He also 
suggests six general “qualities” that help him “feel with” a story, given the fundamental role 
of feeling and emotional integrity to autoethnography’s effectiveness and success.18 It is also 
true that in other literature related to autoethnography, these are “qualities” defined as 
criteria.19  
According to Bochner, the first of these qualities is thick description that calls for a richness of 
narrative detail. Ideally, this should evoke an interest in daily routines and the authenticity 
                                                     
17 Inviting the reader into the text to engage in such an evaluative process is not antithetical to the 
autoethnographic process but part of it, as this author illustrates. See: M. Humphreys, 'Getting Personal: 
Reflexivity and Autoethnographic Vignettes', pp. 850-51.  
18 A. Bochner, 'Criteria against Ourselves', Qualitative Inquiry, 6 (2000), p. 270.   
19 In the work of Guba or Lather, however, Bochner’s ostensibly non-evaluative “qualities” are defined with some 
considerable precision, including the quality of “thick description”.  
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of emotion discovered in negotiating unexpected and difficult circumstances. The second 
quality is a narrative line that is complicated and made interesting by a non-linear movement 
in the narrative that shifts the reader between the past and present, but also between the 
writer and her cultural context. The third quality emerges when the sincerity of the writer’s 
vulnerability accurately reflects and responds, in Bochner’s words, to “life’s limitations”. 
These relate to “the cultural scripts that resist transformation…contradictory feelings, 
ambivalence, and layers of subjectivity”.20  
Of greatest interest to the subject of wonder and the ethical is the fourth quality, which leads 
to transformation that is provoked by an epiphany to move the writer from who she was, to 
who she has become.21 The fifth, re-confirms the centrality of the writer’s ethical accountability 
and its evocation which emerges through the narrative. We find this articulated in Ladies’ 
Shoes during the phone call and the revelatory moment of horror and moral clarity, that 
exposes me to my responsibility for this utterly innocent man in whose betrayal I have 
undeniably participated. How effectively the narrative communicates this moral 
imperative—and only the reader can say—relates to the sixth quality, which is the story’s 
ability to move us. Without this quality, this momentum, the possibilities or meanings 
emerging from the story may not succeed in shifting our perspective, our thinking and 
behaviour.22  
These six qualities are at the heart of autoethnography’s unapologetic moral project and its 
resistance to the ongoing imposition of a positivist—generalizing—worldview. I have little 
interest in attempting to discredit science’s inestimable contributions to the world here. 
Nonetheless, my decision to use autoethnography to interrogate the moral ramifications of 
my clinical role has found me at the centre of an academic and ethical maelstrom.23   
4.3  Dodging bullets in the paradigm wars 
I have learned that heresy is greatly maligned and, when put to good use, can begin 
a robust dance of agency in one’s personal/political/professional life. So…I began 
writing and performing autoethnography concentrating on the body as the site from 
                                                     
20 A. Bochner, 'Criteria against Ourselves', pp. 270-71.  
21 Ibid. p. 270.  
22 Ibid. p. 271. Ellis describes similar characteristics. See: C. Ellis, T.E. Adams, and A.P. Bochner, 
'Autoethnography: An Overview', pp. 275-77.  
23 For a good overview, see: N.K. Denzin, 'Moments, Mixed Methods, and Paradigm Dialogs'. 
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which the story is generated.24 
The priority of social justice in qualitative research aims to address and redress the problem 
of dehumanization and the erosion of personal liberty.25 This is central to the project of 
evocative autoethnography that has incubated through the “paradigm wars” of the past fifty 
years.26 These are the wars between the interests of scientific based research—quantitative 
research—and qualitative research that have played out between these two opposing camps 
and among opponents within each one, in a constantly shifting ideological landscape. 
Denzin has theorized that no fewer than seven paradigmatic shifts have taken place from 
the beginning of the twentieth century to this present or “seventh moment”. While these 
shifts may cut across disparate historical periods and ideologies, they appear as Denzin 
claims, to be operating simultaneously. Far from being frozen or contained within their 
historical contexts, these differing and opposing ideologies are constantly interacting, 
competing and informing each other in this present moment.27 
Qualitative ground has been won and lost throughout these wars although at the end of the 
1990s Denzin observes that the “the key assumptions of the interpretive movement were 
demolished”. This occurred when the "incompatibility and incommensurability” debates 
emerged once again to derogate and destroy the legitimacy of qualitative research as 
“nonscience”. Yet, qualitative research does not and cannot employ the same criteria used to 
prove the validity and reliability of quantitative research.28  
Even within the qualitative camp, the criteria debate is fraught. Some argue for the need for 
rationalist criteria to improve the quality and standing of qualitative research. Others claim 
that the research community’s insistence on rationalist criteria undermines the legitimacy 
                                                     
24 T. Spry, 'Performing Autoethnography: An Embodied Methodological Praxis', Qualitative inquiry, 7 (2001), p. 
709.   
25 Denzin is impassioned about the need for a socially conscious approach to research given what he describes as 
the clear erosion of individual rights and the mobilization of a police state in America in the aftermath of 12/11. 
See: N.K. Denzin, 'Performing [Auto] Ethnography Politically', p. 258.  
26 N.K. Denzin, 'Moments, Mixed Methods, and Paradigm Dialogs', pp. 420-22.  
27 In 1994 Denzin noted 5 historical periods, and in 2001, 7 historical periods. See: 
N.K. Denzin, 'Romancing the Text: The Qualitative Researcher-Writer-as-Bricoleur', in Qualitative Methodologies in 
Music Education Research Conference, ed. by Bulletin of the Council for Research in Music Education' (University of 
Illinois Press, 1994), pp. 15-30 (p. 16); N.K. Denzin, 'The Reflexive Interview and a Performative Social Science', 
Qualitative research, 1 (2001), pp. 24-25.  
28 N.K. Denzin, 'Moments, Mixed Methods, and Paradigm Dialogs', p. 423.  
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and clout of qualitative research.29 Still others attribute the problem of legitimacy to a 
setback for qualitative research caused by the growing conservatism in research practice in 
the past ten years.30  
Further complicating this picture are those scholars describing quantitative and qualitative 
approaches as methods rather than paradigms, when methodology is actually secondary to 
the question of paradigm. For, certainly, the worldview of the researcher is as informed 
methodologically as it is ontologically and epistemologically.31 Indeed, the interests of this 
study strongly support such a view given the remarkable shift in research focus to the moral 
and political that is now heralding a “third paradigm”. 
A paradigm may be viewed as a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deal with 
ultimates or first principles. It represents a worldview that defines, for its holder, the 
nature of the “world,” the individual’s place in it, and the range of possible 
relationships to that world and its parts, as, for example, cosmologies and theologies 
do.32 
A brief analysis of the shifting ideologies forming the backdrop of the “paradigm wars” will 
help contextualize the historical emergence of this new paradigm. Four of these ideologies, 
sketched-in below, define positivism, post-positivism, constructivism and postmodernism.33 
4.3.1 Positivism 
Quantitative research generally reflects the values and beliefs of positivism, which claims 
the existence of an “apprehendable reality”. This is supposedly “driven by immutable laws 
and mechanisms…in the form of time and context-free generalizations, some of which take 
the form of cause-effect laws”.34 “The term positivism denotes the “received view” that has 
dominated the formal discourse in the physical and social sciences for some 400 years.”35 
This approach describes a reductive, rationalistic, deterministic or atomistic perspective seen 
only by the observer. The perspective assumes that whatever—or whoever—is being 
                                                     
29 L. Krefting, 'Rigor in Qualitative Research: The Assessment of Trustworthiness', The American journal of 
occupational therapy, 45 (1991), p. 214.  
30 S.J. Tracy, 'Qualitative Quality: Eight “Big-Tent” Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research', Qualitative inquiry, 
16 (2010), p. 838.  
31 E.G. Guba and Y.S. Lincoln, 'Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research', in Handbook of Qualitative Research, 
ed. by N. K. Denzin (Thousand Oak, CA: Sage, 1994), pp. 105-17.  
32 Ibid. p. 107.  
33 See Table 6.2 for an overview of the differences between positivism, post-positivism and constructivism see: 
ibid. p. 112.  
34 Ibid. p. 109.  
35 Ibid. p. 108.  
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observed is also completely independent of the researcher or, more accurately for our 
interests, dissociated from her.  
The precision developed through this kind of research is inarguably necessary when the 
goal is prediction and control, and may explain why mathematics has been called the queen 
of science.36 Yet, the ongoing dominance of positivism means that the “hard sciences” like 
chemistry and physics still command far greater respect and legitimacy. Whereas, those 
fields of research that do not quantify their findings, are derogated as “soft” sciences and 
deemed less valuable and less scientifically legitimate for that reason.   
4.3.2 Post-positivism 
By comparison, post-positivism embraces the notion of an ultimate reality we can only 
assume but never wholly grasp. Since we can never perfectly apprehend reality, the best we 
can do is approximate the truth by subjecting our research claims to critical examination. 
This process is “always subject to falsification” and accomplished by measuring or 
comparing the research to what is known—or agreed—and by submitting it to the scrutiny 
of the research community. 37 Its methods are practiced through qualitative approaches that 
recognize the importance of social context and meaning making on the part of its subjects. 
Norman Denzin describes this approach as multi-method, interpretive and naturalistic. Its 
methods include the use of case study, personal experience, introspection, life story, 
interview, observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts that describe routine and 
problematic moments and meanings in individuals’ lives.38 
4.3.3. Constructivism 
Constructivism moves beyond the notion of an ultimate truth to ideas about the fluidity of 
knowledge. In this instance, truth is not established but rather, informed and refined.39 The 
findings are “literally created” as the research emerges through the process occurring 
between and among investigators and respondents. “The naturalistic paradigm asserts … 
that the inquirer and the respondent (note the shift in terminology from “object”) are 
                                                     
36 Ibid. p. 105. 
37 Ibid. p. 110.  
38 N.K. Denzin, 'Romancing the Text: The Qualitative Researcher-Writer-as-Bricoleur', p. 16.  
214 E.G. Guba and Y.S. Lincoln, 'Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research', pp. 110-11. 
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interrelated with each influencing the other”.40 The outcome is consensual, co-created and 
evolving as autoethnography partially demonstrates. This kind of research started showing 
up on the desks of thesis committees, peer-review committees and journal editors as a new 
and emerging form of research demanding recognition.41 Finally, the academy had to 
respond to the demand for an emerging form of research that recognized new values and 
took aim at traditional research approaches. 
4.3.4 Postmodernism 
Finally, postmodernism shows the connection between truth and the “vocabularies and 
paradigms” used to describe it. Within this research, new relationships are established 
between “authors, audiences and texts” to resist the methods of those who formerly used 
and discarded the cultures they investigated. Postmodernism recognizes the significance of 
the story for its complexity and ability to communicate morally and ethically. It represents a 
move away from the notion of value-free to value-laden research that favours literature over 
the hard sciences.42 The self-reflexive voice that emerges as the centrepiece of this approach 
reflects the many possible ways of “knowing and inquiring,”43 enabling the researcher to 
become a “boundary-crosser” of a whole constellation of identities. These are constantly 
shifting and identify not only the speaker but also the one for whom she speaks.44  
4.4  The third paradigm 
These four ideologies trace the movement towards an emerging third paradigm that is 
beyond the current capacity or interests of quantitative, qualitative, or even “mixed 
methods” research, which combines the two. 
The field is on the edge of a new paradigm dialogue, a third formation existing 
beyond SBR45 and mixed methods. This is the space primarily filled by non-mixed 
methods interpretive researchers, the empowerment discourses: critical 
constructionists, feminists, critical pedagogy and performance studies; oral historians 
… and interpretive interactionists. These are scholars in a different space. They 
                                                     
40 E.G. Guba, 'Criteria for Assessing the Trustworthiness of Naturalistic Inquiries', Educational communication and 
technology, 29 (1981), p. 77.  
41 Ibid. pp. 75-76.  
42 C. Ellis, T.E. Adams, and A.P. Bochner, 'Autoethnography: An Overview', p. 274.  
43 S. Wall, 'An Autoethnography on Learning About Autoethnography', International Journal of Qualitative 
Methods, 5 (2008), pp. 147-48.  
44 D.E. Reed-Danahay, Auto/Ethnography (Berg New York, 1997), p. 3.  
45 SBR is the acronym for science based research. 
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seldom use terms like validity and reliability. For some, a minimalist approach to 
theory is endorsed. A disruptive politics of representation is the focus, as are the 
methods that disturb the smooth surfaces of SBR. Scholars are crafting works that 
move persons and communities to action ..."46 
Paradoxically, autoethnography’s strength lies not in the policing of boundaries or the 
imposition of theory and truth claims. It lies in the emotional intimacy and vulnerability of a 
well-crafted story and the emerging epiphany that may help “move” the reader and his or 
her communities to political action.47 There are no tidy boundaries in autoethnography 
between the “ethnographic, the artistic, the epistemological, the aesthetic, and the 
political”.48 
Despite the emergence of these new cultural perspectives and the ever-growing role of 
subjectivity, positivism is still the orthodox approach for empirical research.49 Research 
failing to reflect these positivist standards is consequently less well regarded, or rewarded, 
in terms of research dollars, authority, visibility, or “scientific” legitimacy.50 American 
qualitative scholar, Yvonna Lincoln, suggests the stakes are actually much higher than this. 
There is a “politics” of evidence. Beyond the questions of legitimacy, hegemony and 
reward structures at universities, there are larger questions, which subsume mere 
issues of legitimacy. Three of those questions are whether or not science has a moral 
aspect; who determines what counts as evidence and who is persuaded by it; and 
what is the nature of the “language game” which is being played out in the politics 
of evidence?51  
The policing function of the dominant discourse constantly overshadows autoethnography 
to threaten its legitimacy and development. Bochner has attempted to extricate 
autoethnography from this political tug-of-war by suggesting that these two ways of seeing 
are not so much opposing as simply incommensurable. He suggests that the arguments 
claimed by either side are ultimately "contingent on human choices”.52 Autoethnography 
                                                     
46 N.K. Denzin, 'Moments, Mixed Methods, and Paradigm Dialogs', p. 424.  
47 Ibid. p. 423. For more on this new paradigm, see also: N.K. Denzin, 'Aesthetics and the Practices of Qualitative 
Inquiry', Qualitative Inquiry, 6 (2000). 
48 N.K. Denzin, 'Aesthetics and the Practices of Qualitative Inquiry', p. 261. 
49 P. Lather, 'Issues of Validity in Openly Ideological Research: Between a Rock and a Soft Place', Interchange, 17 
(1986), p. 63.  
50 For new criteria suggested for qualitative research, see: S.J. Tracy, 'Qualitative Quality: Eight “Big-Tent” 
Criteria ', pp. 839-40.  
51 Y.S. Lincoln, 'On the Nature of Qualitative Evidence', in Annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Higher 
Eduction, (Nov. 21-24, 2002), pp. 1-23 (p. 16).  
52 A. Bochner, 'Criteria against Ourselves', p. 266.  
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does focus on the ethical and the epiphanic as opposed to a “pre-existing or static set of 
standards”. As Bochner confirms, however, the latter is what distracts us from the work of 
clarifying the “important differences that separate us,” and ultimately hobbles the progress 
of truly ethical research.53  
Denzin also suggests that “moral and epistemological discourses” need not be in conflict 
and are not antithetical to each other but can cohabit “side by side”. Evidence of which may 
be found in emerging fields of study on “[r]ace, ethnicity, sexuality, class, the research rights 
of indigenous peoples, whiteness, and queer studies”. These are now informing discourse 
that, Denzin observes, would never have occurred in the 70s and 80s.54 Nonetheless, the 
paradigm wars rages on.  
4.5  From ethnography to autoethnography and thick description 
In this section, we examine the rise of autoethnography from its ethnographic roots and 
consider the central role played by “thick description”. Ethnography is a theoretical field of 
practice aimed at deepening understanding of a given culture or group from an insider or an 
outsider’s perspective. The researcher is engaged first-hand in observing, participating and 
closely documenting the people within a given culture or environment.55 As a participant 
observer, the ethnographer uses “thick description” to develop her written accounts and to 
look for repeating patterns within that culture. These emerge in recurring themes found, for 
example, in songs, stories, belief systems, rituals or events.56  
“Thick description” is a term coined by leading American anthropologist, Clifford Geertz 
that emerged in the development of ethnography.57 It was an approach used to deepen 
knowledge and cultivate depth, perspective and understanding within single cases, as 
opposed to “codify[ing] abstract regularities” to generalize across cases.58 Thick description, 
Geertz claimed, was inseparable from cultural theory given the limitations of its inner logic. 
Any emerging ethnographic theory, he believed, must necessarily reflect back to this 
                                                     
53 Ibid. p. 269. 
54 N.K. Denzin, 'Moments, Mixed Methods, and Paradigm Dialogs', p. 424.  
55 C. Ellis, The Ethnographic I: A Methodological Novel About Autoethnography (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 
2004), p. 26.  
56 C. Ellis, T.E. Adams, and A.P. Bochner, 'Autoethnography: An Overview', p. 277.  
57 See: C. Geertz, 'Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture', in Turning Points in Qualitative 
Research: Tying Knots in a Handkerchief, ed. by Y. S. Lincoln and N. K. Denzin (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 
2003), pp. 143-68. 
58 Ibid. p. 165.  
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description and grow “out of the delicacy of its distinctions, not the sweep of its 
abstractions”.59 The strength of thick description lies in its resistance to generalization and its 
ability to glean not only difference but also the refinement and subtlety of such difference.  
Ethnography becomes autoethnography when this rich, detailed, evocative language focusses 
on the author within her own cultural context. Rather than the researcher remaining in the 
background, as she does in ethnography, the autoethnographer is the writer and 
protagonist. Her inner process, experience and response are central to the story and to an 
understanding of the social world that she inhabits.60 In this inquiry, as we have already 
seen, thick description eludes a generalizing, reductive perspective to evoke the 
irreducibility—the perfection, the inviolability—of the help seeker, while also asserting what 
is irrevocably relational between the clinician and the help seeker. The “method and text”61 of 
thick description justifies a minimalist approach to the use and development of theory in 
autoethnography. For, as Bochner reminds us, “there is nothing more theoretical than a 
good story”.62  
4.5.1 Evocative versus analytic autoethnography 
The issue of theory building emerges as the central debate between analytic and evocative 
autoethnographers, although this is something of a sidebar as autoethnography is generally 
identified with its evocative form. Nonetheless, the issue of generalizability is the main 
dividing line between these two types and the argument is heated.  
Denzin abandoned his own analytic roots for what he believes to be higher moral ground, 
despite the greater academic risks involved. He also strenuously objects to the appropriation 
of evocative autoethnography’s creative techniques by analytic autoethnographers who, he 
claims, continue to oppose “poststructural,63 antifoundational arguments” of the past quarter 
                                                     
59 Ibid. pp. 164-65.  
60 L. Anderson, 'Analytic Autoethnography', p. 384.  
61 D.E. Reed-Danahay, 'Auto/Ethnography', p. 8.  
62 A. Bochner, 'It's About Time: Narrative and the Divided Self', Qualitative Inquiry, 3 (1997), p. 435.  
63 Poststructuralism is defined as the abandonment of the aims of “transcendence,” characterized by a focus on 
“individual or particular/local resistance to the effects of power,” including power legitimized as transcendental. 
See: M. Morris, 'The Critique of Transcendence: Poststructuralism and the Political', Political Theory, 32 (2004). pp. 
121-122. Lather suggests that, poststructuralism and the autoethnographic are attempts to move from 
"yesterday's institutions" by focussing on the “difficulties involved in representing the social rather than 
repressing them in pursuit of an unrealized ideal”. See: P. Lather, 'Fertile Obsession: Validity after 
Poststructuralism', The Sociological Quarterly, 34 (1993), pp. 673, 76, 77.  
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century.64 Denzin derides his analytic colleagues for failing to “write messy vulnerable texts 
that make you cry,” and for “keep[ing] politics out of their research”.65  
Ethnography is a not an innocent practice…Through our writing and our talk, we 
enact the worlds we study…The pedagogical is always moral and political; by 
enacting a way of seeing and being, it challenges, contests, or endorses the official, 
hegemonic ways of seeing and representing the other.66  
In contrast analytic autoethnographer, Leon Anderson, calls for an approach to 
autoethnography that embraces theory building and claims the need for broader 
generalization.67 Despite these differences, analytic and evocative types still share three of 
five major characteristics which Anderson himself claims are central to autoethnography 
and which include, membership, self-reflexivity and narrative.68 
4.5.2 Membership 
American anthropologist, Davie Hayano, was the first to theorize the importance of the 
social connection between the researcher and the subject that is so fundamental to the 
interests of autoethnography. 69 This approach to research came to his attention in 1966 
during a seminar at the London School of Economics when the story was recounted of a 
“shouting match” that had occurred some years before between a black and a white African, 
Jomo Kenyatta and L.S.B. Leakey. Their ferocious argument hinged on Kenyatta’s study of 
his own people that brought into question the “validity of anthropological data” that did not 
also include a careful assessment of the “characteristics, interests, and origin of the person 
who did the field work”.70 Hayano went on to theorize this issue.  
Hayano claimed that the “membership” of the researcher to the subject(s) actually defined 
autoethnography and he theorized three possible types. In each case, membership 
minimally required that, “researchers possess the qualities of often permanent self-
identification with a group and full internal membership, as recognized both by themselves 
                                                     
64 N.K. Denzin, 'Analytic Autoethnography, or Déjà Vu All over Again', Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 35 
(2006), p. 421. 
65 Ibid. p. 421.  
66 See: ibid. p. 422.  
67 L. Anderson, 'Analytic Autoethnography', p. 388. 
68Anderson proposes five main characteristics for analytic autoethnography including, membership, reflexivity, 
narrative visibility of the researcher, dialogue with other informants and theoretical analysis. See: ibid. p. 378. 
69 C. Ellis, T.E. Adams, and A.P. Bochner, 'Autoethnography: An Overview', p. 278.   
70 D.M. Hayano, 'Auto-Ethnography: Paradigms, Problems, and Prospects', Human organization, 38 (1979), pp. 99-
100.  
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and the people of whom they are a part”.71 This represented a major step forward in 
addressing the problem of research conducted within a hierarchical system that had 
previously placed the “subject” below the researcher.72  
Such distinctions have blurred as the field advances, giving way to more contemporary 
ideas about affiliation and “co-participant” equality. 73 Carolyn Ellis, for example, recognizes 
even friendship as an ethical platform for moral research because it eliminates the 
researcher’s need to “pretend”. Ellis regretfully recounts how, earlier in her career, she and 
other colleagues had feigned friendship with research participants to obtain the information 
they required.74 In community mental health care, we find similar emotional manipulations 
replicated within the “therapeutic relationship” where the help seeker’s trust is conscripted 
in the service of clinical exigencies.75  
Encouragingly, the vocabulary describing the “subject” within ethnography has evolved 
over time, moving her ever closer to the researcher as an “informant” a “participant,” a “co-
participant” and now even a “friend”. The narrowing gap has changed the researcher’s role 
from the “privileged possessor of expert knowledge” to a collaborator and community 
member allied with her subject.76 This increasing intimacy has also opened the dialogue to 
ever more complex questions about relational possibilities that are moving autoethnography 
towards a form of moral practice and social activism. This approach has enormous salience 
for the clinical relationship in community mental health care and is an area of research that 
is virtually unexplored in psychological literature.77  
                                                     
71 Ibid. p. 100.  
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Reflexivity is central to autoethnography and becoming more widely accepted, Denzin 
insists, as part of a “global, reflexive, critical ethnography”.78 Reflexivity is an introspective 
process that mines the feeling, memory, cognition, impulse and physiological response of 
the researcher. These allow her to map new knowledge about a given experience or 
encounter.79 The reflexive voice of the researcher becomes the research itself in its reflection 
on her experience, process and role.80 
There are also various forms—theoretical approaches—of reflexivity. Of greatest interest to 
our inquiry is “confessional reflexivity” because it so closely allied to my own narrative 
interests and style.81 Carolyn Ellis describes confessional ethnography as the story about the 
research that early ethnographers typically kept separate from their public work. This term 
now refers to an approach focussed on the interaction between the researcher and the 
participant within the evocative writing process. Ellis prefers the term “ethnographic 
memoir” despite the problematic associations with memoir that undermine 
autoethnography’s legitimacy. Still, the term “confessional” is equally problematic given its 
connotations of shame, weakness and guilt used to derogate and dismiss autoethnography, 
and is an issue that Ellis, Behar and Bochner have addressed in their work.82 Nonetheless, it 
is the interior process of self and other interrogation, which transforms the researcher’s 
“beliefs, actions, and sense of self”.83  
In earlier conceptualizations of this term, reflexivity referred to one of several different 
practices aimed at increasing the “trustworthiness” of naturalistic research.84 These included 
daily journaling, “peer debriefings” or “member checks” that helped solicit participants’ 
response to the research. They also included the use of “triangulation,” aimed at testing 
                                                     
78 N.K. Denzin, 'Performing [Auto] Ethnography Politically', p. 268.  
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80 S. Wall, 'An Autoethnography on Learning About Autoethnography', pp. 147-48.  
81 For details on all three theoretical approaches to reflexivity, see: N.K. Denzin, 'Performing [Auto] Ethnography 
Politically', pp. 268-70.  
82 See: C. Ellis, 'The Ethnographic I: A Methodological Novel About Autoethnography', pp. 49-50.  
83 L. Anderson, 'Analytic Autoethnography', pp. 382-83.  
84 Guba translated quantitative criteria into criteria applicable for the qualitative approaches of naturalistic 
research and changed the concept of rigour as the primary measure of quantitative excellence to trustworthiness, 
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one’s reflexivity against various data sources, investigators, theories, and methods.85 This 
early formulation of reflexivity was entrenched in ideas of scientific neutrality and 
objectivity that have given way to the transparently political and subversive aims of 
autoethnographers that are openly “committed to a more just social order”.86 
In working to make a place for itself in the academy, autoethnography will need to establish 
clear criteria to claim its validity, no matter how persuasively those autoethnographers—
described as theoretically minimalist—may argue to the contrary. Patti Lather’s work on 
validity in autoethnography has shown that the issue of criteria is very much part of the 
dialogue. The work of developing, theorizing and translating quantitative criteria into their 
qualitative equivalent, and more specifically their autoethnographic equivalent, is ongoing 
and challenging. An example, found in the notion of “rigour” as a measure of quantitative 
merit, translates into the qualitative equivalent of “trustworthiness”.87 This skilful 
translation also reflects the necessary integrity of the writer’s process to the verisimilitude of 
her narrative, if she is to move the reader. It seems reasonable, therefore, to suggest that such 
trustworthiness does reflect the “rigour” of the story’s ethical veracity. These are also early 
days in the development of criteria that, Patti Lather cautions, will have to be fully 
articulated to genuinely support “morally engaged” research.88 
The role of reflexivity has changed significantly over time. No longer primarily or simply 
used to establish the legitimacy of naturalistic research as a respectably neutral player in 
empirical research, the self-reflexive voice is emerging in autoethnography as a radical 
political tool. In our current inquiry, the trustworthiness of this voice lies in its capacity to 
interrogate and illuminate the ethical violations of clinical praxis while extending a moral 
appeal to the clinician that is exceptionally compelling. 
4.5.4 Narrative  
Narrative presence is fundamental to autoethnography and typically expressed in the form 
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of a short story written in the first person with the researcher as subject.89 This narrative can 
also be expressed through other creative mediums, including photography, dance, stage 
plays, and video music, even film. The choice is contingent on the research question and the 
researcher’s creative skill, which determine the process and outcome of the work.90 A 
written narrative could be virtually anything from a poem to a comic book. In evocative 
autoethnography, however, the narrative becomes the theoretical and, as we have mentioned, 
may remain as a stand-alone piece stripped of any additional theory or analysis as 
illustrated in the three following examples.  
In The Academic Tourist, for example, Robert Pelias’ ironic examination of his life as a career 
academic offers a witty but poignant expose of the pretensions of academia. As the mortified 
writer, Pelias mines these pretensions to uncover the hubris of the academy and the 
humanity of an academician trying to keep up appearances.91 In Girl in a Cast, American 
anthropologist, Ruth Behar, tracks an anguishing period in her childhood to a spiritual 
awakening in adulthood that helps her reclaim her vulnerable and authentic voice in 
mainstream anthropology. 92 In, It's about time: Narrative and the divided self, Arthur Bochner 
connects the sudden news of his father’s death to his recognition of the inadequacy of the 
academy in which he is also deeply entrenched.93 The transformative moment occurs when 
Bochner sees – as if for the first time—what he already profoundly knows but learns anew. “I 
was stunned to learn how tame the academic world is in comparison to the wilderness of 
lived experience“.94  
These are all gripping, emotional, seamless, stand-alone pieces that qualify as 
autoethnography. They are revelatory, artistically crafted, convincing, evocative, and speak 
for themselves without the need for theory or analysis. They also demand an ethical 
response from the writer as well as the reader. For, in each of the three narratives, a paradox 
emerges that discloses and confirms a problem—an enigma—as well as a possible resolution 
pointing towards the ethical and the relational. The latter is also elusive, complex and 
                                                     
89 C. Ellis, 'The Ethnographic I: A Methodological Novel About Autoethnography', p. 30.  
90 Ibid. p. 193.  
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92 R. Behar, 'The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology That Breaks Your Heart ', pp. 104-35.  
93 A. Bochner, 'It's About Time: Narrative and the Divided Self'. 
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with 9/11, see also: A. Bochner, 'Love Survives', Qualitative Inquiry, 8 (2002).  
Chapter Four - Autoethnography 
83 
 
somehow thwarted by the impregnable defense of the status quo in which the writer is 
situated. 
As we can see, narrative presence provides the researcher with the means to attempt a very 
different kind of research discovered in narrative’s capacity to make visible the unjust and 
policing mechanisms of power. This transparency resides in the inclusive style of the 
narrative that also makes the meaning of the story accessible to a broad range of readers 
beyond the boundaries of the academy and its obscure lexicons. Certainly, the creation of 
narrative presence that calls for evocation would seem to require the writer’s abstention from 
professional or academic jargon that might exclude many readers.95 Finally, narrative 
presence enables the researcher to explore protected worlds of highly personal experience 
rarely accessed in traditional research that subvert boundaries and hierarchical separations 
between and among us. Within them, the writer can sensitize the reader to the politics of her 
experience and the larger truth about people different—or perhaps not so different—from 
herself.96 
4.5.5 Conclusion  
Autoethnography illustrates the salience of membership, self-reflexivity and narrative to its 
moral and political project. In our current enquiry, these characteristics have enabled me to 
interrogate and reveal the harrowing injustice beneath the seamless veneer of clinical praxis 
and authority, as we find explored in Ladies’ Shoes.97 Here the stunning singularity of the 
vulnerable help seeker—whose face we never even see—infiltrates the writer’s generalized 
worldview to assert its shattering truth. The transformative moment magnifies and confirms 
the clinician’s—my—undisputable intimacy with the stranger and the devastating 
responsibility she has failed to honour.  
Yet, even the most successful autoethnographer remains open to the ongoing threat of 
eviscerating personal critique that can be emotionally wounding and academically 
damaging. Carolyn Ellis recounts the emotional risk she took with her students, in sharing 
an exceptionally personal story of loss that she had written with her husband. She had only 
intended to open up a wider dialogue about a sensitive issue and about the significant risks 
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of undertaking this type of research, but the feedback from some of her students was 
devastating.98  
I am trembling by the time I finish. I want to dismiss these responses but … I push 
myself to face them. I know people react in these ways, but that knowledge doesn’t 
dull the pain of seeing the condemnation in print, a pain that is part of the cost of 
doing autoethnography deeply and honestly. 99 
Ruth Behar suggests that the vulnerable writer also has more to lose because “boring self-
revelation” is ultimately “humiliating”.100 Yet, the exposure of the writer’s inner world to 
such scrutiny also speaks to the integrity of an intensely moral research process that makes 
the autoethnographer something of a cultural whistle blower and more likely to be reviled 
for that reason.  
4.6  Criticism and limitations of autoethnography 
Qualitative researchers are called journalists, or soft scientists. Their work is termed 
unscientific, or only exploratory, or entirely personal and full of bias. It is called 
criticism and not theory, or it is interpreted politically, as a disguised version of 
Marxism or humanism.101 
Autoethnography is subject to criticism from inside and outside of its borders as it should 
be. Its most predictable “defect,” however, seems to lie in its heresy of defying the laws of 
logical positivism. Patti Lather has suggested this is a specious argument given the 
“increasingly definitive critique of the inadequacies of positivist assumptions in the face of 
the complexities of human experience”.102 This is the critique based in feminist research, neo-
Marxist critical ethnography and Freirian "empowering" research,” whose greater foci lie in 
“transformative agendas” and “research as praxis”.103 This has opened a space for the recent 
flourishing of autoethnography, although the opposition is still attempting to tarnish its 
“scientific legitimacy” while ignoring the gravitas of its moral project.  
The dominion of scientific neutrality and objectivity—so cherished by the positivist 
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worldview—seems inviolable when invoked to delegitimize autoethnography, but these are 
also myths, Lather has observed. Indeed, these are the very elements that “mystify the 
inherently ideological nature of research in the human sciences and legitimate privilege 
based on class, race, and gender”.104 In contrast, autoethnography’s project seeks to demystify 
which is why its methods are transgressive and performative. Not surprisingly it is fiercely 
opposed by those upholding the very structures that autoethnography seeks to subvert. The 
backlash predictably hinges on a singularly one-dimensional argument that is uniformly 
consistent with a reductive worldview. This view asserts that autoethnography is not 
reliable, valid, rigorous, sufficiently theorized, generalizable, scientific or legitimate enough, 
because it does not embrace the positivist project. From a positivist viewpoint, this is quite 
true but as Bochner and his colleagues have asserted, and as post-modernity has shown it is 
a myth that criteria are “beyond culture…ourselves and our own conventions”.105 
Nonetheless, the consequences of challenging this myth are substantial. 
4.6.1 The perils of writing autoethnography 
The concerns of any researcher undertaking autoethnographic research can be withering 
and Niall Devlin suggests eight different “traps” for the unwary. In identifying these, Devlin 
confirms his own awareness of the kinds of opposition he can anticipate as an 
autoethnographer, and a readiness to ensure that no offence is given. I would suggest, 
however, that this list is already underwritten with contempt for the autoethnographer that 
is hard to miss on closer investigation.  
Thus, autoethnography is to avoid being: 
 1. Normative (attempting to establish a new set of universal rules)  
2. Sanctimonious/Pharisaic (adopting an inappropriate tone)  
3. Instrumental (assuming that experiences can be unproblematically  
codified, categorized and made thematic)  
4. Narcissistic/vainglorious (reflectivity that just said “look at me”)  
5. Monologic (developing knowledge only through self-reflection instead of  
dialogic interaction with theory and others)  
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6. Enabling closure (presuming that there is only one truth and enabling only  
one reading of the situation)  
7. Warranting insider accounts (privileging the knowledge produced just  
because it has been developed by a practitioner)  
8. Slipping into reflectivity as personal therapy.106 
This list really addresses only two concerns. The first, and arguably the most benign, is the 
need to avoid generalization which, interestingly, is the whole point of evocative 
autoethnography. Certainly, this “trap” would appear to pose little—if any—risk. For, in 
writing autoethnography, the researcher is establishing her intention—indeed her desire—to 
assiduously avoid, sidestep and subvert the very problems generalization create, the argument 
for analytic autoethnography notwithstanding.107 Nonetheless, Devlin’s list stipulates that 
the researcher is to resist undertaking autoethnography that might appear to be normative, 
thematised, codified or closed as enumerated by items 1, 3 and 6 respectively.  
The second concern is the self-reflexive voice which apparently is at risk of extraordinary 
and un-conscious self-indulgence. Hence, the researcher is to avoid the traps of being 
sanctimonious, narcissistic, monologic, of privileging her knowledge, or worse, of slipping 
into personal therapy, according to items 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8. These concerns raise the immediate 
question of why any researcher would ever willingly risk such accusations. For, these could 
effectively decimate a scholar’s academic reputation and her research, rendering it worthless 
if not contemptible by any standards. Of greater interest is whether this self-reflexive voice—
and the damning and disturbing moral issues it reveals—can ever avoid being pilloried by 
these accusations from the opposition.  
With respect to Devlin’s list, it would seem that the indictment of generalization would 
more likely come from other autoethnographers who, like Denzin, have intentionally 
distanced themselves from the theoretical pursuits of analytic autoethnography. In contrast 
is the reflexive voice that is so vulnerable to such blistering censure by its positivist critics 
simply because it is used. I would have to agree that it is entirely possible for autoethnography 
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to be poorly written, narcissistic, psychologically naïve and boring to read. It is equally 
possible for positivist research to be shoddy, bloodless, obtuse, dehumanizing and 
irrelevant. More importantly, the sheer dominance of positivist research protects it from the 
criticism to which autoethnography remains vulnerable. Indeed, the contempt and power of 
the positivist critique is the very one that confirms autoethnography’s raison d'être. 
4.6.2 Power and responsibility: The problem of integrity  
It is also true that autoethnography’s self-reflexive voice can never be completely beyond 
suspicion or reproach no matter how responsibly or vulnerably it is used. For, the voice 
tracking the researcher’s moment-to-moment process as well as the power dynamics in 
which she is embedded also benefits the researcher. While autoethnography invites me to 
resist the mechanisms of power on behalf of the vulnerable help seeker, it also compromises 
my efforts to do so, given my membership with the authorizing institution. This is what 
shapes and legitimizes my speech and writing as a scholar—even my clinical notes—that I 
hesitate to imperil with autoethnographic candour.108 I am well aware that my self-conscious 
confession and discomfort, within a form that makes any evidence admissible, leaves me all 
too visible and consequently vulnerable professionally and ethically.109 
Despite the moral distress, and the sometimes harrowing sense of culpability I have 
experienced as a clinician, my institutional authority is valuable to me. As William Tierney 
observes, however, this authority continually jeopardizes the integrity of my 
autoethnography. Postmodernity may sufficiently disturb my perspective to help me resist 
slipping into the comfortable roles of “power and domination”. Yet, claiming membership, 
kinship or friendship with those I wish to authorize and dignify as an autoethnographer is 
not enough. Tierney notes that this is especially true for the researcher who does not like 
working with those with whom she is engaged in research, and with whom she will never 
become “comrades” or “find solidarity”.110 Even if she does like them, however, her research 
will still be at risk. For, this solidarity can “reinstill in our relations … who is right and who 
is wrong,” even though the researcher is the one who always holds the balance of “power, 
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voice, and authority”.111  
By refusing to essentialize the help seeker, or to fall prey to the illusion that there is any real 
refuge from the problem of power, the danger posed by my authority is still only partially 
resolved. This is especially true, Tierney suggests, when I wish to rescue someone as I surely 
have in the context of my work.112 Moreover, like Ruth Behar, I too have been unsettled to 
find myself “resisting the “I” of the ethnographer as a privileged eye, a voyeuristic eye, an 
all-powerful eye”.113 There is no escape, Tierney confirms, because “[t]he relationship in 
which we involve ourselves is inherently infused with power. Our challenge is to recognize 
it and decide how we will function within it”.114 Yet, there is good reason to confront these 
challenges, and to be heartened by the integrity of an approach that places the problem of 
power at the forefront while demanding the ethical vigilance of the researcher.115 
4.7  Conclusion 
It is not just about “method or technique”. Rather, qualitative research is about 
making the world visible in ways that implement the goals of social justice and 
radical progressive democracy.116  
The ethical concerns at the centre of this inquiry make evocative autoethnography’s demand 
for “radical social change” both urgent and hopeful. 117 Its proponents are courageously if 
not recklessly demonstrating how scholars can and must disclose their inner lives in their 
research. These scholars are committed to the ongoing evolution of autoethnography as a 
form of research which recognizes that “[t]he critical imagination is radically democratic, 
pedagogical, and interventionist”.118 Its mandate rejects the idea of research for its own sake. 
That is, research aimed at gaining ever more fine-grained or sophisticated perspectives or 
theories of problems or phenomena, while ignoring the suffering of people at the centre. “Its 
ethics challenge the ethics of the marketplace, it seeks utopian transformations committed to 
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radical democratic ideals”.119 All of which help expose and subvert the many accepted 
norms, beliefs and values of academic research. 
Autoethnography corrects the still restricted view of what constitutes real or significant 
research, and has enabled me to perform what should profoundly concern anyone seeking 
the help of community mental health care or working in this field.120 The term “performance 
ethnography” denotes what Denzin sees as the imminent future of autoethnography. That 
is, as a form of discourse and a way of being in the world that is fundamentally moral and 
political. Performance, he believes, will eventually blur the line between autoethnography 
and ethnography altogether when the self-reflexive researcher becomes the “guiding 
presence” in the text. At which point the critical social sciences will become “a force to be 
reckoned with in political and cultural arenas”.121 Perhaps they will.  
Nonetheless, Tierney’s point that the self-reflective voice is never beyond the problem of the 
power it seeks to subvert, cannot be overstated. Even within this inquiry there are good 
enough reasons for caution and restraint in challenging the professional and institutional 
boundaries of community mental health care. Yet, the dark side of “professional 
boundaries” and the epistemic injustice they hide are rarely made clear, which is where 
autoethnography can shine its light and must be allowed to do so. 
The last word goes to Patti Lather who soberly observes that: “Only those with advanced 
education have a shot at piercing through the theory and the jargon and arriving at a greater 
understanding of social forces”.122 With this shot in view, autoethnography offers 
researchers in the field of community mental health care the opportunity and the tools to 
break down the barriers of this theory and jargon and the moral obligation to try.
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Chapter 5.      
Wonder: A the turn towards the divine 
Once we are smitten we are never healed. To be human means to be an open wound.1 
5.1  Introduction 
It was a chance encounter twenty years ago during the course of my Master’s 
studies that led, one afternoon, to the shattering of conventional awareness and an 
opening to a sense of presence, perfection and awe. I have pursued this evanescence 
through a Master’s dissertation and PhD thesis, looking for a way to bring its 
epiphany to bear on the harsh realities of community mental health care.  
We begin with the story of The Nitobe Garden in which I attempted so many years 
ago to capture this remarkable event. The Nitobe Memorial Garden is a formal 
Japanese garden on the campus of the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, 
where a colleague from class and I had escaped one afternoon to take turns 
practicing “empathy skills” as we had been instructed. We sat in the open air 
protected from a soft summer’s rain under the roof of a rustic wooden shelter 
surrounded by the manicured garden and a pond populated with orange Koi. When 
it was my turn to take the counselling role, my colleague began to speak quietly and 
thoughtfully about his life while I leaned in to listen more carefully, but as his story 
unfolded, I found myself overtaken by rapture.2  
5.1.2 The Nitobe Garden 
You're talking, I see your lips move and hear the sound, but my mind is running. 
For what? For shelter, for validation, for a reason, for joy. I feel my mind turning 
over like a car with a dead battery, stalled, while an unseen driver intently turns the 
key, turns the key, turns the key. I am struggling to remember the name of your 
sister, your brother, the details of what happened. I want to hang on to the details, 
I'm supposed to have them in mind, but I can't. There is only You, only You and 
this dawning ecstasy. 
…Gazing down at my arms I see my skin spiked with gooseflesh, I feel the hairs 
standing at attention, tuned to this impossible moment. The moment endures past 
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my fear, I dare breathe, I can trust it, can't I? This feeling is everywhere around us, 
but mostly here, the source is here, in this rain shelter, where he speaks while I 
listen. Where the rain falls in a mist around us, smudging the edges and filling all 
the in-betweens with something that loves me, all of me, and that I love in return 
with an inundating gratitude that longs to express itself in great wracking sobs. 
Does he know what's happening? How can he not? He offers no clue but the words 
keep coming and the story opens like a rose, petal by petal. I yearn towards its centre 
as a flower leans towards the light. With each word, each poetic pause, each gesture, 
he becomes more naked, more precious, the wounds and scars more clearly defined 
and dear. I wonder if he will undress down to his bones. The parade unreels like a 
film behind my eyes. I see the people he describes, meet his family members, walk 
through their home, stroll around his town. I endure the indignities, the penury, the 
loss, the unbearable loss. What can I offer him for his pain? What? Empathy? 
Guidance? For what? For his gift? For the joy? The sight? For his sacred story? 
What can I offer? Nothing. Nothing. 
My body riots behind a seamless composure. I clench my teeth to keep them from 
chattering. A fist expands in my throat and aches with a need to cry. Finally tears 
break through the barrier and sit on my eyes blinding and burning me. I tip my head 
back to keep them from spilling down my face, but there are too many waiting for 
release. I brush them away with the back of my hand pretending my eyes are tired 
and want to be rubbed. "Are you cold?" he asks me. I don't know, am I? "No I'm 
fine, please go on," someone with my voice responds. 
What has seeped into my pores now thunders through me like a mountain cascade. I 
adore him, his unbearable perfection; the angel wings hidden from view but surely 
there, the golden cadence of his voice, the fine milky skin on his forehead, his heroic 
fear. I have to celebrate, I have to share this. I look at him and know there is even 
more, much more. I am you, I am you, I AM YOU! Yes, yes, I see it. I am trembling 
with joy, I have always loved, always been, always will be, never alone, impossible, 
impossible, loved always and loving this way, without knowing, but knowing, 
always knowing. 
"Do you feel it?" My voice is hushed. My eyes probe his beautiful face for hidden 
evidence of an experience he is for some inexplicable reason withholding from me. A 
pause ensues; his eyes meet mine and then scan the rain shelter for clues to my 
question. He looks puzzled and returns his gaze to my face. "Feel what?" he asks, 
soberly. Neither of us pursues the question, and seconds later he is back at the loom 
weaving his words. I look out at the trees beyond our enclosure and worship the 
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spaces between the leaves, knowing what glue it is that binds these beings together, 
and how it is they sing.3  
In seeing my self in the transfigured face of my colleague, there was no confusion 
about my identity or his. Nor could this this astounding recognition be interpreted 
as a metaphor. It was a visceral cataclysm that confirmed the pricelessness of this 
life—my life—and an immensity of love for which I now owed this stranger 
everything. 
The Nitobe Garden articulates the question implicit in this inquiry. What does it mean 
when a clinician recognizes the vulnerable help seeker as herself, when the person 
she is educated and paid to help becomes extraordinary, transfigured, dear as kin, 
dearer?4 This question has problematized the moral complexities of James’ story in 
chapter 2 and the systemic reduction of the vulnerable help seeker discussed in 
chapter 3. It has also supported my argument for autoethnography and fuelled the 
moral plea for clinicians to come out from behind their professional masks to 
disclose their wonder-full and disturbing stories. The next three chapters will 
attempt an answer to this question by undertaking three respective tasks of, 1) 
naming and describing, 2) theorizing and, 3) applying—or trying to apply—this 
enigma to the interests of our study.  
5.1.3 The focus of this chapter 
This chapter traces a shift of emphasis on wonder as a phenomenon or experience 
towards a more nuanced perspective of its moral and relational implications. We 
begin with an historical perspective that touches on wonder’s origins and 
etymology to frame a preliminary understanding of this notion and demonstrate its 
congruence to praxis. As we shall see, various elements emerging from our 
etymological analysis, embedded in the therapeutic process itself, make wonder 
possibly less of a novelty in the clinical encounter than one might imagine.  
                                                     
3 This story was originally titled The third thing. The narrative also captures the essence of Emmanuel 
Levinas’ ethical vision whose work was to remain unknown to me until midway through this project. 
See: C. Racine, 'Mystical Experience of a Counsellor', Women and Therapy, 20 (1997), 62-64. 
4 Philosopher, Professor Martyn Evans uses the term transfiguration in his work on wonder. See: H.M. 
Evans, 'Transfigurings: Beauty, Wonder and the Noumenal', in Transfigurings: The world, wonder and 
beauty (Published, 2012), pp. 1-8. 
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We will also turn to contemporary scholarship to mine several definitions and 
orientations describing the current play of wonder in the literature, and to examine 
their relevance to the question evoked in The Nitobe Garden. Finally, Professor 
Martyn Evans’ work on wonder and the clinical encounter will move us towards an 
orientation more specifically allied to our practical and ethical interests.5 In 
diverging from Evans’ perspective, my critique and analysis will build towards an 
argument for an accommodation of awe and horror in our interpretation of wonder. 
This will also claim the unilateral responsibility of the clinician for the help seeker 
that refutes any suggestion of mutuality or reciprocity within the therapeutic 
relationship so-called.  
5.1.4 Wonder and Levinas, a strategic marriage 
The central argument for wonder is as informed by the question raised by The Nitobe 
Garden, as by the work of Emmanuel Levinas discussed in the following chapter. 
Levinas’ work has profoundly influenced this inquiry and motivated my interest in 
contributing to the budding conversation on the role of Levinasian ethics in clinical 
praxis. Nonetheless, the deceptively simple and compelling notion of “wonder” 
offers an imaginative and accessible working term for the clinician that is useful for 
our purposes. “Wonder” is also possibly still free enough from academic 
colonization to enable its unequivocal moral invitation to transgress the reductive 
sphere of such concern to our inquiry.  
A modest renaissance of interest in wonder is currently creating a niche for itself in 
the medical humanities. This emerging field employs narrative to help transform 
clinicians’ understanding of dis-ease and reconfigure our approaches to healing. 
The medical humanities also invite a more philosophical consideration and critique 
of the “underlying unquestioned assumptions within medical policy and practice”.6 
One such question is “whether medicine is essentially a technical science or an 
existential practice with a centrally ethical task,”7 and the interests of this inquiry 
                                                     
5 This article motivated my decision to shift the focus of this study from mysticism to wonder. See: 
H.M. Evans, 'Wonder and the Clinical Encounter'. 
6 J. Macnaughton, 'Medical Humanities' Challenge to Medicine', Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice, 
17 (2011), p. 927.  
7 H.M. Evans, 'Travelling Companions: Ethics and Humanities in Medicine', Bioethica Forum, 4 (2011), 
pp. 129-30.  
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clearly chime with the latter. This evolving conversation, together with Martyn 
Evans’ work on wonder, has opened a space for the examination of wonder’s moral 
potential in the unlikely context of community mental health care.   
If the overuse or misuse of “wonder” in the vernacular has diminished wonder’s 
value over time, its ubiquity has certain virtues. Chief among them is that wonder 
offers a benign, non-polarizing point of departure for ethical discourse that is 
arguably more conducive to the secular environment of community mental health 
care than Levinas’ obscure terms of reference might yet allow. In sum, I would not 
wish to see the notion of wonder subsumed or eliminated by Levinas’ ethical vision 
so much as integrated, developed and strengthened by it.  
5.2  A brief genealogy of  wonder  
What is the source of "wonder"? Is it something in the wonderful, or in the 
wonderer, in the person who experiences wonder? Or should it be located at 
the level of context or relationship, something that emerges in certain 
situations? Does it just arise, do we have to wait on it, or can it be learned or 
elicited? Does it really speak of something beyond? Do we have to try and 
indicate the level of that beyond? Does it require religious or theological 
language, or can it be psychologised or biologised, or would these be 
reductions?8 
Several philosophers now writing about wonder, including Sam Keen, Dennis 
Quinn, Mary-Jane Rubenstein and others, lament wonder’s demise and 
misinterpretation. They claim that the immense impact of this loss is now a matter 
of pressing social concern. Keen suggests that wonder’s dissolution implies the 
erosion of our connection with nature and our sense of place within the cosmos. The 
outcome of which has robbed us of our identity, our sense of continuity and 
purpose, as well as our affiliation to the sacred world we inhabit, including the 
universe beyond.  
In domesticating our world, Keen claims that we “insulate it against the intrusion of 
strangeness”.9 He interprets the central significance of wonder as a gift of meaning10 
                                                     
8 These questions were kindly suggested by Professor Gerard Loughlin in an earlier draft of this 
chapter. 
9 S. Keen, Apology for Wonder (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 28.  
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that is not simply eclipsed—or reduced—by an increase of knowledge.11 Similarly, 
Dennis Quinn blames wonder’s demise on the scientific revolution that has reduced 
wonder to the empirical and the quantifiable, making the notion of “quality” almost 
obsolete.12  Wonder, Quinn suggests, is now mistaken as “doubt, aesthetic delight, 
curiosity, the pleasure of discovery, vague religious sentiment, delight in novelty, 
indiscriminate approval, and sheer gush”.13 Rubenstein also decries the tragedy of 
wonder’s loss and the consequences of this cultural and linguistic destitution that 
cheats us of those aspects of our nature that fully define our humanity.  
[W]onder’s capacity to arouse and inflict terror, worship and grief is utterly 
decimated—or more precisely, fervently repressed—by the modern brand of 
wonder that connotes white bread, lunchbox superheroes and fifties 
sitcoms…wonder is only wonder when it remains open”.14  
Wonder emerged as the origin of Greek philosophy before following the rise of 
religion and reaching its apogee in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries. It was 
subsequently claimed by the emerging project of science during the Renaissance, 
and then by the interests of the Enlightenment, until its subsequent demise 
thereafter.  
Keen observes that the Greeks “discovered”15 the centrality of wonder to philosophy 
when “Plato had Socrates proclaim that it was the source and foundation of 
philosophy”.16 Quinn recounts the story of Socrates and Theatetus, the boy whose 
own encounter with wonder led Socrates to observe that this experience was the 
beginning of philosophy. For, “[h]e who said that Iris was the child of Thaumas 
made a good genealogy”.17 This genealogy began with Iris, goddess of the rainbow 
and daughter of Thaumas, the sea god of wonders, and Electra his wife. Iris’ beauty, 
“divine nature” and mysterious celestial appearance, were to have aroused the 
                                                                                                                                                      
10 Ibid. p. 27.  
11 Ibid. p. 26.  
12 D. Quinn, Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), 
pp. 239-49.  
13 Ibid. p. xii.  
14 M.J. Rubenstein, Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 10.  
15 S. Keen, 'Apology for Wonder', p. 62.  
16 Ibid. p. 72.  
17 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', p. ix.  
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“passion that initiates and sustains the love of wisdom”.18 Thaumatology, American 
literary critic Philip Fisher suggests, was the science of wonders and miracles until 
the Renaissance. At which time the fork in the road divided science from theology 
when the miraculous became superfluous to the modern notion of science.19 Yet, it 
was believed that through Iris, the love of wisdom was initiated and sustained.20  
Mary-Jane Rubenstein’s re-interpretation of this story suggests that wonder was 
misappropriated to exclude the darker side of what she claims to be its profoundly 
ambivalent nature. Rubenstein suggests that Socrates’ version of the story left out 
Thaumas’ other two daughters in wonder’s lineage. Like Iris, her sisters Aello and 
Oypetes were winged creatures—“inter-cosmic messengers”—who had the 
frightening task of carrying humans to the underworld. Unlike Iris, the image of 
these Harpies deteriorated over time into terrifying clawed creatures leaving Iris 
and her divine beauty as wonder’s only representative. 21  
In silencing “the ravenous and noisome” as fundamental aspects of wonder, 
Rubenstein believes Socrates sanitized wonder’s meaning by “declawing it” and 
inaccurately claiming wonder’s place as the origin of philosophy. Yet, it was also the 
Socratic tradition, Rubenstein insists, that sought to keep wonder open before this 
focus was replaced by Aristotle’s “remedy for wonder in the knowledge of cause 
and effect”. This moved wonder’s function from one of infinite potential for opening 
and expansion to one, “that eliminates itself through the knowledge of causes” in 
the pursuit of answers to the mystery posed by wonder.22 In these two perspectives, 
we discover the long-standing tension central to our inquiry between the open and 
closed. By which we also mean the a-theoretical and theoretical, the anarchical and 
hierarchical, the affective and the rational and, as we shall discuss in the next 
chapter on Emmanuel Levinas, the moral and the reductive.  
                                                     
18 Ibid.  
19 P. Fisher, Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), p. 11.  
20 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', p. ix.  
21 M.J. Rubenstein, 'Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe', p. 11.  
22 Ibid. p. 12.  
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5.3 Etymology  
In attempting to resuscitate wonder, these and other authors have turned to its 
etymology for evidence of lost meaning. The following analysis suggests a number 
of meanings to guide our investigation that also resonate with the central themes 
emerging through The Nitobe Garden, and the therapeutic process itself. 
5.3.1  Passive participation, witnessing and astonishment 
In relating wonder’s meaning to Thaumas and thaumatology, for example, we 
discover in the Greek root thau a connection to something in which we also 
participate, albeit passively. Thus, thaomai “may mean to wonder or to gaze upon 
with wonder,” while thauma from thea alludes to theatre, the place we go to be 
exposed to and overwhelmed by wonder. “Thau” also relates to the notion of theory 
as the focus of philosophical contemplation. In contrast, Greek words like “thambos” 
and “tethepa” have a stronger resonance with terror in emphasizing “a condition of 
helplessness, bewilderment, confusion, amazement, or stupor”.23 These words 
apparently “derive from the idea of being struck,” while the Latin “attonius,” for 
astonish, means “thunderstruck”.24   
5.3.2  Pleasure and delight 
Beginning with its German connections, wunder may also suggest joy or delight and 
the pleasure often associated with wonder. 25 Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park 
suggest a connection between wonder and smiling in the French “merveille,” the 
Italian “meraviglia,” and the English “marvel,” dating back to twelfth century.26 This 
might suggest the source of wonder and the delight it conjures as emanating from 
the object of wonderment itself. These authors also find a strong commonality in 
“the vocabulary of wonder” from the twelfth to the thirteenth century onwards that 
did not differentiate the sacred from the profane, “the miraculous and the 
marvellous”27 that would, centuries later, be differentiated as “religion” and 
                                                     
23 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', pp. 6-7. See also: S. Keen, 'Apology for 
Wonder', p. 28.  
24 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', pp. 6-7.  
25 Ibid. p. 2.  
26 L. Daston and K. Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: Zone Books, 1998), p. 
16. 
27 Ibid.  
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“science”. With respect to delight, there is also the old English wendan, associated 
with ideas of wending or turning, that Quinn suggests may describe the process of 
searching this way and that for an answer posed by the wonderful.28 Such 
peregrinations might reflect the profound and compelling pleasure—the yearning—
that drives our pursuit of wonder’s enigma. 
5.3.3  Esteem, love, approval 
Interestingly, wonder has lost its historical connection to “esteem-love-approval”.29 
Until the nineteenth century, wonder and admire were used synonymously whereas 
esteem is now more clearly expressed in words like “wonderful,” or “wonderfully”. 
With this ungluing of wonder from the more binding and refined aspects of human 
relationship, wonder may have been effectively removed from the elevating or 
reverential implications of esteem, thereby diminishing its relational significance to 
little more than a novelty. Yet, the historical connection between admire and 
wonder is still found in the German wunder, although ambiguously. “Verwundern,” 
for example, refers to astonishment and “bewundern” to esteem, which might appear 
to connect the object of wonder with the response it elicits or even the wonder 
within it.30 
5.3.4  Light, reflection, mirror 
“Admirare,” is the Latin root for marvel and admire as well as miracle and “probably 
derives from mir which refers to seeing,” and may include the notion of sensing or 
seeing with the mind’s eye. Mirror and mirage also share the same root.31 Again, 
this connects wonder to seeing but also reflecting; something akin to a mirage or a 
dream captured by “soft” eyes, rather than a hard analytic gaze. In medieval 
mysticism, the allusion of the “inflamed/enflaming” mirror alluded to the soul’s 
need for purification for her to “become the perfect reflective surface for the 
divine”.32 Daston and Park suggest that a departure from the root mir to mira relates 
                                                     
28 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', p. 2. 
29 Ibid. pp. 3-4.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 This mirror was a central motif in the work of one especially controversial medieval woman, 
Marguerite Porete. See: M. Porete, The Mirror of Simple Souls (IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 
1999). See: A.M. Hollywood, 'Beauvoir, Irigaray, and the Mystical', p. 169.  
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to the Latin words mirabilia or miracula that refer to objects of wonder themselves. 
“Admiration” was also used synonymously with paradox which Quinn defines as 
“contrary to or beyond doxa – opinion…as opposed to real knowledge“.33 For, in 
paradox we find what is real and worthy of such admiration and esteem.  
Evelyn Underhill references a number of writers from medieval mystics to poets like 
Blake and Whitman who bore consistent witness to a light that evokes an intense 
emotional response associated with some profound meaning.34 The theme of light is 
also significant in The Nitobe Garden where, “I …worship the spaces between the leaves, 
knowing what glue it is that binds these beings together”. Evans has evoked a similar 
quality of light in his enigmatic encounter with an ash tree, where he finds himself 
“fixated” by the tree’s “elaborate structure” and the “precise and almost granular 
penetration of the air around it”.35 This light or space has a physicality or mass that 
is somehow magnified yet diffuse, “thick” and imbued with its own sentience.  
5.3.5 Ambivalence 
Another historical connection relevant to our discussion is found in the old English 
wundor, related to the German wunder as well as wunde, which can mean, ”cut, gash” 
or even wound. Rubenstein suggests that such contrasting interpretations imply 
wonder’s ambivalent nature that connects us simultaneously to “marvel and dread, 
(or) amazement and terror”. Rubenstein notes, for example, several biblical 
allusions to the word “fear” which illustrate the quality of awe, dread and reverence 
that wonder also evokes. In describing wonder as a “kind of wound of the 
everyday” which must remain open or become something else, Rubenstein 
highlights the importance of openness and ambivalence to our definition.36 Her 
observation could hardly be more relevant to our inquiry because this wound is 
confronted by the mental health clinician in her every encounter with the vulnerable 
help seeker. The two aspects of openness and ambivalence arguably transform the 
clinician’s self-perception and understanding of her “clinical” task by radically 
                                                     
33 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', pp. 8-9.  
34 E. Underhill, 'Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness', 
pp. 249-56.  
35 H.M. Evans, 'Transfigurings: Beauty, Wonder and the Noumenal', p. 1.  
36 M.J. Rubenstein, 'Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe', pp. 9-10.  
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revising her relationship to the help seeker, as The Nitobe Garden illustrates. In 
discovering the wonder-full aperture in the seamless armour of the status quo, 
issues of closure, resolution, solution, interpretation or even understanding are 
surpassed by the more immediate, astounding and problematic issue of recognizing 
the help seeker as oneself.  
This brief etymology suggests a surprising congruence with the evocation of The 
Nitobe Garden and the therapeutic process, which according to these descriptions 
might appear capable of calling forth wonder. Mental health clinicians are actually 
exquisitely poised for this kind of illumination given the nature of their “listening” 
and witnessing practice, and the historical37 and still current connection of mental 
health care to the clergy and spiritual practice.38 There should be little doubt that in 
her day-to-day routines, the community mental health clinician has unlimited access 
to a rare intimacy afforded by the raw suffering of others in the theatre of the 
consultation room. There, the clinician may be chronically exposed to amazement 
and terror, and confronted by an ambivalence that will alternately attract and repel 
her. 
5.4 Praxis and wonder  
In this next section, we briefly examine the characteristics of light, love, openness 
and ambivalence to illustrate how they translate in praxis. I draw in part on the 
work of psychologist Carl Rogers for this analysis, whose counselling theory was 
central to my own education and practice.  
5.4.1 Light 
The notion of light is central to the act of “reflection” in the process of “talk-
therapy”.39 It is the therapist’s task to “reflect” or “mirror” back observations, 
intuitions, feelings, and aspects of the help seeker’s narrative to promote insight, 
illumination and epiphany – to enlighten. The art of reflection—empathic 
                                                     
37 A number of key players advocated for the mentally ill from the late 1700s to the mid-1800s whose 
crusade was motivated by their own religious faith. See: H.G. Koenig, M.E. McCullough, and D.B. 
Larson, 'Handbook of Religion and Health', pp. 24-29.  
38 For remarkable statistics on the involvement of clergy with the mentally ill in America, see: A.J. 
Weaver and others, 'What Do Psychologists Know About Working with the Clergy? An Analysis of 
Eight APA Journals: 1991–1994', Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 28 (1997).  
39 For a perspective on the loss of “talk” in contemporary psychiatry, see: G. Harris, 'Talk Doesn’t Pay, 
So Psychiatry Turns Instead to Drug Therapy', New York Times, (Mar. 5, 2011). 
Chapter Five - Wonder 
101 
 
reflection—was raised to a very sophisticated level by Carl Rogers. His immense 
legacy now drives a clinical interest in empathy and person-centred—patient-
centred—care that has become an industry standard. Rogers apprehended a quality 
of connection and depth with those who came to him for help that prompted him to 
speak of “other realities” to which he believed psychology needed to pay closer 
attention.40 He also acknowledged the threat that this reality posed his profession 
and his colleagues who were, and still are, blinkered and silenced by the dictates of 
the hard sciences. Daringly, he theorized that the accuracy of non-directive 
“reflection” was foundational to therapeutic change and claimed that its impact was 
as transformational for the clinician as for the help seeker.41 Herein we find a 
troubling issue we will shortly consider regarding Rogers’ notion of mutuality and 
reciprocity.42 
5.4.2  Love 
The transformative implications of “unconditional positive regard” or “empathy,” 
so central to Rogers’ theory of psychological change, resonate profoundly with the 
notions of esteem, love and approval.43 Yet, Rogers was careful to assert that these 
“conditions” should never seek to possess, control or satisfy the needs of the 
clinician because they represented a “caring for the client as a separate person.”44  
The issue of love is almost anathema within praxis despite the undisputed centrality 
of the “therapeutic relationship” and “trust” to the help seeker’s process of change. 
Esteem, love and approval all inform our ideas of affiliation, kinship, friendship,45 
community, inter-dependence, intimacy, tenderness and reverence, especially 
where positive regard for the other elevates the person in question.46 Yet, the spectre 
                                                     
40 C.R. Rogers, 'Some New Challenges', American Psychologist, 28 (1973), 385-86.  
41 C.R. Rogers, 'The Nondirective Method as a Technique for Social Research', American Journal of 
Sociology, 50 (1945), p. 279.  
42 See: Reciprocity and mutuality (5.6.3). 
43 See: C.R. Rogers, 'The Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Therapeutic Personality Change', 
Journal of consulting psychology, 21 (1957), p. 96.  
44 Rogers’ italics. See: ibid. p. 98.  
45 This study showed that women make less distinction between friendship and kinship, which raises 
questions about wonder and gender in clinical care and the implications of the sense of kinship arising 
in the wonder-full encounter. J.M. Ackerman, D.T. Kenrick, and M. Schaller, 'Is Friendship Akin to 
Kinship?', Evolution and Human Behavior, 28 (2007). 
46 See: D. Keltner and J. Haidt, 'Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual, and Aesthetic Emotion', Cognition 
& Emotion, 17 (2003). 
Chapter Five - Wonder 
102 
 
of boundary violation inevitably pre-empts any serious examination of love in 
praxis.47 This would seem to preclude love’s inclusion in any interpretation of 
wonder relevant to our interests.48 However, Quinn reminds us that the traditional 
view of wonder recognizes the centrality of love, which must be present for the 
negative emotions even to arise. “In fact this love abides and persists in all emotions 
as their first principle”.49 Quinn claims Socrates left no doubt that love is inherent in 
the friendship formed through the shared quest for truth. This is one that is “fired 
by wonder” and the recognition that ultimately, “the object of wonder is not 
knowledge at all but love”.50  
Interestingly, the sense of being in love or overwhelmed by love, as I was in The 
Nitobe Garden, resists any qualification that might reduce my meaning to something 
benign—safe—or in Rubenstein’s terms, “declawed”.51 This cataclysm does not 
correspond to an “appropriate” or institutional52 “type” of love authentic enough to 
claim the name, or “cool” enough to ensure no violation is implied. We will return 
to this theme in the chapters ahead.53 For now, I will resist imposing any disclaimers 
on love in praxis other than to assert that love either recognizes and reveres the help 
seeker, and yearns to protect her sanctity and vulnerability, or is not love.54   
                                                     
47 The authors express regret for the loss of love as a cornerstone of nursing practice relevant to this 
discussion. They offer reasons for its erosion and suggest the need for love to be cultivated as a practice 
which, as Rogers’ suggests, seeks to give but not take from the patient. Yet, their analysis fails to 
identify the reductive paradigm in which they are also educated, indoctrinated and collude. See: T. 
Stickley and D. Freshwater, 'The Art of Loving and the Therapeutic Relationship', Nursing Inquiry, 9 
(2002). 
48 During my counselling education students were admonished, to never to touch their clients. The 
concern was that the help seeker could interpret such a gesture as a sexual invitation or violation that 
could cost the clinician a malpractice suit, her reputation and career.  
49 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', p. 16. 
50 Ibid. p. 87. 
51 Psychotherapist Janet Sayers provocatively suggests the centrality of love to the aims of 
psychotherapy that “entails the oneness…at the heart of the mystical and the religious…and also the 
heart of falling in love, making love and being in love. J. Sayers, 'Divine Therapy: Love, Mysticism, and 
Psychoanalysis', p. 1.  
52 Evans alludes to “institutional love”. H.M. Evans, 'Wonderful Treatment', in Medical Humanities 
Companion, ed. by P. Louhiala, I. Heath, and J. Saunders (London: Radcliffe Publishing, 2013), pp. 17-32 
(p. 24). 
53 Ibid. pp. 30-31. 
54 The prohibitions of loving are explored in: C. Racine, 'Loving in the Context of Community Mental 
Health', pp. 113-14.  
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5.4.3  Openness 
The openness to which Rubenstein alludes invites the clinician to lean into the 
ineffability rather than attempting to solve or resolve its enigma. This is the 
openness suggested by Evans’ definition of wonder as “an attitude of special, 
intense, preparatory, and transfiguring attentiveness to what may be revealed as 
extraordinary.”55 Rogers also suggested that “openness to experience” was as 
fundamental as any other aspect of research.56 Here, then, we are referring to a 
quality of being disarmed; an inclination towards the unexpected or unknowable 
and a willingness to be affected—changed. This can be difficult to achieve or 
maintain in practice although psychologist Tobin Hart claims that “deeply empathic 
therapists,” sensitive to the feeling states of others, appear able to “regulate” their 
degree of openness.57 Without discounting the possibility of an individual proclivity 
or porosity for such openness, such skill is also cultivated with practice.58  
“Openness” is also prescribed for “skilled helpers” of all stripes in Gerard Egan’s 
seminal text on counselling, which illustrates a model for how one is to physically 
attend the help seeker according to the acronym, “SOLER”.59 This dated model is 
current in the literature and represents what appears to be the ongoing effort of 
researchers to help clinicians maintain an edge on institutional reduction and 
indoctrination. It is poignant to imagine that future clinical professionals need to be 
“taught” how to cultivate the open stance of the most rudimentary human response 
to vulnerability and pain60 or conversely, how to perform it. Yet, such openness also 
necessitates great courage in willingly softening one’s psychological and intellectual 
                                                     
55 H.M. Evans, 'Wonder and the Clinical Encounter', p. 128.  
56 C.R. Rogers, 'Some New Challenges', p. 380.  
57 T. Hart, 'Carl Rogers as Mystic', The person-centered journal, 6 (1999), p. 85.  
58 Lynn Underwood examines the practice of love among monks living in a monastery, to compare the 
role of intention to the practitioner’s “success”. Failure to love is always the practitioner’s limitation 
and not the responsibility of even the most difficult person he is attempting to love. Ownership of such 
failure is crucial to praxis where a clinician may easily project her own sense of failure or inadequacy 
onto the help seeker. See: L.G. Underwood, 'Interviews with Trappist Monks as a Contribution to 
Research Methodology in the Investigation of Compassionate Love', Journal for the theory of social 
behaviour, 35 (2005). 
59 This was the introductory text used during my Master’s education in counselling psychology. See: G. 
Egan, 'The Skilled Helper: A Systematic Approach to Effective Helping'. 
60 SOLER: Squarely, Open, Lean towards the other, Eye contact, Relax. For a recent re-evaluation of 
this model, see: T. Stickley, 'From Soler to Surety for Effective Non-Verbal Communication', Nurse 
education in practice, 11 (2011). 
Chapter Five - Wonder 
104 
 
defences to be with, contain and feel extremes of emotion—from the sublime to the 
horrifying. Certainly, openness resonates with spiritual practice or contemplation 
and has a well-established role in therapy.61 
5.4.4 Ambivalence 
In terms of praxis, ambivalence refers to the clinician’s emotional process and her 
response to the help seeker that might elsewhere be construed as counter-
transference. Of interest is the clinician’s ambivalence to the paradoxical and the 
emotional extremes at either end of the spectrum of wonder. Keen, for example, 
suggests that we are ambivalent to wonder because it is traumatic.62 Levinas also 
described the “wonder-full” cataclysm as a trauma. Certainly, the themes of light, 
love, and openness we have discussed here are potentially and profoundly 
uplifting, yet they are also disturbing, mesmerizing and overwhelming. In 
confronting the combination of horror and awe, grief and worship, and the 
interplay of darkness and light within her work, the clinician is continually 
negotiating her emotional but also her moral ambivalence. This relates not only to 
the paradox at the centre of wonder and the extremes it communicates but, more 
importantly, to the paradox posed by the help seeker herself. We will revisit the 
issue of ambivalence later in this chapter along with the role of awe and horror in 
our definition of wonder. 
The characteristics examined in this section resonate with therapeutic praxis and my 
own subjective experience, although they are not necessarily representative of every 
wonder-full encounter. As I have shown, wonder’s etymology offers a diversity of 
meanings. These, at least partially, reaffirm the value of our emerging interest in 
wonder, and claim a place for it within the enterprise of community mental health 
care. The clinician’s ability to see the help seeker and reflect something beyond, to 
remain open and undefended in the face of her anguish and vulnerability, and to 
love and esteem her in opposition to every clinical sanction against such intimacy, 
informs not only a wonder-full perspective but a just one as well. Yet this intimacy 
                                                     
61 For a thoughtful examination of Buddhist practice in the clinical relationship see: A.L. Back and 
others, 'Compassionate Silence in the Patient–Clinician Encounter: A Contemplative Approach', Journal 
of palliative medicine, 12 (2009). 
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is contingent on the clinician’s ability to negotiate her own ruminating ambivalence 
to the help seeker’s plea, and rendered inscrutable and dangerous by the institution. 
5.5  What is Wonder?  
In clarifying what it means to see another as oneself, we are also asking how the 
clinician can adequately respond to the help seeker, although this may not be easily 
decoded. Sitting with my colleague in the Nitobe Garden that day, I was shocked to 
find that there was no adequate "therapeutic response" and nothing to offer in the 
“realm of possible options”. 
All paled in comparison to the staggering beauty and integrity I perceived in him… 
which enveloped us both. Anything I could do as a counsellor would simply 
diminish and impose on or corrupt the perfection…I remember scanning my mind in 
disbelief, finding there was nothing to be done, and coming to what seemed like more 
adequate, if unprofessional alternatives…I found myself wondering if I should 
offer…my sweater, or extend my hand to hold his, or get up from my seat to embrace 
him…. Seeing this spark of divinity before me, embraced in the sacred shelter of this 
relationship and knowing the depth of its meaning in my own life, I have a terrible 
decision to make: what can I do? What must I do for this person?63  
The following section examines various explanations of wonder by considering the 
mechanism—that we might describe as a hinge—to account for the shift that swings 
open one’s perspective so radically and suddenly before closing it again. The impact 
of the help seeker’s appeal is of greatest interest here, for this insinuates itself wonder-
fully and problematically into the clinician’s most interior life. The orientations to 
wonder examined ahead also appear to provide less than an adequate response to 
our moral question. They are included, however, because they reflect the 
philosophical foundations of the problem we are attempting to address and for that 
reason are relevant to our discussion.  
5.5.1 A cognitive account 
In their attempt to explain what it is that strikes a sense of wonder within us, Dennis 
Quinn, Sam Keen and Robert Fuller all refer briefly to Piaget’s theory of 
accommodation and assimilation for a partial answer.64 
                                                     
63 C. Racine, 'Mystical Experience of a Counsellor', pp. 65-66. 
64 J.H. Flavell, 'Piaget's Legacy', Psychological Science, 7 (1996), p. 200.  
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Piaget was a Swiss developmental psychologist who focussed on the cognitive 
development of children. He theorized “accommodation” as a process of cognitive 
disturbance that occurs when a child is confronted by an unknown experience. This 
is subsequently “assimilated” through a cognitive adjustment that reconfigures the 
child’s conceptual map to the new situation. The process is curiosity driven and 
enables the child to explore and understand the material world in a trajectory 
moving constantly from accommodation to assimilation.  
Piaget’s detractors criticized his formulation for its “theological and mythic 
thought” that represented a form of pre-logical thinking at odds with 
developmental psychology and its interest in cognitive process.65 His formulation 
might appear to resonate with a more “open” interpretation of something preceding 
thought and the theoretical. But this aspect of Piaget’s theory arguably has less to do 
with the apprehension of wonder and more with the drive to denature, neutralize 
and theorize it. The endpoint is cognitive mastery of the child’s world, making 
wonder a thrilling anti-chamber to knowing but possibly little else. Assimilation also 
reflects but one aspect of a comprehensive and controversial theoretical framework 
used to describe childhood stages of cognitive development. Altogether, this theory 
fails to address our moral question and might even appear to deny it with a 
perspective confined to that which is yet to be encountered and conquered, if only 
cognitively.  
5.5.2 An account of the consciousness of ignorance  
Quinn suggests that a more traditional view represents wonder as the seat of 
wisdom. In these terms, wonder is capable of moving us from the unknown to 
knowledge and inheres especially in philosophy, poetry, the arts and “the passion 
that arises from the consciousness of ignorance”.66 Quinn repeatedly claims that 
wonder works through our awareness of ignorance and must shock us sufficiently 
with its mystery to jeopardize our intellectual life and challenge what we thought 
                                                     
65 R. Fuller, 'Wonder and the Religious Sensibility: A Study in Religion and Emotion', The Journal of 
Religion, 86 (2006 ), 375-76.  
66 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', p. 5.  
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we knew. Quinn claims this view prevailed from the time of Plato to Descartes and 
is not to be confused with curiosity or the irrationality of “radical romantics”.  
This view of wonder upholds the “love of truth,” love being the first “presupposed” 
of all emotions that “abides and persists” in all others which is also necessary for 
negative emotions to be detected. Such love, Quinn claims, is antithetical to the 
sceptic unable to wonder or the pragmatist incapable of rising above the practical.67 
Nonetheless, Quinn’s interpretation of wonder is continually re-directed towards 
inquiry and thinking. We may be “purged” of ignorance by writing poetry or doing 
philosophy, which can bring the highest pleasure.68 We may even transcend “mortal 
art” by storytelling, which the Greeks believed was a “God-like” pursuit. 69 Yet, even 
these sacred practices, Quinn insists, are in the service of “knowing” and 
knowledge, the greatest peril being ignorance or not-knowing.  
5.5.3 An aesthetic account 
In contrast is Philip Fisher who claims a “connection between intellectual curiosity 
(“I wonder if…”), and the pleasure of amazement”.70 Fisher denies any association 
of religion or spirituality to wonder, claiming that efforts to connect the two only 
hide religious feelings in an “aesthetic disguise”.71 Fisher’s view of wonder works 
through the encounter of aesthetic novelty and the hit of the first encounter accessed 
only through the faculty of sight and certain forms of art. These include architecture, 
painting, sculpture and some engineering projects, as opposed to “the arts of time—
narration, dance, music” which, he insists, leave us immune to wonder.72 Even 
conventions of syntax and grammar, Fisher claims, can trigger memory and build 
expectation that pre-empt wonder’s possibility. He takes no account of the 
enigmatic canon of metaphysical or mystic writers and poets whose linguistic 
wizardry might contest his view. Fisher does concede, however, that on rare 
occasions temporal art may give way to the possibility of wonder.73  
                                                     
67 Ibid. p. 16. 
68 Ibid. p. 45. 
69 Ibid. p. 42. 
70 P. Fisher, 'Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences', pp. 10-11.  
71 Ibid. p. 2. 
72 Ibid. p. 21. 
73 Ibid. p. 21. 
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His is a perspective informed by a relentless drive for “the visual, the sudden, and 
the unexpected,” which is limited to the notion of “first sight” and the privilege of 
youth that declines with age.74 Rubenstein might suggest that in chasing down the 
new and unfamiliar for the satisfaction of another now-I-get-it moment, Fisher’s 
perspective denies the possibility of wonder moving in another direction. Denies, 
that is, the movement from the ordinary to the strange or to the extraordinary, which 
might challenge Fisher’s keen appetite for a constant stream of novelty. Fisher 
insists that the “fate of the ordinary” is to remain in the shadow of whatever is rare 
and sudden in experience, "like the rainbow”.75 Even so, it is difficult to imagine that 
a rainbow could hold more potential for our wonderment than an epiphanic 
encounter with another.  
5.5.4 An account of curiosity  
Curiosity, according to Quinn, suggests a deficiency in wonder. Emerging from the 
Latin cura, curiosity holds an earlier association with ideas of “care, solicitude, or 
concern,” still found in words like pastoral care and curate.76 Related to the idea of 
carefulness or skilfulness, curiosity’s meaning has also degenerated to 
inquisitiveness and the vice related to the intemperance of wanting to know too 
much or to an excess of studiousness. Together with its association to the vice of 
lust, curiosity does not fare well in the wonder discourse.  
Quinn also equates curiosity with scientific colonization and suggests it emerged 
from contemporary mechanistic science and the false assumption that everything 
can be known. The idea of curiosity as a drive to be sated or problem to be solved 
fails to correspond to our search for a more “open” interpretation of wonder that 
might resist capture by the theoretical. Yet, curiosity can help the clinician hesitate 
and remain—however briefly—in the destabilizing open-ness of the unknown. Even 
Quinn grudgingly accords curiosity “a certain commendable habit of mind in 
scientific inquiry”.77 He insists, however, that curiosity’s desire to plumb unsolvable 
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76 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', p. 26.  
77 Ibid. p. 27.  
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mysteries far exceeds its interest or capacity.78 Interestingly, curiosity plays a role in 
mindfulness and compassion practice.79 One recent study also suggests the 
importance of curiosity’s role in helping psychotherapists achieve greater 
“attunement” with the help seeker.80  
5.5.5 A scientific account 
Richard Dawkins shares Fisher’s aversion to religion but claims that wonder is 
accessible only through science. His scorn for mystery or any “benevolent overseer 
of our lives”81 might appear to weaken his claim that “the purveyors of superstition, 
the paranormal and astrology” are eroding science.82 For these purveyors 
presumably include the considerable population of all religious believers and 
spiritual seekers, scholars and scientists among them. Yet only the scientist, Dawkins 
claims, responds adequately to wonder. Underscoring his contempt for the Church 
and the mystic “happy to revel in a mystery,” Dawkins claims that only the 
productive scientist can acknowledges the profundity by getting to work to find the 
answer.83  
Dawkin’s accounts of the natural world are mesmerizing in showing how squid 
change colour, how insects hear, how DNA might reconstitute human beings on 
other planets.84 Yet, his rhetoric is as dogmatic as any religious fundamentalist he 
might wish to challenge. In attempting to “un-weave the rainbow,” Dawkins argues 
that by understanding phenomena more deeply their mystery can be more 
wonderfully known and this may be true.85 Yet his view of wonder would deny any 
inherent value in the mystery itself or its connection to the moral question, which is 
a rather significant oversight. Dawkins may be justified in claiming that poets are 
                                                     
78 Ibid. p. 26.  
79 In the teaching of mindfulness practice, Daniel Siegle has developed the acronym “COAL,” that 
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81 R. Dawkins, Unweaving the Rainbow: Science, Delusion and the Appetite for Wonder (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2000), pp. 6-7.  
82 Ibid. p. 118.  
83 Ibid. p. 17.  
84 Ibid. pp. 7-8, 75, 90, 104-05.  
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led by, “the very same spirit that moves great scientists.”86 Still, his perspective 
belies a conqueror’s acquisitive taste for knowledge and consigns wonder to 
insignificance unless it can be refuted, unlocked or proven through science into 
tangible existence—like a prize.  
5.5.6 A biologised account 
In contrast is American philosopher of religion Robert Fuller, whose biological slant 
identifies wonder as an emotion central to our religious sensibilities.87 Fuller 
condemns the one-dimensional view of evolutionary biology and psychology that 
has given greater priority to issues of survival related to fight, flight and aggression. 
We have erred, he suggests, in focussing away from the affiliative emotions that 
contribute to our sense of belonging, bondedness and bliss. Consequently we have 
failed to recognize how joy, amazement, interest and an absence of utility 
correspond to wonder and give rise to “more abstract and higher conceptions of the 
world” and their pursuit.88 It is these emotions, Fuller claims, that have contributed 
to the highest forms of human and moral development. He is less clear on how this 
development has arisen and refers, in part, back to Piaget’s model to support his 
argument.89 Despite his transparently religious bias, Fuller’s argument seems to 
relate more to human survival than he might wish. In suggesting that the emotion 
of wonder is an adaptive aspect of brain function, however, he “biologises” the very 
thing he is attempting to divinize. Nonetheless, he claims that our adaptive capacity 
to wonder is “seeking the intentionality of the whole that lies behind the observable 
parts”.90  
Fuller deserves some credit for attempting to claim scientific authority for a divine 
principle by examining wonder as an emotion to prove its existence. Yet, he has not 
effectively bridged the divide between the languages of reductive science and 
philosophical inquiry. Wonder is constituted as a bland although high-minded 
“emotion” directed by some ultimate principle that Fuller earnestly wishes to show 
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is mediated through the sensitive radar of brain chemistry. Yet, this “emotion” 
eludes the deeper implications of the unifying principle that really underlies Fuller’s 
work, leaving it too mechanical or limited to neurology to really matter.  
As we have seen in this section, scholars who are writing about wonder view this 
notion as having profound and urgent significance psychologically and 
developmentally, culturally, scientifically, aesthetically and religiously. Yet, the 
orientations examined here fall short of addressing the enigmatic moral appeal for 
which we are seeking an adequate answer. They focus instead on knowledge and 
resolution, solution and assimilation and a drive that is largely appetitive, 
acquisitive or implies mastery. Interestingly, the possible significance of wonder as 
a wild card that remains untamed, unknowable and open is not found in these 
formulations. This leaves the pressing ethical and relational implications of the 
emotionally super-charged event in The Nitobe Garden curiously absent in these 
formulations of wonder.  
5.6  Wonder, the clinician and Martyn Evans 
[T]he proper attitude of the clinician is to combine intelligence with a proper 
form of reverence: an attitude neither of terrified awe at responsibility, nor of 
immobile marvelling at the incomprehensible, but of dynamic, transfiguring 
wonder in the face of shared embodiment. When the doctor addresses the 
patient’s wonderful fragility she also, thereby, reengages with her own.91 
Professor Martyn Evans’ thoughtfully argued formulation of wonder speaks 
relevantly to the clinician and supports and informs the interests of our inquiry. His 
analysis provides solid groundwork on which to build, especially with respect to his 
invitation to the research community to go further, as noted earlier.92 
No one has attempted any sustained analytic discussion on the clinical 
relevance of wonder, nor exploration of the ethical or aesthetic aspect of 
wonder in relation to medical practice from the perspective of either the 
clinician or the patient.93   
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Evans’ engagement with the medical humanities encouragingly prioritizes the 
importance of wonder as a value in medical practice.94 He calls for the replacement 
of the mechanized notion of medical training with education that emphasizes the 
clinician’s need for greater ethical sensitivity.95 Evans also appeals for an easing of 
the strict boundaries among competing areas of academic specialization towards the 
development of a shared interdisciplinary language that might better address the 
needs of the patient.96 His focus on the ethical, his absolute concern for the welfare 
of the patient and his terms of reference reflect arguments I have pursued elsewhere 
in research on “mystical experience”.97  
Evans’ formulation of wonder as something both “epiphanic” and “transfiguring” 
confirms Grace Jantzen’s observation that our culture—and its vernacular—are 
deeply embedded in its Christian roots, despite what some theologians might 
describe as its secular veneer.98 Evans concedes, for example, that wonder’s ineffable 
significance cannot be discounted for, “not only is metaphysics not discreditable, it 
is not even avoidable in thinking about our experience of the world.”99 He construes 
wonder as an orientation or attitude rather than an emotion—but not quite a 
relationship—sympathetic to ideas of spiritual or meditative practice now playing an 
increasingly important role in clinical literature. He also notes that wonder has 
greater durability than curiosity because it “survives explanation” and remains 
enigmatically refreshing for that reason.100 In saying as much, Evans also confirms 
his recognition of wonder’s openness as something beyond reason or resolution.101  
Evans’ use of narrative additionally supports the argument for self-disclosure and 
emotional transparency in research on wonder and ethics, and his vignettes evoke 
                                                     
94 See: H.M. Evans, 'Medical Humanities: Stranger at the Gate, or Long-Lost Friend?', Medicine, Health 
Care and Philosophy, 10 (2007), 369-70.  
95 H.M. Evans, 'Reflections on the Humanities in Medical Education', p. 511. 
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Medical Humanities, 30 (2004). 
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the mystery he is attempting to analyse. In one account, Evans describes his 
enraptured response to a musical performance through which his life became “more 
nearly complete as a result of hearing and understanding…than it would have been 
otherwise”.102 Elsewhere, he describes seeing a premature infant struggling for life 
in a hospital where he states, the child “emanated wonder in the invitation to see 
him as one of us”.103 Evans’ personal evocations point to an extra-ordinary and life-
affirming apprehension tied to an ultimacy that is beautiful, mysterious and tacitly 
relational but which also requires metaphor and affective language to translate. 
Hence, wonder is: 
 [A] special kind of transfiguring encounter…a very particular attitude of 
special attentiveness…prompted by circumstances that may be entirely 
ordinary yet…yield an object in which the ordinary is transfigured by and 
suffused with something extraordinary as well. The attitude of wonder is 
thus one of altered, compellingly intensified attention to something that we 
immediately acknowledge as somehow important—something that might be 
unexpected…and towards which we will likely want to turn our faculty of 
understanding; something whose initial appearance to us engages our 
imagination before our understanding; something…larger and more 
significant than ourselves; something in the face of which we momentarily 
set aside our own concerns (and even our self-conscious awareness, in the 
most powerful instances)…Wonder is not the same as awe: its object need be 
neither sublime nor terrifying. It is closer to marveling, yet it is not confined 
to static gazing but has its own dynamic leading-on to the desire to 
understand. It has pale echoes in curiosity, but its objects persist in our 
imagination, even beyond the point where we have at one level explained 
them.104  
Evans wants to ignite a sense of reverence to enable the clinician to see the help seeker 
as if for the first time, to be morally refreshed and better able to resist the de-
moralizing drudgery of the clinical environment and routine. Less clearly articulated 
are the implications of the wonder-full encounter for community mental health care, 
but neither are they excluded. Yet, I am inclined to argue for a formulation of 
wonder less affectively limited than the one Evans proposes. I hesitate to confine the 
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clinician’s wonder-full apprehension such that it fails to take into clear account the 
horrendous ethical problems looming in the background that wonder is supposed to 
mitigate. I would also contend that community mental health care differs 
sufficiently from all other kinds of health practice to warrant an adjustment to 
Evans’ definition. My argument relates specifically to the complex dangers of the 
therapeutic relationship and its much greater focus within community mental 
health care, and to the issue of patients’ legal rights in community mental health 
care.  
These concerns are less relevant for the patient seeking medical care and at complete 
liberty to decline any treatment, even if this decision contributes to the patient’s 
deterioration or death. If it is a question of mental health, however, such liberty can 
be swiftly and brutally curtailed, making the issue of systemic violence suddenly 
much more relevant. Consequently, I must argue for a definition of wonder that 
includes the awe-full and recognizes the presence of the sublime.  
Evans is entirely persuasive in reckoning that “[w]hen the doctor addresses the 
patient’s wonderful fragility she also, thereby, reengages with her own”.105 Yet this 
wonder-full reengagement—whether tender or unsettling, astonishing or 
horrifying—is neither neutral nor benign in calling the clinician to account. To 
apprehend another as one’s self is to be confronted by the awe-full moral question 
beyond all “therapeutic” considerations. What can I do, what must I do for this person?  
5.6.1 My flower 
My friend Mariana is howling, incoherent at the other end of a Skype call from 
Canada while I am here in Durham writing my thesis. Her daughter, Julia, has been 
committed to the psychiatric ward of the local hospital for what appears to be a 
psychotic breakdown. We look at each other in horror through the computer screen 
and cry while Mariana chokes out the complicated details of the past 24 hours.  
We had said goodbye only weeks before after holidaying together in England, the 
three of us. When we met, I could see Julia was not quite herself. Her laughter was 
more subdued and the relaxed intimacy between us, developed from her adolescence 
over twenty years, had been replaced with a remoteness that eluded my efforts to 
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connect with her. The complexity of her life and the heartache she had recently 
sustained helped me account for her unaccustomed gravity.  
The week Mariana calls is a nightmare. I don’t really know what’s happening and I 
can’t get to Julia on the other side of the world. It’s maddeningly all second hand and 
coming from Mariana who can’t stop crying. But also from one of Julia’s devoted 
friends and two nurses I speak to during that week as well from Julia herself, the 
little ghost girl who talks to me all too briefly every day from the public phone on her 
ward.  
Julia tries from the first day of her incarceration to frantically enlist the help of 
friends on the outside to find her a human rights lawyer or activist to get her out. Is 
she paranoid? But wouldn’t she be? Her mother is denied the right to spend even the 
first night with her daughter who has never spent a night in any hospital let alone a 
locked psychiatric facility. They put her at the end of the ward and she asks to be 
moved closer to the nursing station because she is afraid. Because a man—another 
glassy-eyed inmate—had apparently appeared in the doorway of her room on a 
number of occasions to stare at her. 
 I become increasingly alarmed in the following 48 hours to hear she is taking on the 
staff and demanding to be released. “Julia, they will not like this. You must comply. 
You must. Your defiance will be interpreted as part of your illness. Tell me you 
understand what I am saying. You have to stop confronting them or it will not go 
well. Lie low for a few days, they don’t have the resources to keep you in there long 
and there’s a line up around the block waiting for your bed. This will pass; we’ll get 
you out. I promise”.  
Julia is enraged with her mother the first day or two, refusing to see her when 
Mariana urges her daughter to relax and stay safe and quiet, for she believes her 
mother has colluded in keeping her there. Julia tells me she feels as though the entire 
staff is watching her and I tell her they are. I can’t help feeling a sense of guilty relief 
that she is at least safe until we find out what the hell is going on. I call a close friend 
and colleague in Canada still working in the system for a consult. “Well kiddo, you 
know as well as me that the hospital doesn’t want her leaving if she’s at risk of 
hopping off a bridge and she’ll be let out all too soon, that’s the bigger concern”. But 
is she really at risk? She’s denied being suicidal ever since she arrived, but they don’t 
believe her.  
Julia is rational and articulate on the phone and grateful to hear my voice long-
distance but sounds so vulnerable, young and far away. I ask if she knows what 
happened. She only remembers having anxiety and a migraine and has no apparent 
memory or insight into her state of mind when she was sectioned, which worries me. 
She’s vague, regressed, drugged, not herself. Julia gives me permission to speak to 
the night nurse, Peter. I have already told her I would happily have a conference call 
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with the psychiatrist in her presence if she would like that. She would, she says. 
“Tell the nurse, tell the psychiatrist,” I say. 
Peter tells me they have her on two milligrams of Risperidone106 and that she is 
starting to “settle” and become engaged in activities on the ward. I tell him she does 
not seem to be psychotic and ask for her diagnosis and why she is being held against 
her will. There’s no diagnosis yet, Peter tells me, she’s under observation. He also 
reminds me, not unreasonably, that it’s to her benefit to be there as she’d presented 
with psychotic symptoms the night she came in. He assures me of this. “But there 
are countless people walking the streets with psychotic symptoms who have not been 
sectioned,” I say. Peter is silent. He does not know when she will be released. He is 
courteous, soft spoken. In response to my request he says he’ll try to talk to one of the 
doctors about getting her voluntary status but can promise nothing. He’s also about 
to go on three days leave. Mariana is upset to hear this as she and Julia greatly value 
Peter’s kindness. The day nurse, Mariana states, is a bitch.  
The following day I speak to Mariana on Skype who has been waiting for a call from 
the psychiatrist for three hours. I have coached her to ask him about a release date, 
about the diagnosis, about re-negotiating Julia’s certified status to a voluntary stay 
in hospital to ease her distress about being locked up. But also that she be allowed a 
day pass under Mariana’s care, even for an hour’s walk, to get her off a ward where 
she has been wandering for an unrelenting three days. Mariana writes down what I 
say and the call finally comes through. 
Mariana does not want to tell the doctor too much, she’s a refugee mother and she 
knows about imprisonment. She assures him coolly that Julia has no history of 
mental illness. I am uncomfortably aware of my friend’s foreign accent and want 
this man to take her seriously. But the conversation threatens to unravel when 
Mariana raises her voice to inform him levelly that she is ESL107 and that a nurse 
had twisted her words which resulted in Julia being perceived as being in less control 
than she actually had been. I want her to stay calm. Mariana holds the receiver to the 
screen of her computer for me to hear, but the male voice on the other end is blurred. 
The doctor wants to know if Julia has problems with power and control, with 
authority. He’s a moron, I think to myself.  
I get off Skype and phone the hospital to reassure Julia she will likely be released in a 
week or less, my voice upbeat and brittle. Julia tells me she has just been given a 
sedative by injection after a run-in with one of the nurses. I beg her to try to listen to 
me but her speech is slurred and slow and she tells me she’s sorry but can’t stay on 
the phone anymore because she needs to lie down. She is now being chemically 
restrained. I can’t work, I can’t think. 
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When I call Julia the following day the transition has been successfully made. This 
young woman with a dancer’s body and an angel’s face, my friend, gifted, gutsy, 
funny, intelligent, politically motivated and aware, well-travelled, educated, and 
employed is now docile as a new born lamb. Expressing her gratitude for the 
kindness of the staff in a soft flat voice, she tells me it is a good place for her to be for 
now. She thanks me with a creepy formality for being so kind, as though we’d just 
been introduced. Mariana calls me later to ask what has happened. It doesn’t make 
sense to her that her daughter has transmuted from a wild cat into this nearly inert 
creature seemingly overnight. “It’s simple,” I say. “Takes no time at all”. 
I try again another day, another call, another nurse. Her name is also Catherine. It 
takes me five or six tries to get through. It’s Thursday morning. Julia has been there 
since Saturday night without receiving any formal psychiatric or psycho-social 
assessment or diagnosis. She has been held against her will without her own clothes, 
without any counselling services, certainly without legal counsel, even without her 
phone that they allow her to use only five minutes a day. Despite having no history 
of mental illness or addiction she has been denied even a single right to free 
movement while being chemically restrained for lack of compliance, and medicated 
with a potent anti-psychotic. It has taken a scant five days to reduce Julia to a shell.  
I have a lot to say and measure my words, wanting so badly to sound professional. I 
introduce myself, explain my reasons for calling, my relationship to Julia, my PhD 
work on community mental health care, my background as a clinician and my 
concern that a terrible mistake has been made. The nursing notes that Catherine 
consults are all she has in the absence of an assessment. They don’t reflect that Julia 
has a brother, two university degrees completed with distinction, a nice apartment in 
a beautiful part of town, a responsible position in a respected educational institution, 
close friends and a significant investment in creative endeavours, as an artist in her 
own right. They don’t mention that her parents had been jailed in their country as 
political dissidents. Her father, having been imprisoned for a year and tortured, had 
stayed behind, while Mariana fled to Canada with the children to a city whose name 
she’d never heard before. 
”You’ve got a superstar on the ward Catherine and you don’t even know it,” I say. 
“Don’t you think that Julia’s response to her certification was warranted?” 
Catherine wants me to know that Julia is in a state-of-the-art psychiatric facility 
only recently opened which provides her with the luxury of her own room and a 
private bath. “It’s really very nice,” she adds. “But how would you feel if you wound 
up in a situation like this, being locked up and drugged with no rights, can you 
imagine?” Catherine hesitatingly concedes she has thought about it and 
acknowledges it would be scary.  
Chapter Five - Wonder 
118 
 
I ask if Julia has received any culturally sensitive care, or if she possibly could, while 
in hospital. “That comes later, in community mental health care,” Catherine informs 
me. I don’t argue, there’s no point, I already know what kind of service will be 
available to Julia. I ask again about a pass for a walk outside, about having Julia’s 
certification revoked to voluntary status, about when exactly we might expect an 
assessment and diagnosis. She has no idea how powerless I feel. Catherine is 
apologetic in explaining that doctors are on holiday and that they are short-staffed 
which is why Julia has not yet been assessed. She says this twice, possibly to 
exonerate herself and I hope this means I’ve made a dent. Later that day, Julia is 
given back her clothes and allowed to go outside for a walk with her mother. 
The following day she is allowed a weekend pass to be with her mother from Friday 
night to Monday morning. Mariana calls me on Skype the moment they get home to 
show me her girl, my flower, flattened by drugs and subdued by the ordeal she has 
survived. Her vacant eyes smile dully into the camera and she tells me softly, in a 
child’s voice, that overall it was good experience and she thinks it has helped but that 
it’s nice to be home. She has really appreciated my help, she says again, and thanks 
me. I cringe to hear her speak to me like this, resisting the desire to appeal to her, 
“Julia, it’s me! Don’t say that”. 
She is released on Monday following the weekend on 2 milligrams of Risperidone 
that might be given as a starting dosage to someone twice her size who is suffering 
from hallucinations or schizophrenia. Julia has never had anything stronger than 
Tylenol108 until this event. She returns to work part-time two days after her 
discharge, despite dire warnings from the hospital psychiatrist and her family doctor 
about her need to take an extended leave of absence and stay on the medication. Julia 
sleeps with all the lights on in the bedroom of Mariana’s apartment for the first week 
and more after her discharge, and is unable to return to her own apartment. She 
manages to have a shower at the end of the first week out of hospital without having 
to ask her mother to stand outside the bathroom door because she is afraid. No 
wonder. 
I want to believe that Julia will be able to see a psychiatrist in community mental 
health care well in advance of a likely waiting period of eight to twelve weeks as a 
result of my impassioned pleas to an intake nurse, called Gloria. She listens caringly 
while I bleed out the story over the phone and beg her assistance. But she also gently 
reminds me at the end of our conversation, “Catherine you know that the system 
is…” “Broken, yes, I know, Gloria, I know. It’s broken. But please, please do what 
                                                     
108 Acetaminophen, found in Paracetamol in the UK, is sold under the trade name of Tylenol in North 
America. 
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you can, promise me you will do what you can. She has got to get off this 
medication. Please help me”.109  
5.6.2 Critique and analysis 
The implications of My Flower might identify a gap in Evans’ analysis of wonder 
worth considering further. As a philosopher and ethicist who is not a clinician, 
Evans is scrupulously respectful of the medical professional and at pains not to 
transgress. Yet, he may overplay this card by focusing on the dehumanization of the 
patient as it relates to the clinician’s exposure of the factory-like experience described 
by Simone Weil.110 This is the factory with its deadening routines, constraints, and 
ethical indifference, its waste and inability to value the relational, which supposedly 
turns the clinician into an automaton.111  
There is more than a grain of truth to Evans’ assertion and ample literature to 
defend it. However, the gap between the well-heeled, well-resourced, well-educated 
and employed clinician and her disenfranchised community mental health patient is 
unbridgeable, making this comparison ethically disturbing and possibly misleading. 
Weil herself identifies our dehumanizing propensity in claiming that, “everybody 
despises the afflicted to some extent, although practically no one is conscious of 
it.”112 Evans’ work on wonder undoubtedly seeks to address the consequences of 
such contempt. Yet he risks minimising the clinician’s ethical responsibility by 
blaming the institutional “factory” for impairing her, and the help seeker for boring 
her.113 This leaves the most vulnerable person in the therapeutic equation in second 
place, after the ennui and dehumanization of the clinician.  
                                                     
109 In the year since her hospitalization, Julia has seen three psychiatrists and had two medication 
changes that are still not adequately managing her symptoms. She continues to hear voices although to 
our relief, has been diagnosed with a thought disorder rather than schizophrenia. This does not lessen 
the disturbing impact of these voices although she continues to work full time and is attempting to 
translate her experience through her painting. Julia is now actively engaged in the community of 
“voice hearers” in a leadership role, and has been relentless in her efforts to rise above her current 
affliction.   
110 H.M. Evans, 'Wonder and the Clinical Encounter', p. 130. 
111 Ibid. 
112 S. Weil, Waiting for God (New York: Harper, 1951), p. 40. 
113 Evans suggests the doctor’s humanity is “tested” and “abraded” by the boring routine of caring for 
unexceptional patients. “The dramatic patient encounter is exceptional. The nondramatic patient is 
unremarkable. The unremarkable patient becomes routine … uninteresting. How does one respond 
fully and attentively to an uninteresting patient … by what we might call ‘‘patient-centered tedium’’? 
See: H.M. Evans, 'Wonder and the Clinical Encounter', p. 125. 
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There are two other problematic issues arising in Evans’ perspective of wonder that 
deserve closer analysis and that I wish to challenge in the following two sections. 
The first concerns Evans’ call for reciprocity in the clinical relationship and the 
second his suggestion that our definition for wonder, as it pertains to the clinical 
context, need not be sublime or terrifying and is not the same as awe.  
5.6.3 Reciprocity and mutuality 
In claiming the importance of reciprocity in the clinical relationship, Evans’ interest 
in “embodied human agency” suggests the appealing notion of the body as the 
locus of wonder for the shared response of the clinician and the vulnerable help 
seeker. 114 Here, the collaborative possibility of “marvelling” at the body (or, even, 
the nature of the mind), suggests a skilful way of redirecting the clinician and the 
help seeker away from the vortex of pathology, institutional reduction and control 
of the medical machine. From this perspective, Evans accurately confirms my own 
wonder-full clinical encounters where intimacy, immediacy and reverence are 
palpable. Here, the help seeker is confirmed and revered through an intimate 
encounter with the clinician who—if only briefly—transcends the excruciating 
administrative tedium, micro-management and ever-declining resources of her 
work place. 
Nonetheless, Evans’ claim of even a modicum of reciprocity in the clinical 
relationship is tenuous at best although he suggests otherwise. “I see no reason 
suddenly to drop this reciprocal requirement of acknowledgment of the Other, 
simply because the project of the clinical encounter is an asymmetric one (that is, 
primarily conceived towards the benefit of the patient)”.115 Evans’ focus on an 
asymmetry conceived for the help seeker’s benefit does not make it so, nor is there is 
any equivalence between the clinician and the help seeker. The asymmetry imposed 
by the clinical hierarchy through the clinician’s authority, unequivocally forecloses 
on any argument for reciprocity.   
                                                     
114 H.M. Evans, 'Wonder and the Patient'. pp. 47- 49. 
115 Ibid. p. 53.  
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Evans also references the work of Michelle Clifton-Soderstrom,116 who employs a 
Levinasian perspective to assert the practice of medicine as “foremost an ethic,” 
preceding even its scientific concerns.117 Like Evans, she seeks an open and real 
dialogue between the medical professional and the patient. Unlike him, she denies 
the possibility of reciprocity in suggesting that, “the other needs me and calls to me 
as a weak master to a strong slave”.118 This allusion recalls Levinas’ ethical vision 
that posits the unilateral and extreme responsibility of the strong for the weak, 
which in this case corresponds to the responsibility of the medical professional for 
the help seeker. Yet, even as a weak (clinical) master I will never be weaker than the 
strongest—enslaved—help seeker. Any argument to the contrary obfuscates the 
formidable legal power, especially of the community mental health hierarchy, in 
which the clinical relationship occurs. 
The idea of reciprocity or mutuality in the clinical relationship is seductive and 
regretfully too substantial a subject to adequately analyse here. Part of its appeal 
surely lies in the clinician’s wish to do no harm or less harm. However, this idea 
always precludes serious scrutiny of the clinician’s morally ambiguous position 
above the help seeker, which a wonder-full, possibly awe-full perspective might help 
expose. That said, clinicians routinely attempt to subvert the reductive system in 
which they are also trapped, by attempting to meet the help seeker as another 
equally fragile human being. Carl Rogers proposed exactly this in identifying 
mutuality as one of his three core conditions necessary and sufficient for therapeutic 
change. While mutuality might appear to benefit both parties, however, the far 
greater benefit will always fall to the clinician. There are even greater moral 
dilemmas than this to consider beyond the lack of equivalence between the clinician 
and the help seeker. 
During a public debate with Carl Rogers in 1957, for example, Martin Buber 
famously confronted Rogers on the unavoidable inequality of power in the 
therapeutic relationship that he believed prohibited true mutuality. This 
                                                     
116 Ibid. pp. 52-53.  
117 M. Clifton-Soderstrom, 'Levinas and the Patient as Other: The Ethical Foundation of Medicine', The 
Journal of medicine and philosophy, 28 (2003), p. 447. 
118 Ibid. p. 452.  
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observation, Brian Thorne has noted, struck at the core of Rogers’ theoretical 
argument, which of course it does. Buber insisted that the mutuality Rogers 
claimed, while possibly capable of strengthening a person’s individuality or 
identity, still failed to make her fully human. In the absence of true reciprocity, 
Buber suggested, the individual’s “awareness of others” and her “development of 
the responsiveness which makes for social responsibility” would be impaired.119  
Certainly, it is hard to imagine how a help seeker who has been re-identified as 
mentally ill, “treated” or confined against her will, medicated and globally 
stigmatized in every part of her life, could easily conjure sufficient agency to be or 
become socially responsible and engaged. Even, that is, with the help of a 
“subversive” clinician dedicated to establishing the possibilities of wonder in her 
practice, and to informing the help seeker’s political awareness and agency beyond 
it. Psychologist, Rollo May, also criticized Rogers and humanistic psychology for its 
failure to address the issue of evil in the emotional material presented to therapists 
by their clients.120   
There can be no real place for reciprocity in this discussion, much as the ethicist or 
ethical clinician might wish otherwise, as long as the asymmetrical relationship and 
the roles and laws governing this relationship prevail. But even beyond this 
asymmetry, or possibly because of it, thinkers like Buber and May have offered 
compelling critiques that point to the erosion of the help seeker’s moral agency and 
awareness, which the most earnest call for reciprocity and mutuality cannot easily 
refute. 
5.6.4 Awe 
Evans’ suggestion that wonder need not be sublime or terrifying and is not the same 
as awe poses another problem, for the reality of community mental health care can 
be all too horrifying, as My Flower shows. This reality is also normalized and 
neutralized through protocols and efficiencies conducted with equanimity and 
without question—by which I also mean professional entitlement.  
                                                     
119 B. Thorne, Carl Rogers (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 71-72.  
120 Ibid. p. 72.  
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Keen’s observation that horror is incompatible with wonder confirms Evans’ 
aversion to the inclusion of awe in his definition. Keen claims that horror threatens 
to “degrade or destroy, while we wonder at those things that promise to enrich and 
fulfill life”.121 Conversely, Quinn observes that in Latin, horror describes wonder, 
awe, reverence and stupor.122 More relevantly, Quinn notes that horror occurs 
“when we encounter a universe governed by injustice,” which we are surely 
attempting to address here. Yet if, as Keen suggests, horror is to wonder as 
desecration is to the sacred, his objection also serves my purpose. 
Our narratives suggest that the divinity of this “transfigured” and innocent help 
seeker, who shines as stunning evidence of all I have ever wished for, is precisely 
what illuminates the horror of this injustice, and my part in it. If we wish to 
interrupt the clinician’s entrancement with the status quo, it seems our definition of 
wonder would be incomplete without awe and ambivalence. Its inclusion need not 
refute Evans’ call for wonder as moral refreshment but can broaden the continuum 
of interpretation to allow for the galvanizing impact of wonder that could impel the 
clinician to stand with the vulnerable help seeker against injustice. Evans does not 
whitewash his definition by suggesting that wonder will always be aesthetically 
pleasing or beautiful. Yet, his proposed containment of wonder to something less 
than cataclysmic—lest it impair the clinician’s judgement or capacity to fulfil her 
duties--is still problematic. For, such judgement and capacity are precisely what we 
wish to challenge and revise.  
Evans is well aware of the institutionalizing threat to wonder, which is why I wish 
to cut it free of any such confinement and allow for the presence of awe, horror and 
the sublime in its definition. Otherwise, we may look forward to the kind of 
colonization that will almost certainly reduce clinical wonder to an acronym—
“CW”—or another “medical modality” or “application”. 
In limiting the boundaries of wonder, we risk negating the whole point of our 
project. This stupefying paradox and horrifying ambivalence has no equal within 
the reductive sphere. I am suggesting that the idea of wonder we are attempting to 
                                                     
121 S. Keen, 'Apology for Wonder', p. 30.  
122 D. Quinn, 'Iris Exiled: A Synoptic History of Wonder', p. 79.  
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harness for its ethical potential is one that must be capable of inviting the clinician to 
recognize the help seeker as her self, which appears to be a step beyond Evans’ 
recommendation. That is to say, as I recognized my colleague in The Nitobe Garden,123 
and James in James’ story,124 and even the unfortunate man in Ladies’ Shoes, who tried 
to decline his dialysis treatment.125 The perspective of wonder we might always 
wish to keep should allow the clinician the “shock” of recognition. For this is one 
that communicates her priceless bond with the stranger to whom everything is 
owed because it enables her to also recognize the horror of the help seeker’s plight 
and her role in its promulgation.   
In the worrying absence of awe and ambivalence that Evans has suggested, I find a 
bias that favours the interests of the clinician and occludes the larger implications of 
institutional hierarchy and the law. If we formulate wonder as little more than 
refreshment for the dis-spirited or jaded clinician, we still turn a blind eye to the 
profound injustice at the core of the de-moralizing institution. We fail that is, to re-
moralize or awaken the clinician, leaving her to continue meting out the injustice, 
albeit in a possibly more reverential way, while her entrancement with the status quo 
remains undisturbed and intact.  
5.7  Conclusion 
In asking what it means to see the vulnerable help seeker as myself, I have 
attempted a brief inquiry of wonder that has directed our analysis towards a 
definition that is awe-full, open and ambivalent. Through a limited examination of 
its etymology, I have drawn a number of parallels between wonder and praxis that 
suggest a surprising congruence between them. In searching for something of a 
template for The Nitobe Garden, I have also examined various formulations of 
wonder. Based on the work of contemporary scholars, these formulations highlight 
the disparity between definitions focussed on knowledge, experience, and 
acquisition or mastery. Altogether, however, they describe a movement towards 
closure or resolution as opposed to remaining resolutely open and unfathomable.  
                                                     
123 See: The Nitobe Garden (5.1.2). 
124 See: James’ story (2.). 
125 See: Ladies’ Shoes (4.2.2). 
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Concluding this chapter was Professor Martyn Evans’ appraisal of wonder within 
the clinical encounter and the emerging field of medical humanities. His perspective 
is exceptionally sympathetic to the clinician and allied to the interests of our inquiry. 
In engaging with Evans’ work, I have also raised issues of specific concern to the 
practice of community mental health, particularly regarding his argument for 
reciprocity, and his reservations about awe and the sublime to our clinical interests. 
The latter represent the very evocation of the wholly/holy Other in Emmanuel 
Levinas’ ethical vision that we will examine next. 
In closing, we cast back to the questions posed by Professor Gerard Loughlin to 
assert that wonder appears to have many, if not infinite, sources or points of 
entry.126 Wonder emerges through what is beheld, but also through the wonderer. It 
may announce itself gradually over time as it did in James’ story or arise 
cataclysmically as it did in The Nitobe Garden. Wonder may also infiltrate the heart 
and mind through one’s intentional turn to the disciplines of meditation, 
contemplation and prayer. Some would argue that wonder speaks of something 
beyond while others, as we have seen, would insist that the only mystery is the one 
yet to explained, proven and claimed. I have suggested that wonder cannot be 
“biologised” or “psychologised” for these are reductions. Yet, wonder does not 
demand the use of religious or theological language for its expression, although the 
language of poetry, paradox and love are central to its evocation. Of all of these 
questions, the most interesting is whether we “have to try to indicate the level of the 
beyond” in our apprehension of wonder. It is this impenetrable “beyond” and the 
ethical vision of Emmanuel Levinas, to which we now turn for a closer look at the 
face of the stranger who is no stranger at all. 
                                                     
126 See Professor Loughlin’s questions in the epigraph of: A brief genealogy of wonder (5.2). 




Levinas and the wholly/holy other 
“You know,” Levinas once confided to Derrida, “One often speaks of ethics to describe what I 
do, but what really interests me in the end is not ethics, not ethics alone, but the holy, the 
holiness of the holy”.1 
6.1  Introduction 
Emmanuel Levinas was a French philosopher and Talmudic scholar whose work focussed 
entirely on the ethical relationship.2 Continental philosopher Jacques Derrida, who was 
more widely known than Levinas, contributed to his immense stature by writing about 
Levinas’ work before he came to prominence. Derrida also established the second wave of 
Levinasian scholarship for which one is inclined to be most grateful.3  
Levinas’ radical work is now gaining currency in the fields of psychology and 
psychotherapy4 and, one scholar has hopefully suggested, may enable psychology to shift its 
“immature and naïve” approach to morality and ethics.5 As Levinas’ vision confirms, the 
cost of continuing to conflate ethics with reason is hardly insignificant when the question of 
certainty is given primacy over the ethical, over “the question of the right”.6 Beyond 
psychology, there are widely diverging spheres of endeavour now investigating Levinas’ 
transcendent ethical vision in growing numbers.7 
Many prominent philosophers have taken Levinas’ work seriously, among them feminist 
philosophers Luce Irigaray and Tina Chanter.8 Religious philosopher, Grace Jantzen, also 
turned to Levinas’ account of ethics in developing a “feminist imaginary” capable of 
                                                     
1 Derrida recounts a fragment of a personal conversation with Levinas. See: J. Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas 
(Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 4.  
2 E. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982 (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1985), p. 56.  
3 For a brief overview of Levinas’ current impact see: P. Atterton and M. Calarco, 'Editors' Introduction: The 
Third Wave of Levinas Scholarship', in Radicalizing Levinas, ed. by Peter Atterton and Matthew Calarco (State 
University of New York Press, 2010).  
4 This special issue is devoted to Levinas. See: G. Sayre, 'Toward a Therapy for the Other', European Journal of 
Psychotherapy & Counselling, 7 (2005), 37.  
5 The author argues for the need for psychology to acquire moral relevance. See: R.N. Williams, 'Self-Betraying 
Emotions and the Psychology of Heteronomy', European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 7 (2005), p. 8.  
6 Ibid.  
7Using the search term, “Levinas,” in the EBSCO database revealed 9609 references ranging in subjects as diverse 
as corporate responsibility, literature, media, and psychology to name a few. Using the search term “Emmanuel 
Levinas” in Google Scholar produced 57, 000 references.  
8 S. Hand, Emmanuel Levinas (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 114-15.  
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addressing systemic violence.9 Jantzen underscored the value of Levinas’ work by 
describing as morally indefensible the discourse of religious philosophers who, prior to him, 
had focussed almost exclusively on the matter of one’s own moral status. By emphasizing 
that status, rather than its particular human consequences, Jantzen insists that the 
recipients—the victims—of this self-centred morality have been disturbingly absent from the 
discussion. “The construal of morality is entirely subject centred,” she observes.10 In contrast, 
Levinas’ focus is on the “other” and on my unequivocal ethical accountability to her. This 
emphasis has special relevance for those working in the healing professions because, as 
Jantzen accurately observes, clinicians know all too well the difficulty of keeping their hands 
clean and the urgent need for greater accountability.11  
Levinas’ focus, then, is on this holy human, wholly Other, who is my neighbour and my 
dear one. This is “the one and only” who Levinas also calls the “loved one, love being the 
condition of the very possibility of uniqueness”.12 By which he means irreducible; that which 
cannot be thematised, broken down into components or somehow assimilated, objectified, 
colonized or manipulated. Levinas’ wonder-full vision succeeds in stepping over all 
theoretical abstraction and the ceaseless appropriative quest to know, believe or understand, 
by making the human relationship the starting point of philosophy. We begin, therefore, not 
with a “clinical strategy” to subvert the atomizing medical machine, which Professor Jane 
Macnaughton observes has proven so resistant to our ongoing efforts to give it a human 
face.13 We begin with the possibility of a relationship with the holy, the holiness of the holy, 
and an irrevocable, primordial call that comes through the human Face of the Other. It is a 
call without beginning, precedence or end.  
In this chapter, we begin with a snapshot of Levinas’ life and proceed to a discussion of the 
two most significant influences on his work, notably Husserl and Heidegger. We will also 
examine how Levinas eclipsed his teachers and challenged Western philosophy with a 
revolutionary configuration of ethics that placed the relational prior to thinking and the 
conceptual. We will then analyse Levinas’ formulation of the “Face” and the “Other” to 
                                                     
9 G. Jantzen, 'Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion ', pp. 231-53.  
10 Ibid. p. 229.  
11 Ibid. pp. 231-37.  
12 E. Levinas, Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 168. 
13 J. Macnaughton, 'Medical Humanities' Challenge to Medicine'. 
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illustrate the paradoxes and complications posed by the enigma of the Face within the 
clinical encounter. In addition, we will discuss the role that language played in Levinas’ 
work as a tool capable of escaping reduction, and consider the meaning of his admonition to 
employ “disinterest” as an ethical path to the other. We will also consider that the 
yearning—the wonder—at the centre of Levinas’ ethical evocation may be being 
apprehended all too well by clinicians in the course of their work, despite being chronically 
denied and mis-construed. Finally, Levinas’ formulation of ethical responsibility as 
fundamentally asymmetrical will be analysed and followed by a brief feminist critique of his 
work before our chapter’s conclusion. 
6.2  Emmanuel Levinas: The man and his vision 
To speak of Redemption in a world that remains without justice is to forget that the 
soul is not the demand for immortality but the impossibility of assassinating, and 
that consequently, the spirit is the proper concern of a just society.14 
Emmanuel Levinas was a Lithuanian Jew born in 1906, who received a traditional Jewish 
education before moving to France in 1923 to begin his studies. In 1928, he moved to 
Germany to study under Husserl and there discovered Heidegger whose work was to 
influence him profoundly. From an early age, he was influenced by the Russian classics and 
Shakespeare,15 and credited his exposure to Russian novels with his eventual turn to 
philosophy.16 Levinas later taught at various universities in France, including the Sorbonne, 
and died in 1995. 
Having become a French citizen and served in the military in Paris, Levinas was drafted in 
1939 but by 1940 was interned by the Germans in a Nazi prisoner of war camp and forced to 
hard labour. Although he managed to elude the concentration camp, Levinas’ family and 
many of his friends perished at the hands of the Nazis. One commentator has suggested that 
a staggering 91% of Lithuania’s Jewish population died at the hands of the Nazis. Among 
them, 30,000 from Levinas’ hometown of Kaunas were murdered over a four month period 
                                                     
14 E. Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1990), p. 101. 
15 E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', p. 22.  
16 T. Chanter, in Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. by T. Chanter (PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2001), (p. 6).  
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by Nazis and Lithuanian nationalists who collaborated with the German forces.17 The impact 
of the holocaust was to be foundational to his entire career. 
Following the war, Levinas studied the Talmud with various renowned Jewish scholars 
before going on to publish some of his best known philosophical work and establishing 
himself as one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century.18 His exposure to the 
horror of Nazism, his Talmudic scholarship and his critique of Heidegger’s work became the 
crucible for his philosophical response to a century that, into this 21st century, is still 
darkened by unremitting violence. 
6.2.1 Husserl and Phenomenology  
Husserl’s phenomenology had a profound impact on Levinas in its attempt to establish 
philosophy as a “science of consciousness” that could eclipse the preoccupation with 
empiricism and theory by focussing on the meaning of perception itself.19 This was not so 
much a movement as a method that sought to overcome the rationalizing and restricting 
limits of traditional philosophy. Phenomenology emphasized a direct apprehension of lived 
experience aimed at pure subjectivity that was a radical approach and practice rather than a 
system of philosophy. It was accomplished, Husserl claimed, by intentionally “bracketing 
out” or “suspending” everything but pure subjectivity so that the practitioner could return 
to the reduction of pure phenomenological insight.20 This meant somehow resisting the 
influence of every construction, every social, cultural or religious assumption, assertion or 
imposition to get to the “truth” without explaining or theorising, in advance, the 
phenomenon being apprehended from “within”.21   
One commentator has suggested that phenomenology became the most important strand of 
European thought in the 20th century although it lacked cohesion and the prominence of a 
real movement. Yet, few of Husserl’s students believed that what he was attempting could 
be achieved, nor did anyone really succeed him. Those who took his work further, including 
                                                     
17 S. Hand, 'Emmanuel Levinas', p. 170.  
18 E. Levinas, Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996), pp. 7-9.  
19 S. Hand, 'Emmanuel Levinas', p. 12.  
20 Husserl’s “phenomenological reduction” describes the purity or essence of things. This is not to be confused 
with the “reduction” created by the assimilating or objectifying impact of the rational, which Levinas describes as 
“the same”.  
21 D. Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 4.  
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Levinas, were to challenge and change Husserl’s vision in significant ways. Having written 
his dissertation on The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology, Levinas was also 
instrumental in contributing to the emergence and popularity of phenomenology in France.22 
While he re-interpreted and re-oriented phenomenology’s approach towards the ethical, 
Levinas still credited Husserl for his remarkable achievement:23 
No one combatted the dehumanization of the Real better than Husserl, the 
dehumanization which is produced when one extends the categories proper to 
mathematized matter to the totality of our experience, when one elevates scientism to 
absolute knowledge … Husserl’s phenomenology has furnished the principal 
intellectual means for substituting a human world for the world as 
physicomathematical science represents it.24 
Nonetheless, Levinas did not believe that the intentionality fundamental to Husserl’s 
process went far enough to ensure the possibility of the transcendent and judged his work as 
ultimately flawed. Husserl may have intended to oppose traditional Western philosophy, 
but its roots were still evident in his philosophical process that made knowledge something 
to be grasped or possessed.25 Even with intentionality, Levinas suggested, the very act of 
thinking interfered with the emergence of pure subjectivity.26 Levinas disagreed with 
Husserl’s idea of consciousness as something that “discloses” an adequate representation, 
insisting it must instead “overflow” the object in a way that makes it un-representable. “The 
welcoming of the face and the work of justice—which condition the birth of truth itself—are 
not interpretable in terms of disclosure”. 27 Subjectivity could be no mere disclosure, for it 
required the overflowing welcome in which “the idea of infinity is consummated”.28  
6.2.2 Heidegger and Onto-theo-logy 
Levinas’ relationship with Martin Heidegger was more problematic both personally and 
philosophically because of Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism and Nazism, 
                                                     
22 Moran notes that French phenomenology developed through Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Ricoeur, Julia Kristeva, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida. See: ibid. pp. 18-19.  
23 Ibid. pp. 1-18.  
24 See: ibid. p. 327. Cited from: E. Levinas, Discovering Existence with Husserl (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998), p. 131. 
25 D. Moran, 'Introduction to Phenomenology', p. 328.  
26 Ibid. p. 329.  
27 E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), p. 
28.  
28 Ibid. p. 27.  
Chapter Six - Levinas 
131 
 
but equally because Levinas was fundamentally opposed to Heidegger’s thinking.29 Its 
exclusive focus on the primacy of being and the problem of ontotheology, Levinas believed, 
reduced God to the limited sphere of being and thought. This essentially placed God on 
equal footing with the thinker.  
If Heidegger taught that the history of Western metaphysics is the history of the 
forgetting of Being, Levinas teaches that it is the history of the forgetting of the 
Other. Heidegger also forgets the Other; forgets the alterity that is beyond Being.30  
In distinguishing between being as a noun and a verb, and in situating being within 
language itself, Heidegger’s formulation along with that of all Western philosophy had, 
Levinas suggested, continued to forget the radical difference between being, beings and 
beyond being. The latter refers to the moment or approach of the transcendent that for Levinas 
is the ethical relationship. Where Heidegger claimed the I of Being, of what is properly mine 
and what is primary and authenticated by my death, Levinas asserted the I only in relation 
to the Other, for whom I am responsible but also for whose death I am responsible.  
This forgetfulness is the remarkable blind spot in onto-theology and the consequence of 
thinking one can have “knowledge of God: theology”.31 In substituting onto-theo-logy for 
thinking and logic, and mistakenly equating God with being or being with God, our 
forgetfulness, Levinas suggested, led us eventually to science. This, he claimed, became the 
totalizing apparatus, “which pays attention only to beings, which subordinates them to 
itself, which wants to conquer and dispose of them, and which seeks power over beings”.32  
Another way of thinking had to be found which Levinas discovered when he asked if God 
did not signify the other of being? By which he meant the possible subversion of being and 
                                                     
29 The implications of Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi party are still contested. One commentator 
suggests that while Heidegger’s involvement was far from innocent from 1933-4, there is insufficient reason to 
argue that the whole of his philosophy was corrupted by this episode. See: J. Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 1-10. Yet, the bald facts of Heidegger’s behaviour are significant. See: S. 
Hand, 'Emmanuel Levinas', p. 15. Another scholar recounts being publicly humiliated by Levinas following his 
presentation on Heidegger that Levinas had agreed to help jury. The author suggests this reflects Levinas’ 
historical rage towards Heidegger’s Nazi involvement and his profound philosophical antipathy to Heidegger’s 
work. See: W.J. Richardson, 'The Irresponsible Subject', in Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel 
Levinas for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, ed. by A.T. Peperzak (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 123-31 pp. 
124-25). 
30 G. Loughlin, 'Other Discourses', New Blackfriars, 75 (1994), p. 20.  
31 E. Levinas, God, Death, and Time (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 121-23. 
32 Ibid. p. 124.  
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onto-theology that starts with “a certain” ethical relationship.33 As early as 1935, Levinas was 
questioning the possibility of transcending ontology, which he addressed in his famous 
essay, “Is Ontology Fundamental?”34 In it, he argued for a philosophy beyond ontology that 
pointed to a transcendence of the Good on which he was to build his primary critique of 
Heidegger’s work. Levinas’ project, to “think God as a beyond being,”35 would occupy the 
rest of his life.36 His two best known works, Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, or 
Beyond Essence, were written as major critiques of Heidegger’s notion of fundamental 
ontology.37 
Jeff Bloechl has observed that Levinas’ departure from Husserl and Heidegger sought to 
overcome what seemed to be their primary conclusion that “all experience refers properly to 
the self,” which makes the self both irreducible and primary.38 Levinas’ deviation from this 
formula suggested a subjectivity that claims “a private and irreducible, ontological 
attachment” to being which is fundamental, inescapable and constant.39 This, however, was 
“being” that engenders a chronic restlessness and exhaustion borne of all the efforts to resist 
“one’s very self”. For Levinas, the self is always constituted by what he describes as the same, 
by which he means that which is already reduced and limited through its own process and 
not as alterity or as the Other, 
Levinas observed that even “[t]he most audacious and remote knowledge does not put us 
into communion with the truly other; … it is still and always a solitude”.40 Yet, the escape 
we seek is less from solitude than from being.41 The real freedom from ontology’s 
rationalizing appropriation that constantly leads us back to the same, is found in the 
                                                     
33 Ibid. pp. 124-25.  
34 E. Levinas, 'Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings', pp. 1-10.  
35 To think God beyond being is the project of Jean-Luc Marion whose commentary is beyond the immediate 
focus of this thesis. See: J.-L. Marion, God without Being: Hors-Texte (Chicago and London: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995). 
36 E. Levinas, 'God, Death, and Time', p. 160.  
37 P. Benson and K.L. O'Neill, 'Facing Risk: Levinas, Ethnography, and Ethics', Anthropology of Consciousness, 18 
(2007), pp. 31-32.   
38 J. Bloechl, Liturgy of the Neighbor: Emmanuel Levinas and the Religion of Responsibility (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne 
University Press, 1999), p. 132.  
39 Ibid. p. 127.  
40 E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', pp. 60-61.  
41 Ibid. p. 59.  
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relationship that originates between me and one particular person.42 This might suggest a 
philosopher’s view of “knowledge” or a certain kind of philosopher. In the work of someone 
like Plato, for example, knowledge is also social and arrived at through dialogue, bringing 
forth what in some sense is already known. Levinas’ focus, however, is on the extraordinary 
relationship that awakens me with its traumatizing contrast between hidebound being and 
the holy. This relationship is one that claims me with a responsibility that “goes all the way 
to fission,”43 where “I am sick with love”.44 This event can presumably apply to any 
relationship but is nothing like a reciprocal relationship of equals, as we shall see.45 
Levinas’ radical reformulation of philosophy, Derrida observed, went against the grain of 
philosophical thought from Plato to Heidegger.46 It took aim at the whole history of 
European philosophy and its influence on Western civilization that totalized and reduced 
“otherness” to the same “originary and ultimate unity”.47 This totality, Levinas claimed, was 
all that was, and is, assimilated in the wake of Western philosophy’s rationalizing and 
reductive grip powered by “the drive for ‘representation’”.48 Ontology, Levinas insisted, was 
the root problem that reduced the intrinsic value of diversity, and the particularity of the 
individual, which leads to the harrowing outcomes of totalitarianism. Within this inquiry, 
these outcomes refer more to the mundane consequences of predictable institutional 
dehumanization, medicalization and asymmetry found in community mental health care in 
its many guises.  
6.3  The Face of the Other 
[T]aking as my point of departure the face of the other, proximity, by hearing—
before all mimicry, in its facial straight forwardness, before all verbal expression, in 
its mortality, from the depths of the weakness—a voice that commands: an order 
addressed to me, not to remain indifferent to that death, not to let the other die alone; 
that is, an order to answer for the life of the other man, at the risk of becoming an 
accomplice to that death.49 
                                                     
42 C. Barnett, 'Ways of Relating: Hospitality and the Acknowledgement of Otherness', Progress in Human 
Geography, 29 (2005), 9.  
43 E. Levinas, 'God, Death, and Time', p. 138.  
44 Here Levinas quotes the Song of Songs. See: ibid. p. 188.  
45 M.L. Morgan, The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas (Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 8.  
46 J. Derrida, 'Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas', p. 3.  
47 E. Levinas, 'Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings', p. x.  
48 D. Moran, 'Introduction to Phenomenology', p. 329.  
49 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', p. 169.  
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6.3.1 The Face 
The “Face,” or what Levinas also qualifies as the approach50 of the Face, alludes to “[t]he 
dimension of the divine,” that “opens forth from the human face” through the face of the 
stranger, the widow, the orphan.51 These are familiar tropes in Levinas’ work, which he cited 
from the Hebrew bible and used to describe the proto-typical moral appeal of the weak to 
the strong.52 Astonishingly, their inversion can also occur when the other is confronted by 
my brutality or disdain. Even those I oppress are capable of responding to my face and moral 
destitution.53 This is a remarkable response, as one commentator has observed, that 
represents an act of essential freedom given the senseless irrationality of such generosity.54 
Elsewhere, Levinas confirms that I am responsible even for the other who persecutes me.55   
In making this claim that might otherwise seem indefensible or even absurd, we also 
remember that Levinas is attempting to work within a phenomenological framework that is 
unapologetically subversive but that also aims to transcend. It may be challenging to 
confirm such claims, yet we can still appreciate Levinas’ intention to awaken us to this this 
felt-sense. My argument does not pretend to explore or even defend all aspects of Levinas’ 
thought. Yet, in drawing on his ethical vision I have been able to articulate and deepen what 
I have recognised—and embodied—in the relationship with the help seeker. Moreover, 
there are examples that confirm such claims, including Nelson Mandela’s famous friendship 
with his own prison guards. This relationship shifted the political perspective of these men 
and contributed to their enduring bond of friendship with Mandela himself.56 In Levinas’ 
words, this is the “phenomenology of sociality”.57 
                                                     
50 The term “approach” is found throughout Levinas’ work and denotes what is beyond volition or anticipation, 
or in Levinas’ terms, beyond being, knowledge or the rational. The “approach” implies or evokes the neighbour, 
proximity, the infinite, the “saying” and, certainly, the Face whose impact upon me is unbidden and absolute. 
Levinas suggests that, “[t]o be on the ground of the signification of an approach is to be with another for or against 
a third party, with the other and the third party against oneself, in justice. See: E. Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, 
or, Beyond Essence (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press 1998), pp. 5, 11-12, 16, 24, 30, 36, 47-48.  
51 E. Levinas, 'Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority', p. 78.  
52 E. Levinas, Nine Talmudic Readings (Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 83-84.  
53 E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', pp. 88-89.  
54 M.L. Morgan, 'The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas', pp. 18-26.  
55 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', p. 106.  
56 K. Weingarten, 'Immersed in America: Life after a Trip to South Africa', in Ethical Ways of Being, ed. by D. 
Kotze, et al. (Chagrin Falls, Ohio: Taos Publication/WorldShare Books, 2012), pp. 25-36 (p. 32). 
57 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', p. 169.  
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Interestingly, the Face does not refer to particular features, the arrangement of the eyes, 
nose, mouth or ears although it is an entirely human face. Levinas even suggests that to 
notice the colour of someone’s eyes is already to be outside of a social relationship with the 
other, for this Face cannot be reduced to mere perception.58 We recognize this Face by its 
“uprightness,” its defencelessness, exposure and poverty that are exposed despite any 
efforts to hide who we really are. Levinas’ evocation of “[t]he skin of the face” being the 
“most naked, most destitute,” refers to its force upon me and the epiphany that calls to me.59  
While this face is vulnerable, “nude,” laid waste, devastated it is also, paradoxically and in 
the same instant, exalted and authorised by what Levinas describes as an elevation or moral 
height that points to the eternal. This Face confirms my relatedness to the other—and also 
the “Other”—and the futility of my enormous, albeit pleasure-full, effort “to be”. The call of 
this face inundates me with a responsibility that never ends, that “demands me, claims me, 
assigns me,” but that also grants freedom—not from the Other, but from the burden of my 
self.60 
Transcendence signifies a movement of traversing (trans) and a movement of 
ascending (scando). In this sense it signifies a double effort of stepping across an 
interval by elevation or a change of level…The distance thus traversed by the gaze is 
transcendence. The gaze is not a climbing but a deference. In this way it is wonder 
and worship.61 
Philosopher, Michael Morgan, suggests four possible philosophical interpretations of the 
“normative force” of this face. Firstly, as a “pluralist response” related to culture and history 
and having no one source or, secondly, as something emerging from our psychology as a 
“naturalist response” or intuitive impulse. Thirdly, as related to reflexivity, free choice, and 
the ability to engage in a rational process or, finally, as a conventional response that reflects 
the compulsions and values of a given society.62  
Yet, none of these “ontological” explanations captures the enigma of the pre-conscious 
draw, “that strips consciousness of its initiative”.63 For, this is what announces my guilt even 
before my action and illuminates an ethical order manifested in, and expressed through, 
                                                     
58 E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', pp. 85-86.  
59 Ibid. p. 86.  
60 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', p. 147. 
61 E. Levinas, 'God, Death, and Time', pp. 163-64.  
62 M.L. Morgan, 'The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas', p. 9.  
63 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', pp. 58-59.  
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human relationship. Metaphysical abstractions, or what Levinas has called the “toys of our 
oratory,” only achieve their meaning and purpose in the here-and-now of the face-to-face 
reflection of the transcendent.64 
6.3.2 The Other 
In simplest terms, Otherness is “the not me” and sameness is “the for me”.65 The relationship 
between the two constitutes an ethical relationship distinguished by the “deference of the 
Same to the Other,” which is no longer “subordinated to ontology or to the thinking of being”.66 
In Levinas’ work  
there are various plays on this word. Hence, the “other” may allude to the other person for 
which Levinas uses the French ‘’l’autrui,” as opposed to “l’autre” which translates as simply 
“the other”. When capitalized, however, the “Other” can be understood as the transcendent 
“trace” of the eternal, of God.  
In a riff on Hamlet’s soliloquy Levinas suggests that, “[t]o be or not to be is not the 
question,”67 for being and its self-interest are always secondary to the evocation of the “the 
Face of the Other”. “Le Visage d’Autrui serait le commencement même de la philosophie”. 
(“The Face of the Other person will be the actual beginning of philosophy”).68 But who or 
what, exactly, is this Other? This is a notion, Morgan suggests, that has been used by other 
philosophers over time to denote, for example, Plato’s “Form of the Good,” Plotinus’ “the 
One,” and Descartes’ “infinite and perfect God”. In Levinas’ interpretation, the Other is the 
human being before whom I stand in a face-to-face encounter.69 Morgan also observes the 
important distinction Levinas’ made between seeing or perceiving the face and encountering 
it. The first can be viewed as “a mode of relation” but “the other is something else, 
something unique and originary and determinative”.70 
This order steals into me like a thief, despite the outstretched nets of consciousness, a 
trauma which surprises me absolutely, always already passed in a past which was 
never present and remains un-representable.71 
                                                     
64 E. Levinas, 'Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism', p. 102.  
65 E.E. Gantt, 'Levinas, Psychotherapy, and the Ethics of Suffering', Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 40 (2000), 18.  
66My italics. E. Levinas, 'God, Death, and Time', p. 127.  
67 Levinas’ play on Hamlet’s words underscores his perspective that the question of being is always superseded 
by the relationship in which the ethics of first philosophy rests. See: E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations 
with Philippe Nemo. 1982', p. 10.  
68 E. Levinas, Entre Nous: Essais Sur Le Penser-À-L'autre (Bernard Grasset, 1991), p. 113.  
69 M.L. Morgan, 'The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas', p. 3.  
70 Ibid. p. 45.  
71 E. Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers (Dordrecht, The Netherlands Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 171.  
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Levinas’ inconsistent use of capitalization for his terms has challenged his interpreters and 
translators. One commentator goes as far as to describe Levinas’ writing at “infuriatingly 
sloppy”72 for similar transgressions, and other inconsistencies and contradictions. However, 
the notion of “other” as a quality of differentness or “alterity” is one that always stands in 
opposition to that which is the same. This word play is evident throughout Levinas’ work, 
where it is prominent even in the title of Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Thus, 
otherness (alterity), the Other (the transcendent), and the other person (l’autrui), are 
entwined in Levinas’ work, always pointing to the ethical that is at once profoundly and 
practically human, relational and infinite.73  
6.4  A case study of the Face of the Other 
This otherness and this absolute separation manifest themselves in the epiphany of 
the face, in the face to face. Being a grouping quite different from the synthesis, it 
initiates a proximity different from the one that presides over the synthesis of data, 
uniting them into a "world" of parts within a whole.74 
The Face at the centre of Levinas’ formulation of ethics is arguably the whole work of 
community mental health care given the clinician’s constant exposure to it and the extremity 
of its demand. Whether the clinician responds hospitably or remains entranced in the 
distancing and reductive sphere of clinical biases, projections and protocols, this is the Face 
“par excellence”75 of community mental health care. Even before taking a seat in the 
consultation room, this Face claims me for a responsibility that my job description and 
clinical education have left me morally and practically unprepared, if not destitute. 
Nonetheless, this face cries out to me. It howls for understanding, for compassion, for safety, 
for respite, for comfort, for justice, for love, but also for its basic human rights—food, shelter, 
education, employment, above the hum of the factory floor, before a single word is uttered.  
6.4.1 Sharon 
A morbidly obese woman walks into my counselling room. She is short, her hair is unkempt 
and unwashed and she looks exhausted and rather fearfully at me. She is so heavy she has 
                                                     
72 D. Moran, 'Introduction to Phenomenology', p. 322.  
73 See: E. Levinas, Time and the Other (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press 1987), p. viii. For a 
lovely encapsulation of infinity and its presence as testimony, see also: E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: 
Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', pp. 105-10.  
74 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', pp. 185-86.  
75 “Par excellence” is a verbal emphasis found repeatedly throughout Levinas’ texts.  
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trouble squeezing into the armed chair and has to lay back in it to make herself reasonably 
comfortable. Her strapped summer dress hangs on her shoulders like a large cotton sac and 
reveals the whole truth of her body. The dimpled skin on her chest and her arms is blemished 
and discoloured where she has picked her skin. She has been ravaged by significant childhood 
sexual abuse that continued into her teen years, spends most of her days in bed too depressed 
to get up, is living with crippling arthritic pain and the prognosis is bleak. A wheelchair 
looms in her future. She needs to work but cannot manage it physically or emotionally. Her 
husband earns a modest living but neither understands nor appreciates her anguish, and her 
children disrespect her and make her cry. She tells me she loves God but she feels utterly 
betrayed by Him and has been poorly treated by members of her church who she loved and 
revered.  
Sharon is terrified to talk about wanting to kill herself for fear I will have her children taken 
away. I explain that the social services lack the manpower and incentive to take teenage 
children away from all the suicidal mothers in the land. We laugh ruefully together, but she is 
still afraid, vigilant. I promise her that no one will take her children yet I worry about their 
welfare and their inability to mother this broken woman.  
One day Sharon shows me a bruise the size of a dinner plate she has made on her abdomen by 
pinching herself. It is a habit that mortifies her but that is not easy to give up because it 
soothes her. She needs permission to reveal this and wants me to coax her to show me the 
wound. I assure her I want to see it, and with no small dignity she lifts up her dress to show 
me the evidence because someone has to bear witness to this much senseless suffering. I am 
utterly silent in the presence of this massive purple wound, the ballooning flesh, the 
underwear, the revelation, and am in that moment overwhelmed by a dignity and anguish I 
find immensely personal and painful to look at. 
From the early days of our meetings I incline myself towards this God lover and tell her, 
honestly, that whenever she enters the room she brings in a quality of wonder and beauty that 
often makes my eyes stream and for which I am profoundly grateful. Sharon looks anxiously, 
uncertainly, into my face to confirm my sincerity. I ask her if she can feel it in the room, the 
light, the spaciousness, this perfection. I call it “God” so she will know what I mean. She tells 
me she can, her face softens, and we sit together in the thick silence for a few moments 
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savouring the evanescence. This is the mystery that she herself evokes, understands and loves, 
even while she yearns for it, even while it eludes her, and upon this we build a plan for her 
next tentative step. 
Levinas’ formulation of the Face shines through Sharon’s actual face, her body, her wounds, 
her anguish and defencelessness. The “uprightness”76 of this face, as John Caruana observes, 
combines three aspects that constitute the sheer impact—the shock—of this face upon me 
that speaks of an integrity testifying to the “divine in the human drama”.77 Indeed, Sharon’s 
dignity and gravitas were absolute.  
In the course of my work, this Face discloses my wonder-full “rapport” and mediates my 
“professional” judgement. The implications of which are found in the enormity of my 
authority over virtually every aspect of her life or, possibly, the authority of someone above 
me in the clinical hierarchy. This is no exaggeration, for with a single phone call, letter, 
clinical note or consultation with another of her care-providers I could theoretically have 
Sharon’s fragile life besieged by the power of the law at my disposal.  
Conversely, I could also tell Sharon she did not “meet the mandate” and literally fire her 
from our care. Sharon is, after all, the prototypical “heart-sink” patient whose needs are 
beyond the capacity of the institution.78 But then the Face commands me and I am 
thenceforth incapable of allowing her to suffer alone. This is a call that consigns me, (“[I]l y a 
comme un appel a moi”),79 that “awakens” me to the violence I fear I might commit, or 
expose her to, despite my best intentions.80 Here, the desire to protect this other even—or 
especially—from myself confirms a responsibility from which there is no release but which I 
am always at liberty to ignore.81 In what he admits is an “extreme formulation,” Levinas 
                                                     
76 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', pp. 130, 31, 48.   
77 J. Caruana, 'Not Ethics, Not Ethics Alone, but the Holy', Journal of Religious Ethics, 34 (2006), p. 562.  
78 See: The heart-sink patient in (3.6.3). See also: C.C. Butler and M. Evans, 'The 'Heartsink' Patient Revisited'. 
79 A paraphrased translation is offered in this paragraph starting with “rapport” and ending with “Il y a comme 
un appel a moi” which, literally translated, means “there is like a call to me”. See: E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: Essais 
Sur Le Penser-À-L'autre', p. 114.  
80 “An awakening to the other man, which is not knowledge,” describes the enlightenment endowed by the face-
to-face in Levinas’ work. See: E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', pp. 168 and 88-89,12, 14, 18, 46, 
220, 39, 40.  
81 In noting the various permutations of post-metaphysical thought which include “being-for-oneself, being- 
with-others, or being-in-the-world, Cohen observes that Levinas placed precedence on “being-for-the-other-
person” above all else including, “being, essence, identity, manifestation, principle, in brief, over me”. See: E. 
Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', p. 10.    
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contends that, “[t]he face orders and ordains me. Its signification is an order signified,”82 
even if I am powerless to do more than stand by helplessly and say, “I am here”.83 
Levinas’ evocation powerfully confirms the accuracy of my apprehension of Sharon’s 
“transfigured” face, although this face shifted continually over the course of our work. In 
one moment it could evoke a wrenching tenderness and palpable sense of the divine. In the 
next, this face would relapse into the totalized perspective of a desecrated “heart-sink” 
patient that left me earnestly wishing Sharon would just go away. Yet, translating the 
ineffable into language is always problematic for there are not two different Sharons. These 
perceptions do not come at different times during our face-to-face meetings, nor are they 
conflated, nor are they separated—as if by a split screen image—nor, strangely, do they 
actually oppose each other, despite the enormity of the contrast between them.  
We might say that Sharon elicited a sense of wonder on which I capitalized as a clinician 
wishing to maintain a more humanized regard for her. Conversely, we might suggest that 
she elicited my sense of horror and despair, guilt and exhaustion that I wished to soften 
under the cover—the protection—of a more wonder-full perspective. Yet, such 
interpretations fail to adequately explain the relationship because I am already in up to my 
neck with this woman before the question of how I am to help even emerges. That I need to 
help her, am compelled to help her, is unequivocal but in no way equivalent to my ability to 
do so. Yet, my desire speaks for itself, as does my ambivalence. Nor are these “evocations” 
somehow imposed upon me. Indeed, they are not divorced from a certain willingness or 
acquiescence on my part to what Levinas so exquisitely identifies as, the welcome of the face 
that is irresistible or nearly so. In this enigma that draws and repels me, I am confronted by 
a yearning that recognizes my need of this “Other”. I am also shocked to recognize that 
Sharon is, very problematically, subordinate to me in every conceivable way by her life 
circumstances and the rules of the clinical game.   
The enigma is partially clarified by, Levinasian scholar, Richard Cohen who observes that 
these two perspectives – ethics versus ontology—do not oppose each other along a shared 
continuum. They actually lie on different planes altogether with the one cancelling out the 
other. Yet, even this nuanced assertion of the primacy of the Other—of “what ought to be”—
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fails to offer Sharon much if any protection. For, the elevated view of this desecrated other 
that is holiness is also fragile, tenuous, unstable and easily collapsed back to the “what is” by 
the reduction of ontology. That said, even the epiphany that Levinas calls the “anarchy” of 
the face is one that can “unsettle essences,” “undo identities” and illuminate, if only briefly, 
what is “better than being”.84  
Sharon’s divinity is, nonetheless, confirmed through her being in an account of “what is” 
that is subtle and blatant, beautiful and horrifying. This enigma does not represent separate 
perspectives or elements as much as it includes them; there is no barrier between them. Nor, I 
would suggest, does this enigma constitute a revelation as much as the shocking recognition 
of relationality to which I am tied inexorably and wonderfully—but also ambivalently. This 
is an ambivalence on which I appear to swing as if on a hinge, back and forth, between my 
desire and repulsion, my reverence and fear and ultimately, between justice and injustice. 
The extremity of Sharon’s vulnerability discloses a responsibility beyond my ken or capacity 
for which I can also resent and blame her for my empty handedness and despair. The step to 
disgust and neglect—dehumanization and abuse—lies just beyond this perimeter. Levinas 
confirms the hairline proximity of divinity to horror, and his ethics of relationship to 
abandonment. Indeed, my clinical response to this face reflects philosopher Mary Jane 
Rubenstein’s description of wonder as something essentially ambivalent where horror and 
holiness—far from opposing each other—are actually wed.85 Whether I act for or against this 
Other, my responsibility is ineffaceable, my relationship unequivocal and always there 
beneath the veneer of my professional mask. Yet, this mask is constantly threatened, along 
with everything it represents and contributes to the project of my being, by a larger purpose 
whose call I can all too easily ignore within my clinical role.  
6.5  The language of wonder 
It is a dazzling, where the eye takes more than it can hold, an igniting of the skin, 
which touches and does not touch what is beyond the graspable, and burns. It is a 
passivity or a passion in which desire can be recognized, in which the “more in the 
less” awakens by its most ardent, noblest and most ancient flame a thought given 
over to thinking more than it thinks.86 
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As Levinas’ work matured, his writing became increasingly enigmatic and paradoxical in his 
ever more explicit attempts at “unsaying,” to communicate his meaning. This implicates 
Derrida’s influence on Levinas’ writing, but also the complex and ongoing relationship of 
post-modern philosophy to negative theology and Dionysius the Areopagite, whose work 
had such influence on the development of the Christian mystical canon.87 Of special interest 
to post-modern philosophers, and Levinas as well, are the linguistic strategies of negative 
theology used to “provoke the collapse of binary language”.88 The power of these strategies 
lies in their ability to create a space for the writer—but also the reader—to apprehend and 
testify to an event beyond being, “despite the constraints of social, political and ecclesial 
structures”.89 Levinas’ work is renowned for the obscurity90 of its language and its 
sometimes delirious excess aimed at protecting the uncontainable Other from ontological 
reduction. 91 As philosopher theologian Amy Hollywood might also suggest, this language 
promotes the social transformation Levinas’ vision seeks to evoke, because it preaches.92  
Derrida described Levinas’ words as being “carried away” in a “discourse that opens each 
signification to its other”.93 Another commentator has suggested that Levinas used this 
language to illustrate the inadequacy of earlier arguments made by philosophers from 
Descartes to Heidegger, and to shock his reader into another way of seeing.94 Certainly, 
Levinas’ writing bears the distinctive hallmark of the apophatic in its paradoxical evocations 
that strain towards the ineffable. Still, the kataphatic is also present in the intense focus of 
this writing on relationship and the “sensory impressions” of the encounter.95 Despite 
Levinas’ efforts to overcome the limits of language and evoke the eternal transcendent, his 
linguistic brilliance also evokes a visceral quality that is profoundly embodied.  
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In his frequent allusions to the work of “unsaying the said,” Levinas demonstrated what he 
means through the sheer wizardry of his language.96 He employed this language to negotiate 
the Face, the Other and the complexity of the ethical relationship around the concretizing 
limitations of “being” and “the said”. In “the said,” the Other is already reduced, assimilated 
and waiting to be reborn in the “saying” through the immediacy of the human encounter in 
which one person addresses another in terms as simple as: “After you, sir”. Even this, 
Levinas reminds us, testifies to the condition of being held hostage to the other which makes 
it possible for there to be “pity, compassion, pardon and proximity” in the world.97 In 
Levinas’ terms, “the saying” is essentially and always goodness, friendship and hospitality.98 
Richard Cohen observed that Levinas acknowledged that only language had the power to 
“break the continuity of being or of history”. 99 Despite his own use of paradox, hyperbole 
and exaggeration100 that often reads like mystical poetry, Levinas’ mistrust of poetry was 
well known and he typically associated it with “mystification, pagan magic, and sorcery”.101 
He insisted that transcendence related exclusively to the holy, but not to the sacred to which 
he ascribed a kind of ecstatic and affective experience that, he believed seduces the self away 
from its larger purpose.  
A thoughtful analysis by Caruana examines the connection between ethics and the holy in 
Levinas’ work.102 It relates to the primary teaching of Judaism, linking the human other and 
“the saintliness of God” to the maintenance of our human bond. Holiness, Levinas argued, is 
corrupted when the transporting ecstasy of the sacred and its solitary drive towards the 
divine derails us from our path towards the other, thus becoming a “form of violence”.103 
Levinas’ concern with the dangers of focussing on affectivity echoes those Christian 
theologians who decry the contemporary definition of the mystical as “an experience”. That 
is, where the “mystical” is essentially reduced by the self for its own gratification. 
Consequently, it is divorced from the larger context of spiritual development and practice, 
mutuality, community, service and the original meaning of the mystical as a 
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contemplation.104 Levinas was resolute that the only possible meaning of this transcendence 
is that which is fulfilled by the ethical terms of my obligation to my neighbour.   
6.6  Choosing disinterest 
Levinas’ relational formulation is never about “thinking” or conceptualizing the other. His is 
not a rational metaphysics that mistakes the purpose of thinking about the ultimate truth, 
with Truth itself. The problem always lies with the ontological quest for certainty and its 
outcome—ownership, possession, mastery, ambition, appropriation and assimilation. This is 
what contributes, Levinas claims, to a “sense of the malignancy of being” and the “sadness 
of self-interest”. Then he offers another way in suggesting we could release ourselves from 
the grip of self-interest for the “joy or accomplishment” in “disinterestedness.” Disinterest, 
he insists, does not represent an emptiness, so much as a turning away from the self towards 
the suffering of the other who—like me—is struggling with the same disappointments and 
inadequacies of being and its ultimately lonely, destructive path.105  
Disinterest necessitates the recognition and relinquishing of the (im)-morality implicit in the 
onto-theological that Jantzen describes as the “symbolic of domination,” because the onto-
theological predictably leads to violence and oppression. 106 In the context of our inquiry, this 
violence is below clinicians’ awareness and committed unintentionally thereby leaving the 
perpetrators oblivious. Disinterest not self-interest, Levinas argued, is the way out of this 
ontological bind towards a “non-ontological notion of God” that begins in the relationship 
with the other.107  
To simplify his point, Levinas compares the difference between being and responsibility to 
frivolous play and gravity. There is the harmfulness of being’s frivolous play and its self-
interests that are found in the privileges of wealth, fame and possessions. Yet, there are even 
greater possibilities to be discovered in responsibility to the Other.108 These do not lie in 
some joyless self-sacrifice but in imagining beyond that which reduces our lives, the people 
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in them and the world around us, to a “series of means for further ends”.109 In terms of our 
inquiry, the need for such imagining can hardly be overstated if the clinician is to respond to 
the holiness of the clinical encounter as something other than an experience or “privilege” 
for her private—if mortified—consumption.   
6.6.1 The Church 
I’d come to London on a three and half hour train ride for a symposium where priests, 
psychiatrists and associated professionals were gathering to explore the links between the 
professional and the vocational. The Church was magnificent, the croissants fresh, the coffee 
plentiful. Gold tiles glittered from the dim recess of the apse, and the well-heeled audience took 
their places in the pews.  
The opening speaker was a young doctor who was perfectly made-up and beautifully dressed. 
She spoke of the torment of her medical training for half an hour with a grimace of a smile on 
her terrified face that never once flagged. The other presenters were middle-aged and older 
men, successful physicians and clerics who could extemporize with their hands in their 
pockets. Media savvy, self-deprecating and at the peak of their careers, they could finally say 
whatever they wanted, and admit as much with an ironic smile. They reeked of authority and 
their focus was surprisingly personal and refreshingly regretful, even wistful.  
Much of their talk and most of their stories were tinged with hushed reverence that borders on 
awe, the humble amazement and soulful gratitude for what we in this business get out of the 
encounter from those who come to us for help. Such sincerity should never stink of 
sanctimony but it almost always does. We like talking like this—when we can—because it’s 
true, and we feel good, we feel special for seeing and saying what is hidden. We feel free and 
daring because this is dangerous territory and stands in opposition to much of what we’re 
been trained to protect and believe and not admit. But we all know that when that wonderful 
thing happens, everything changes. When we actually see, when we know that utter 
perfection sitting in front of us with his stigmatizing label, his epic story and his smashed life 
that no one could ever fix, it’s like discovering the Holy Grail, and we’re confirmed and 
rhapsodic. “It’s such a rare privilege this work, isn’t it? Isn’t it? Yes, it really is”. This is 
always said as if for the first time, as though we’ve just noticed and we have a corner on the 
market that edifies us for that reason.  
 But the tribute never veered towards questions of power or its abuse. No one said a word 
about the differences in salary or status even between the doctors and priests, let alone the 
helpers and the helped. The only culprit ever mentioned was the “system” and we nodded our 
collective heads like congregants at a revival meeting each time another testimonial was given 
about the system that kept us from doing more, from doing enough. All the talk about the 
spirit-withering system added a lustre of virtue to the earnest lamentations of these powerful 
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men, and the rest of us for that matter, who genuinely wanted to pay homage to those who’d 
come broken and empty handed to our doors, with what trust and hope. But who’d 
somehow—marvelously, incredibly—resurrected us instead, not once but many, many, times.  
There was a frisson of anarchy in the church that day that hinged on our communion with the 
one who is constantly revealed as more than an equal, as our teacher, as an unexpected and 
priceless gift, as this “great privilege”. Yet, no one went further. No one talked about the 
injustice and our relationship with the social equivalent of “an untouchable,” who we 
ourselves help create. But who nonetheless makes us well and on whose shoulders we stand. 
Who rescues us from the fray and holds the antidote to our own professional powerlessness, 
ennui and despair. No one remarked how we justify limiting the orbit of our effort to the 
homey boundaries of the consultation room and its many comforts. No one even hinted about 
who really pays for this intimate and affirming reward that allows us to be so very grateful 
with so little outlay. Not even me.   
This question of “being” as opposed to “being- for-the-other” constantly begs the seemingly 
imponderable question that philosopher Philippe Nemo poses to Levinas: “But if one fears 
for the other and not for oneself, can one even live?” Which, Levinas agrees, is the ultimate 
question, but then he reframes it: “Should I be dedicated to being? By being, by persisting in 
being, do I not kill?”110 
We may find Levinas’ repeated allusions to killing, polemical or metaphoric. That we do 
confirms, for Grace Jantzen, the security of academics’ cocooned existence and their 
collusion with violence despite their efforts to act against it.111 The equivalent is true of the 
clinician vis-à-vis the vulnerable help seeker. For, the clinician’s personal involvement in the 
violation and harm of others is appallingly real on closer investigation as the 
autoethnographic narratives in this inquiry are attempting to illustrate.  
In Levinasian terms, in any terms, can it not—should it not—be argued that I have 
contributed in my professional role to the destitution, demoralization, degradation and death 
of the Other, no matter how peripherally, how legitimately, how “ethically”? Is this not the 
point of an argument for Levinas, for wonder, for autoethnography? That is, to reveal, 
interrupt, challenge and name what hides in the ample folds of the rational and the being 
that answers only to itself?  
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Yet, Levinas maps the ontological trap in which I am also caught, which protects, endorses 
and justifies my role, my institution and the culture from which they spring. Even my 
intention to “open to wonder” in the consultation room is tainted by my self-consciousness 
and the anticipatory satisfaction arising from what I already “know” or wish to confirm.112 
At the same time, Levinas’ ethical formulation confirms my moral failure and my unfulfilled 
responsibility—in sum, my profound unconsciousness, my blindness, my violence.  
Curiously, this moral clarity offers the consolation of a sliver of integrity in my 
unacknowledged—invisible—survivor’s guilt and grief. I may not be vindicated but neither 
am I wholly dishonoured.113 Derrida noted that Levinas himself spoke of survivor’s guilt as 
a “guilt without fault and without debt; it is in truth an entrusted responsibility”.114 To 
recognize and claim what I know to be right and just in a morally compromising 
environment speaks of my ethical capacity to do just this. Even if such goodness is routinely 
sacrificed, corrupted and reconfigured by the institution115 it also “consists of taking up a 
position in being, such that the other counts more than myself”.116                                                         
Nemo objects to Levinas’ response by observing that even in the animal kingdom a law 
prevails among all species that makes it impossible to live without killing, and Levinas 
asserts yet again: “In society such as it functions one cannot live without killing or at least 
without taking the preliminary steps for the death of someone”. He then presses the point 
that the banality of our ability to kill does not diminish its significance. Which is why, 
Levinas concludes, the most important question is not “why is there something instead of 
nothing” but “do I not kill by being?”117 Is there a more fundamental question than this for 
the clinician to ask? 
6.7  Responsibility 
It is a passivity more passive still than any passivity that is antithetical to an act, a 
nudity more naked than all "academic" nudity, exposed to the point of outpouring, 
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effusion and prayer… It is a vulnerability and a paining exhausting themselves like a 
hemorrhage, denuding even the aspect that its nudity takes on….It is the passivity of 
being-for-another, which is possible only in the form of giving the very bread I eat.118 
In looking more deeply into Levinas’ account of responsibility, we find in his notions of 
passivity, asymmetry and substitution, meanings that can seem almost indistinguishable 
from each other in their overlapping dynamic. The event they describe is not a quantitative 
progression so much as a suspension, a radicalizing moment of wonder. This is one that lays 
bare my concretized professional identity and a spontaneous “deference” which overflows 
with a sense of my indebtedness to this Other. This event is far more “dangerous” than 
“clinical” empathy in light of the asymmetry it evokes.119 Such asymmetry, according to 
Levinas, also refutes Buber’s I and Thou and a relationship of equals where there is an 
expectation that the other will acknowledge me as “Thou”.120 Any interest in reciprocity is 
the other person’s business, Levinas insists, not his. “I am responsible without waiting for 
his reciprocity were I to die for it”.121  
Such asymmetry is beyond comprehension for it means I am responsible for the harm this 
other may do—or may have done—to another or even to himself or to me. This is in 
addition to anything anyone else may do, be doing, or have done to harm him, or anything 
that might befall him. I am solely and entirely responsible and no one can take my place in 
this responsibility, which makes me “un-substitutible,” although I may be substituted for 
the responsibility of another. To clarify the point, Levinas employs a quote throughout his 
work taken from one of Dostoyevsky’s characters: “We are all guilty for everything and 
everyone, and I more than all the others”.122 Such responsibility calls forth a passivity that is 
intense, acute, urgent, immediate, full. Derrida describes Levinas’ remarkable evocation of 
such consciousness as, “the urgency of a destination leading to the Other and not an eternal 
return to self”.123 Indeed, there is nothing before me in this event but a raw, unequivocal 
yearning that is also paralysing. How can this be? 
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Michael Morgan is perplexed by Levinas’ claim and asks what this passivity really means 
vis-à-vis the subject. He initially concludes that this passivity is prior to the free and active 
self. Then he reasons, the self is beyond freedom and consequently commanded by the Face 
even before understanding. This would mean that the self is not primarily “an actor or 
agent,” although it can claim aspects related to its enjoyment and self-centred pursuits. 
Unlike responsibility, however, these interpretations are less relevant to Levinas’ vision 
because they fail to demonstrate the social meaning of our existence as our primary purpose. 
Morgan then describes passivity as a “transcendental condition” that he suggests is “a 
dimension or cluster of dimensions” all too infrequently occluded by our life and culture. 
Ultimately, Morgan concludes this passivity is understandable only in the here and now, not 
through a temporal reading “back” to the time before subjectivity or action, thought, or 
being. It must be now, because “I am responsible for and to the other person “before I am a 
person”.124   
Morgan’s observation confirms the immensity of the moral impact exerted by the divinized 
Other on the clinician. In these terms, the clinician is wholly dependent on the vulnerable help 
seeker to instruct her, show her, help her and guide her in becoming a person. We return to 
this theme in the following chapter in analysing the work of Jean Vanier. Morgan’s analysis, 
however, is somewhat theoretically remote in its attempt to track the paradoxical origins 
and manifestation of this momentous and immediate obsession. Yet, clarification is found in 
Levinas’ repeated allusions to my being held “hostage,” “ordained,” “chosen” or “elected” to 
this responsibility. All of which suggest the immediacy, transcendence and inviolability of 
this event, even if I cannot yet imagine what I am actually to do. 
Nor is this election a privilege, Levinas cautions, but the hallmark of the morally responsible 
and it is “hard” he confirms.125 It is hard to be “a substitution for another, one in the place of 
another” and called to account for something I did not do and would rather avoid having to 
pay for.126 Mental health clinicians are constantly negotiating the riptide of this imperative, 
this “election,” in their daily encounters with the destitute Other—the help seeker. 
Moreover, the clinician is revealed to herself time-and-again as morally compromised if not 
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bereft, shameful, guilty, uncertain, timid. Yet, Levinas reminds us, this “anarchical 
provocation” also “ordains me to the other”127 which means that even while I am held to 
account, I am also accepted, forgiven, understood, consecrated. 
In eulogizing Levinas, Derrida introduced Levinas’ notion of hospitality, which illuminates 
this paradox of indebtedness and holiness powerfully and satisfyingly. As Derrida observed, 
this passivity is hardly an “abdication of reason” but a sign of my receptivity.128 This, in sum, 
is a welcome to me, the welcoming “host” who discovers to her stunned incredulity that she 
is the one being offered hospitality in her own home. It is the Other who shows me that it is 
not my home, that I am the guest and being hosted after all. Thus, “[t]he one who welcomes 
is first welcomed in his own home. The one who invites is invited by the one whom he 
invites. The one who receives is received”.129 This theme comes closest, in my view, to 
offering the most profound and accessible understanding of this wonder-full paradox of 
being held hostage and ordained, burdened and consecrated in the same instant.  
6.8  Critique 
The ethical order does not prepare us for the divinity; it is the very accession to the 
divinity. All the rest is a dream.130 
Levinas shifts the light of our inquiry on wonder away from traditional philosophical 
interpretations to an exclusively ethical formulation. Remarkably, this formulation enabled 
him to challenge the confinements of theology—or onto-theo-logy—and two thousand years 
of Western philosophy dedicated to the understanding and elaboration of our “being” and 
its place in the world. It is equally remarkable that his ethical account appears to have found 
sufficiently neutral philosophical and religious ground that it avoids polarizing his work.  
This chapter makes no claims to offering a substantial analysis of Levinas’ critics. But as a 
professional in a field ghettoised by female professionals, and an over-representation of 
female to male help seekers, I have more than a passing interest in Levinas’ feminist 
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interpreters.131 Some of these scholars have taken Levinas to task for his male privilege, his 
heteronormative and prophetic language and conservatism, and for his marginalizing 
evocations of the feminine in his construal of alterity. The latter was first identified by 
Simone de Beauvoir132 and then later by Luce Irigaray.133 Irigaray attempted to correct 
Levinas by appealing to him to place the alterity of the feminine in a more equitable and co-
creative position with the subject who transcends, rather than at the expense of she through 
whom he has, or will, transcend.  
A comprehensive analysis of the feminist response provoked by Levinas’ construction of 
eros as the feminine and alterity is beyond the remit of this chapter. Yet, it points very 
usefully to a similar and deeply problematic dynamic seen in the The Church134 where the 
clinician “transcends” to her astonishment and at the entire expense of the help seeker. Thus, 
while the clinician may be humbled and dazzled, the help seeker is still left with little more, 
nothing more, while the clinician has altogether missed the claim made upon him by the 
Face. This is mistaken as yet another consumable to be assimilated, albeit gratefully, on behalf 
of the help seeker.  
Other feminist scholars, like Tina Chanter, argue that the limitations of Levinas’ work for 
which he been pilloried may also be misinterpretations.135 These limitations may be 
insufficient to impugn the enormity of his contribution and its overall benefit to women, 
even if more analysis and development are justified. Still others have used Levinas to 
develop their own work and extend his scholarship.136  
In addition to feminist concerns, other critiques about Levinas’ work, suggest the need for 
more and greater analysis of his later work.137 There is also a certain amount of 
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135 T. Chanter, 'Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas'. 
136 See, for example: M. Joy, 'Levinas: Alterity, the Feminine and Women—A Meditation', Studies in 
Religion/Sciences Religieuses, 22 (1993). 
137 E.P. Ziarek, 'The Ethical Passions of Emmanuel Levinas', in Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. by 
T. Chanter (PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), pp. 78-95.  
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disenchantment expressed about the applicability of his vision, about which he says very 
little. Levinas even admits we cannot yet know what such an ethic would actually look like. 
I will not discuss these limitations, however, for my focus is on the stunning ethical opening 
that Levinas does have to offer the discourse on community mental health care and the 
emerging dialogue on wonder in clinical care.  
6.9  Conclusion 
The suspicions engendered by psychoanalysis, sociology and politics weigh on 
human identity such that we never know to whom we are speaking and what we are 
dealing with when we build our ideas on the basis of human facts. But we do not 
need this knowledge in the relationship in which the other is a neighbour, and in 
which before being an individuation of the genus man, a rational animal, a free will, 
or any essence whatever, he is the persecuted one for whom I am responsible to the 
point of being a hostage for him, and in which my responsibility, instead of 
disclosing me in my "essence" as a transcendental ego, divests me without stop of all 
that can be common to me and another man, who would thus be capable of replacing 
me. I am then called upon in my uniqueness as someone for whom no one else can 
substitute himself.138 
We find in Levinas’ metaphysical argument a riveting answer to the question: what is it to 
see another as oneself? While her face has no particular attribute that would distinguish her 
from me, her Otherness overwhelms me with its holy confirmation. This is the ethical that 
describes incorruptible possibilities and calls for neither “power or possession”. The Other is 
irreducible and paradoxically recognizable as the one with moral height and mastery over 
me.139  
What is needed to disclose this ethics, Levinas has shown, is a separation between the 
subject and this Other who is both the other person but also the Other who represents God,140 
in whose Face the “trace” of the infinite is found.141 This trace is visible in the complexity of 
her entire humanity, her speech, her face. Even the nape of her neck142 is capable of 
                                                     
138 E. Levinas, 'Otherwise Than Being, or, Beyond Essence', p. 59.  
139 E. Levinas, 'Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority', p. 51.  
140 E. Levinas, 'Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings', pp. 7-11.  
141 “I am a testimony, or a trace, or the glory of the Infinite,” see: E. Levinas, 'Collected Philosophical Papers', p. 
170.  
142 Levinas apparently referred frequently in later years to Vasily Grossman’s historical novel about Nazism and 
Stalinism. He alludes to Grossman’s description of people lined up at a gate in the hopes of hearing word about 
their arrested friends: “each reading on the nape of the person in front of him the feelings and hopes of his 
misery”. See: M.L. Morgan, 'The Cambridge Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas', p. 19.  
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contradicting “any totalitarian or absolutist form of economy”.143 This is a Face powerful 
enough to destroy the grip of the ego and leave the subject shattered and incapable of 
responding in anything less than ethical terms, although this imperative is never imposed.144  
This relationship is unchanged, Levinas suggests, even when conducted in an institution 
where justice is exercised and I am required to make comparisons and choices to establish 
fairness. If justice mediates my action within the institution it does not diminish my 
responsibility even when I am confronted by competing demands. The origin of justice lies 
in charity and loving my neighbour which, as Chanter observes, is also a “commentary on 
the violence committed in the name of justice”.145 Levinas also confirms the inevitability of 
the institution while claiming that justice is safeguarded by the “initial interpersonal 
relation”.146 Indeed, the system itself is mediated through my relationship with the other 
person through charity, and cannot exist without justice. Charity is “warped” without 
justice.147 
That the plea of this Face can be ignored, feared or misconstrued by genuinely caring, 
committed and educated clinicians as authorization of their professional “privilege,” rather 
than proof of its obscenity, is not easily challenged. But neither should this be a surprise. 
For, the ontological ground of a mental health clinician’s caring work necessarily reduces the 
other and excludes—and therefore distrusts—anything hinting of the metaphysical or 
requiring the suspension of belief. We repeatedly discover this in the language of 
comparison and quantification, in other words, by employing “the said” to claim 
sovereignty over “the saying” of what is right or ought to be.   
In the clinician’s de-moralization and distress, however, is found evidence of a greater moral 
possibility that engages her desire—her compulsion—to protect this fragile help seeker, as 
James’ story amply illustrates. Poignantly, the answer does not lie in the inadequacy of the 
institution. It does not lie in the ineptitude of a colleague haranguing a patient for “non-
compliance,” or even in the failure of the psychiatrist still tinkering with medication for a 
deteriorating patient. The answer lies in the clinician herself and the stunning evidence of her 
                                                     
143E. Levinas, 'Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings', pp. x-xi.  
144 Ibid. p. xi.  
145 T. Chanter, 'Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas', p. 8. 
146 E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', p. 90.  
147 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', p. 121.  
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own apparent lack of trustworthiness. This is the threat the clinician poses the vulnerable 
help seeker that awakens her to the sickening oversight that Levinas’ work addresses and 
remediates although admittedly with few guidelines.  
This convolution lies in the genuineness of the clinician’s horror residing so closely to her 
preference to protect her self at the expense of another. Nor should we imagine the clinician 
is unmoved or unaffected by the help seeker. Even so, the call of the Face challenging her 
moral indifference, or possibly her cowardice, does not take precedence simply or easily 
over her self-interest.148 Hence, the clinician remains the primary beneficiary of even the 
therapeutic transaction. The vulnerable help seeker meanwhile is the means, the mule, 
carrying the clinician to this incomparable transcendence, this astonishment and wonder. To 
which, even in her hushed reverence, the clinician still finds herself somehow entitled along 
with every other professional privilege she enjoys.  
Levinas reconfigures the very ground from which our questions emerge about why the 
dehumanization persists and how clinicians might better protect others from themselves. In 
doing so, he confirms that the real beneficiary of the therapeutic bond—so-called—is not the 
help seeker. Nor, ultimately, is the phenomenon of wonder we might so earnestly wish to 
“apply,” for her. There are no simple answers for the clinician wanting to cultivate or 
maintain a divinized perspective of the help seeker within an institution constructed by the 
very reductions it intends to perpetuate and protect. Clinicians are still professionally and 
institutionally bound to a medically informed, reductive “practice” that reverberates in 
Nemo’s question: How can I live if I put the other before myself? Still, growing numbers of 
clinicians are turning to Levinas to theorize ethical practice, and practices, “beyond being”. 
This might eventually bring greater significance and morality to their clinical work and the 
institutions they represent and hope to change.
                                                     
148 J. Caruana, 'Not Ethics, Not Ethics Alone, but the Holy'. 




The possible or impossible of Levinasian praxis 
Whether she looks at me or not, she "regards me;" I must answer for her. I call face that which 
thus in another concerns the I—concerns me—reminding me, from behind the countenance 
she puts on in her portrait, of her abandonment, her defencelessness and her mortality, and 
her appeal to my ancient responsibility, as if she were unique in the world—beloved.1 
7.1  Introduction 
Levinas’ ethical vision is finding a place in clinical literature and an emerging therapeutic 
dialogue claiming that therapy may be creating more harm than good, is inadequate to the 
task or no longer relevant.2 Certainly, this inquiry is attempting to illustrate the increasing 
evidence that therapy and community mental health care are operating out of an outmoded 
paradigm, lacking the capacity to address the real issues in people’s lives, if it ever did.3  
The difficulty of translating Levinas into ethical praxis also remains. As we have already 
discussed, Levinas does not develop his work through careful argumentation but through 
“semi-poetic, rhapsodic and grammatically elusive meditations around certain central 
intuitions or metaphors”.4 Philosopher Paul Davies observes that Levinas’ “ethical 
language” actually prohibits an exit from “the scene of an enigma”. It does so by indefinitely 
extending the paradox, which points back to philosophy’s failure but never toward the 
answers that we seek from Levinas’ powerful moral edict.5 This enigma stymies the efforts 
of researchers attempting any clinical applications based on Levinas’ vision. The problem is 
that even the idea of “legitimate scientific research” essentially totalizes Levinas’ project, 
which is to subvert any such reductive endeavours.6 Consequently, Levinasian scholars are 
of two minds as to whether, given the magnitude of this enigma, it can be even calibrated as 
a human response worthy of the call. Levinas himself suggests that the answer lies in 
                                                     
1 I have changed the gender of this quote from “him” to “her”. E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-
Other', p. 227.  
2 For a thought provoking conversation on the failure of therapy in the 20th century, see: J. Hillman and M. 
Ventura, We’ve Had 100 Years of Psychotherapy and the World’s Getting Worse (San Francisco: Harper, 1992). 
3 R. House, 'Commentary: Taking Therapy Beyond Modernity? The Promise and Limitations of a Levinasian 
Understanding', European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 7 (2005), p. 104.  
4 R.P. Blum, 'Emmanuel Levinas' Theory of Commitment', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44 (1983), p. 
145.  
5 P. Davies, 'On Resorting to an Ethical Language', in Ethics as First Philosophy: The Significance of Emmanuel Levinas 
for Philosophy, Literature and Religion, ed. by A.T. Peperzak (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 95-104. 
6 R.P. Blum, 'Emmanuel Levinas' Theory of Commitment', p. 146.  
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“maturity and patience for insoluble problems,” while conceding that to say as much is a 
“pathetic formula”.7  
I do not know how to draw the solution to insoluble problems. It is still sleeping in 
the bottom of a box; but a box over which persons who have drawn close to each 
other keep watch. I have no idea other than the idea of the idea that one should have. 
… I have the idea of a possibility in which the impossible may be sleeping.8 
Nonetheless, there is emerging scholarshipand exemplars to help us imagine Levinas’ ethics 
into practice and this chapter focuses on a number of these.9 We will begin with an analysis 
of Jean Vanier’s work, whose engagement with intellectually disabled adults powerfully 
exemplifies the possibilities of Levinas’ formulation of being-for-the-Other. We will also 
consider a number of examples to illustrate how Levinasian ethics is challenging clinical 
praxis and reordering institutional priorities to ensure the primacy of the vulnerable other. 
The first half of this chapter, then, will examine the themes of practice and application 
through a comparative analysis of Jean Vanier’s  and Levinas’ work. The second half will 
explore how Levinas’ thinking is informing and interrogating clinical praxis, but also how it 
is being used in collaboration with the work of other thinkers to raise new ethical questions 
and refine others.  
7.2 Turning to Jean Vanier and our need for the vulnerable other   
The heart is never “successful”. It does not want power, honours, privileges, or 
efficiency; it seeks a personal relationship with another, a communion of hearts, 
which is the to-and-fro of love. This opening of the heart implies vulnerability and 
the offering of our needs and weaknesses. The heart gives and receives, but above all 
it gives.10 
Emmanuel Levinas and Jean Vanier share a seemingly incontestable rationality that argues 
for the abandonment of the self to the other as the only way through the problem of violence 
and dehumanization. Both employ a view of the transcendent irreducible other, albeit from 
differing perspectives, to inform arguments that seem to reach strikingly similar and 
passionate conclusions.  
                                                     
7 The allusion of the box in which a lamb lies sleeping comes from Antoine de Saint Exupéry’s Le Petit Prince. See: 
E. Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence (Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 88.   
8 Ibid. p. 89.  
9 See, for example: ‘Special Issue: Levinas and the Other in Psychotherapy and Counselling,’ The European Journal 
of Psychotherapy and Counselling, 7, (2005).  
10 J. Vanier, Becoming Human (Toronto, ON: House of Anansi, 1998), p. 63.  
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Jean Vanier is a Canadian humanitarian, theologian, philosopher11 and son of one of 
Canada’s former Governor Generals, Georges Vanier.12 Vanier, who is now 86 years old, has 
dedicated his life to the cause of intellectually disabled adults and to extending, by his own 
admission, an experiment of peacemaking into the world. His long friendship with activist 
Daniel Berrigan13 speaks to a life-long interest in peacemaking which Vanier has claimed 
and demonstrated can be created by sharing one’s life with the weak.14 Vanier has also 
sought to understand what it is to be part of a global community15 and his contribution to 
that dialogue has been considerable.16  
Anyone coming to Vanier’s work from a secular clinical perspective, however, might have 
reservations about his conservative Catholicism. This has influenced his stand on abortion,17 
his reported evasion of issues related to advancing women’s role in the Catholic Church18 
and his psychological interpretation of homosexuality as deviance.19 Yet the immensity of 
his work, the integrity of his message and his own emotional transparency are not easily 
dismissed on these grounds. 
7.2.1 A brief biography of Jean Vanier and a history of L’Arche 
Raised a devout Catholic,20 Vanier was later influenced by his mother’s spiritual director and 
Dominican priest, Philippe Thomas, who apparently was “removed by Rome for 
unorthodoxy and for spiritual direction that was considered too mystical”.21 Interestingly, 
Thomas—now deceased—has been accused only recently of sexually abusing a significant 
                                                     
11 Vanier’s PhD was titled: Happiness as Principle and end of Aristotelian Ethics. See: J. Vanier and C. Whitney-
Brown, Jean Vanier: Essential Writings (London: Darton, 2008), p. 26.  
12 George Vanier’s career was in the military and the diplomatic services. With his wife Pauline, Vanier served as 
Canada’s Governor General from 1957-1967). See: J. Dunne, 'Sense of Community in L'arche and in the Writings 
of Jean Vanier', Journal of Community Psychology, 14 (1986), 41.  
13 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 44.  
14 Vanier won the Templeton prize for 2015. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qNxAVzICf-M> [accessed 
30 July 2016]. 
15 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 43.  
16 The web pages for Jean Vanier and L’Arche offer an insight into Vanier’s many publications and initiatives, as 
well as the matrix of socially engaged activity and publicity that has gone beyond Vanier’s guiding hand, 
although presumably not his vision. See: <http.//www.jean-vanier.org/en/home> and L’Arche Canada: 
<http://www.larche.ca: 8080/ > [accessed 30 July 2016]. 
17 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 48.  
18 J.L. Allen Jr, 'L’Arche Founder Reveals Face of Christ', National Catholic Reporter Online, (Nov. 01, 2002) 
<http://ncronline.org/>. 
19 For references to abortion and homosexuality, see: T. Kearney and J. Vanier, 'The Prophetic Cry: Interview with 
Jean Vanier', The Crane Bag, 5 (1981), pp. 81-82.  
20 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 17.  
21 Ibid. pp. 24-25.  
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number of adult women in his role as spiritual director over the course of almost three 
decades.22 It was Thomas, however, who prompted Vanier towards his vocation during a 
summer sabbatical in France, when Vanier was away from his work as a young philosophy 
professor at the University of Toronto. Thomas introduced Vanier to the plight of the 
intellectually disabled in a local psychiatric hospital and, horrified by the dehumanization 
he found there, Vanier felt “called” to address the injustice. He and Thomas subsequently 
invited two men from this hospital to live with them in a run-down house they called 
L’Arche, in the hopes of re-humanizing their lives.23 Soon Vanier’s relationship with these 
men revealed his need for them as he began, in their company, to grapple with his own 
“human weakness” and “longings”.24 This is the weakness, he suggests, that “carries within 
it a secret power. The cry and the trust that flow from weakness can open up hearts. The one 
who is weaker can call forth powers of love in the one who is stronger”.25 
Vanier consistently attests to the ineffable in his appeal to the reader to abandon the culture 
of competition and become “downwardly mobile”.26 His voice is rationally compelling and 
unadorned, making his radical message all the more accessible. He draws liberally and 
emotionally on biblical allusions, the notion of Jesus’s presence in the other, and on personal 
stories of intellectually disabled individuals who have forged his awareness and life. 
Vanier’s writing is nothing like Levinas’ prophetic and obscure language. However, the 
paradox at the centre of the relationship they both describe recognizes the primacy and 
holiness of the Other/other who does and should precede all else.  
Like Levinas, Vanier’s formulation of the relational extends beyond the simple notion of 
“service”. Interestingly, the real role of the typically abled “assistants” who come to live in 
L’Arche communities is not to “help” so much as to enter into friendship, a “covenant of 
                                                     
22 In a recent inquiry undertaken by L’Arche, 14 witnesses and 10 victims offered reliable testimony that Thomas 
Philippe had sexually abused adult women to whom he was ministering as spiritual director between 1970 and 
1990, two years before his death. Philippe apparently had a psychological and spiritual hold over these women 
that he used to enforce their silence. L’Arche has opened the findings of this investigation to the public. See: 
<http.//www.la-croix.com/Religion/Actualite/L-Arche-fait-la-lumiere-sur-la-face-cachee-du-P.-Thomas-Philippe-
2015-10-15-1368960.> L’Arche’s public response to this news is also detailed on the L’Arche website. See: 
<http://www.larche.org.uk/News/safeguarding-policies-and-practices > [accessed 30 July 2016]. 
23 In French, l’Arche means “Noah’s Arc”. 
24 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 28. Vanier speaks of the “forces of 
darkness and hatred” in his own heart. “Elitism” he claims, “is the sickness of us all”. Ibid. p. 75.  
25 J. Vanier, 'Becoming Human', p. 40.  
26 For a thoughtful discussion on altruism and ambivalence see: K. Reimer, 'Natural Character: Psychological 
Realism for the Downwardly Mobile', Theology and science, 2 (2004).  
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love,” as brothers and sisters with the “residents,” in order to share their lives. Not 
surprisingly, Vanier observes that it is often difficult to know who is a member of the 
community; all are in need and the shared hunger for relationship is the core of this need.27  
The freedom claimed through the relationship Vanier describes is also fragile because it is 
freely chosen, not imposed, and because the typically abled who come to L’Arche tend not 
to stay for long, which is why Vanier calls his a “pilgrim community”. Assistants in L’Arche 
homes face an arduous psychological process that involves effort, loss, disillusionment and a 
relinquishing of the self and its project.28 They can feel overwhelmed by their insignificant 
“useless” offerings, dwarfed by the immensity of the need represented by the intellectually 
disabled whose lives they share. 
Residents in L’Arche homes cope not only with profound disabilities, as many have also 
endured horrific life circumstances. Consequently, there is no great remediating solution or 
task to be accomplished beyond, “giving baths,29 cleaning, cooking, eating, laughing, getting 
angry, praying”.30 Psychologist Kevin Reimer, who spent some time in L’Arche, reports with 
considerable sensitivity the ambivalence he found among assistants who had lived in 
L’Arche for over three years and who struggled psychologically in various ways in their 
altruistic roles.31 Yet, such ambivalence does not necessarily dilute the alchemy of love that, 
Vanier observes, lies in the capacity of the broken individual to reveal her beauty and to heal 
and disturb the strong in the same moment.  
7.2.2 Downward mobility  
Vanier insists on the importance of climbing to the bottom of “the ladder of human 
promotion to be with the weak and the poor”.32 This metaphor relates to Jesus washing the 
feet of his disciples and confirms the importance of resisting the seduction of “self-mastery 
and domination,” which thwarts inclusion and friendship, and especially communion in 
Vanier’s work. Becoming downwardly mobile means we are finally free to be with others as 
                                                     
27 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 103.  
28 J. Dunne, 'Sense of Community in L'arche and in the Writings of Jean Vanier', pp. 47-49.  
29 The body, touch, holding, the act of bathing are fundamental in Vanier’s theology of the body that alludes to 
the vulnerability of Christ’s body as the answer to the pyramid—the structure of hierarchy. See: P.A. Comensoli, 
'Descending the Ladder: The Theological Anthropology of Jean Vanier's Key Metaphor', Journal of Religion, 
Disability & Health, 15 (2011), pp. 120-23, 27.  
30 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 102.  
31 K. Reimer, 'Natural Character: Psychological Realism for the Downwardly Mobile', pp. 94-96.  
32 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 103.  
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opposed to being at the top, “where one deigns that others may be”.33 The striving and 
rewards of being-for-the-self find no purchase with the vulnerable, unselfconscious, present-
centred nature of those with intellectual disabilities. As one observer has noted, this 
population has little access to “cultural devices” used by the typically abled to prop up the 
meaning and value of their lives. Instead, they are almost entirely dependent on relationship 
to know and express themselves and to claim the same dignity and stability as anyone else.34  
Vanier’s language turns to the mystical when he insists that learning to be with the pain of 
another, or even our own pain, requires that we be “touched by God”35 or feel “the kiss of 
God”.36 He uses the allusion of the Wedding Feast as the Kingdom of God and describes 
God as the Lover.37 Similar allusions are made throughout the mystical canon to capture the 
inexorable, embodied draw of the divine.38 Richard Kearney also reminds us that despite his 
Judaism and self-proclaimed atheism, Levinas also employed the face of Christ as the 
prototypical Face of the Other, which further illustrates the shared orientation of these two 
philosophers.39 
Vanier’s central argument is inspired by the Christian Beatitudes that allow him to identify 
the weak and the poor as gifted spiritual teachers because of their level of suffering. 40 His 
claim is further supported by his sympathy for Aristotle’s view of friendship based on 
shared character and values.41 The theme of friendship and fraternity also underpins 
Levinas’ work, although Simon Critchley has criticized Levinas’ “classical politics of 
friendship” which appear to occur “between brothers, free equals who happen to be male”. 
                                                     
33 P.A. Comensoli, 'Descending the Ladder: The Theological Anthropology of Jean Vanier's Key Metaphor', pp. 
119-20. See also: J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 84.  
34 J. Dunne, 'Sense of Community in L'arche and in the Writings of Jean Vanier', p. 47.  
35 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 115.  
36 Ibid. p. 154.  
37 Ibid. pp. 159, 61.  
38 See for example: ‘The Language of Love in Christian and Jewish Mysticism’, in Mysticism and Language, ed. by 
S.T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 202-35. 
39 Kearney to Levinas: “What do you think of when you think of the face of the other? He said, “Christ,” and I 
said, But you’re a Jew, and he said, “Yes. But Christ is the suffering Jew par excellence, for us Jews too”. He’s one 
of us, kind of thing. And he said it in a wonderfully ecumenical way obviously”. See: R. Kearney, 'The God Who 
May Be', in Ideas, ed. by David Cayley' (Published: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006), pp. 1-22 (p. 19).  
40 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', pp. 105-09.  
41 P. Cushing and T. Lewis, 'Negotiating Mutuality and Agency in Care‐Giving Relationships with Women with 
Intellectual Disabilities', Hypatia, 17 (2002), p.177.  
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42 It is not my intention to analyse Aristotle’s view of friendship in the work of these two 
thinkers but to indicate their deeply shared interest in a theme that powerfully informs their 
respective visions. It is worth noting, however, that Critchley identifies as highly 
problematic Levinas’ “androcentric conception of friendship, fraternity and political 
community, where the feminine is the essential, but essentially pre-ethical, opening of the 
ethical basis of community”.43 This was an issue identified in the previous chapter by some 
of Levinas’ feminist critics.44  
Vanier’s focus on friendship engages closely with the day-to-day practicalities of living and 
working in what is essentially a spiritual community. Regardless of religion, and L’Arche 
communities now represent a broad spectrum of religions worldwide, a faith tradition is at 
the centre, no matter how inclusively practiced. This focus informs the notion of friendship, 
mutuality and interdependence between the strong and the weak in a living environment 
where a sense of the divine is intentionally cultivated, celebrated and recognized. Vanier’s 
construal of friendship offers a simple and practical antidote to injustice and 
dehumanization in the care of vulnerable populations. Yet, such friendship is untenable in 
the secular hierarchy of community mental health, although Professor John Swinton argues 
to the contrary. Swinton is greatly influenced by Vanier’s thinking and, as a leader in the 
field of theology and disability, his claim for the need for friendship in the care of the 
mentally ill an appealing one.45 His perspective also illustrates the dilemma revealed by his 
argument, which is briefly touched on in the following digression and examined more 
comprehensively in the following chapter. 
7.2.3  The red herring 
Swinton’s work embraces Vanier’s vision and “[t]he primary emphasis within L'Arche…on 
friendship and mutuality-in-community”.46 It is a formula Swinton claims for the “disabled” 
in arguing for a quality of “belonging” he would like to see extended beyond the idea of 
                                                     
42 A brief synopsis of these problems which tend overlap may be found in: S. Critchley, 'Five Problems in 
Levinas’s View of Politics and the Sketch of a Solution to Them', Political Theory, 32 (2004), 173-75.  
43 S. Critchley, 'The Other's Decision in Me (What Are the Politics of Friendship?)', European Journal of Social 
Theory, 1 (1998), pp. 269-70.  
44 See: Critique (6.8). 
45 See for example: J. Swinton, 'Who Is the God We Worship? Theologies of Disability; Challenges and New 
Possibilities', International Journal of Practical Theology, 14 (2011).  
46 J. Swinton, 'The Body of Christ Has Down’s Syndrome: Theological Reflections on Vulnerability, Disability, 
and Graceful Communities', Journal of Pastoral Theology, 13 (2003), 75.  
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simple “inclusivity,” particularly within the Church.47 Swinton also extends this formula to 
the sphere of community mental health care and the “evil” of dehumanization that harms 
not only the help seeker but the clinician as well. However, in forwarding the idea of 
friendship and recommending love as the “solution” to clinical distancing and 
dehumanization, Swinton appears to recant at the same time.48 He does so by 
acknowledging the need for caution given the possible dangers of blurred boundaries and 
the implications of misunderstanding and misconduct that could potentially harm the help 
seeker. In conceding as much, Swinton confirms the real possibility of “using” the help 
seeker. That is, of mistaking love for an invitation to abuse the vulnerable help seeker, which 
the reductive clinical environment would seem to ensure. Yet, friendship and love that 
might require such vigilance are not in the order of a perspective that would elevate the other 
above the clinician, and claim the clinician’s whole responsibility. 
The call for love and friendship does not, cannot go far enough in addressing the problem of 
clinical dehumanization, as Swinton’s proviso seems to confirm. The reductive clinical 
environment and hierarchical interests of the institution—and by default—the clinician, are 
justified and occluded by the norms of “clinical distance” and “objectivity”. Swinton’s 
suggestion that carers should love, but not too closely—or dangerously—is the standard 
defence, if not the apology, that appears to protect the clinician and the institution more than 
the vulnerable help seeker. The interests of the reduction come first, along with the hierarchy 
that reifies it, while the expressed concern for the welfare of the objectified help seeker 
would have us believe otherwise. Either way, the help seeker is at real and significant risk, 
whether from the dehumanizing indifference and reduction of clinical distance or in the 
event of the friendship that Swinton prescribes, but only to a point. This is the red herring that 
chronically deflects a closer examination of what lies beyond the defence of “clinical 
distance” and how much the institution—and the clinician—have to lose by challenging the 
balance of power with a call to friendship and love, about which Vanier seems very clear.  
The attitudes and agendas of community mental health care and a community like L’Arche 
are arguably worlds apart, but hardly antithetical. Vanier identifies five attitudes towards 
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the intellectually disabled useful to our discussion of community mental health care and the 
“mentally ill”. In Levinasian terms they describe the graded shift of the advantaged I, or 
clinician, from being-for-the-self to being-for-the-other. At one end of this continuum 
disability, or in terms of our inquiry mental illness, is viewed as disorder or deviance to be 
“suppressed” by the clinician. While at the other end, or on another continuum altogether, a 
transcendent perspective represents an irreducible holiness Vanier claims can lead an 
individual to God.49 “People with disabilities are necessary for the wholeness of the body of 
humanity,” Vanier claims, not only to maintain its integrity but also to point to its 
fractures.50 Similarly, the idea of mental illness is all too often a sign—the canary in the coal 
mine of a violent and indifferent world. In this way, Vanier identifies my personal need for 
the vulnerable help seeker and his elevation and primacy over me. This also mirrors Levinas’ 
notion of asymmetry and the responsibility of the I for the Other. 
7.2.4 Yearning for the vulnerable other: The ultimate paradox 
My need for the vulnerable other is possibly the most difficult, radical and persuasive aspect 
of Vanier’s argument. The implication being that the strong may actually not progress or 
evolve, may not overcome their own darkness, violence and loneliness51 without the help of 
the weak and the destitute. In saying as much, Vanier may come dangerously close to 
diminishing the horror of the lives of the people he cherishes by essentializing them and 
idealizing them for his own purposes. Similar concerns have emerged about Teresa of 
Calcutta whose popularity and legacy, some have suggested, were products of a media tour-
de-force. For, Teresa, it has been suggested, could have significantly increased the medical 
care, living conditions and comfort of those in her care given the vast financial donations at 
her disposal. If, that is, she had been less intent on valorizing the beauty of the suffering face 
of Christ52 in the lives of those she served, rather than actually responding to it. 53 
                                                     
49 For a brief overview of five “attitudes” towards disability described by Vanier, which I would argue are 
equally relevant to attitudes to mental illness, see: J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential 
Writings', pp. 47-48.  
50 Ibid. p. 48.  
51 The issue of loneliness from either the side of the weak or the strong is a constant refrain in Vanier’s work 
synthesized here: J. Vanier, 'Becoming Human', pp. 5-34.  
52S. Larivée, C. Sénéchal, and G. Chénard, 'Les Côtés Ténébreux De Mère Teresa', Studies in Religion/Sciences 
Religieuses, 42 (2013), pp. 10-12. 
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Vanier walks a similar tightrope as a humanitarian super-star with a rich network of 
international connections both secular and religious that has supported his cause for 
decades. His eventual canonization is already a source of speculation and his ethical 
reputation remains remarkably unblemished.54 The witness of ordinary citizens participating 
as “assistants” in L’Arche communities also confirms their own transformative process as 
well as the comfort, order, peace, and hospitality found in the homes they share with this 
population.55 The work of L’Arche and other projects emerging from it has also survived 
close scrutiny across decades. Meanwhile, Vanier’s legacy continues to grow even into 
advanced old age as he continues to broadcast a message compelling us to see our own 
poverty of spirit. His deceptively simple mantra echoes Levinas’ ultimate question: “Should 
I be dedicated to being? By being, by persisting in being, do I not kill“?56 Vanier says it 
somewhat more simply: “Elitism is the sickness of us all”.57  
Vanier’s emotional transparency may be the crowning achievement of his life’s work. His 
willingness to stand as a family member beside those he champions while acknowledging 
the enormous challenges of living with and through this population, speaks not just to his 
integrity but also the burden and pain of being-for-the-other.58 In confessing the 
“humiliating darkness” of his own rage, despair and loneliness that he has been forced to 
confront through his relationships with this vulnerable population, Vanier articulates the 
anguish and the rewards of accepting the invitation of the face. 59 That he may do so 
strategically to humanize his own image, to widen his sphere of influence and to place the 
possibility of his efforts within the reach of mortals less extraordinary or privileged than 
himself, does not necessarily compromise the integrity of his message.60 Vanier’s 
prescription never attempts to hide the withering implications of a responsibility that can 
make the self-interested project of striving, upward mobility, pleasure and a possibly lonely 
but unencumbered freedom, look wistfully alluring by comparison. Indeed, philosopher 
                                                     
54 J.L. Allen Jr, 'L’arche Founder Reveals Face of Christ'. 
55 See, for example: <https://vimeo.com/11093809> [accessed 30 July 2016]. 
56 E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', p. 120.  
57 J. Vanier and C. Whitney-Brown, 'Jean Vanier: Essential Writings', p. 75.  
58 For a flavour of the psycho-spiritual process of the assistants, see: J. Dunne, 'Sense of Community in L'arche 
and in the Writings of Jean Vanier', pp. 46-47.  
59 Ibid. p. 52.  
60 For a brief summary of the ways Vanier attempts to claim his place at the bottom of the ladder of success 
despite his celebrity, see: D. Todd, 'Jean Vanier: The Path to Spiritual Liberation', The Vancouver Sun, (Mar. 5, 
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Catherine Chalier acknowledges that Levinas’ view does not mean we are necessarily happy 
to be burdened by such responsibility and that we “will most likely try to forget it”.61 
Regardless of our ability or interest in remembering, philosopher Adriaan Peperzak reminds 
us that within such responsibility lies our heart’s desire.  
Desire transcends economy by desiring the other—not for satisfaction or consolation, 
not as a partner in love, but as the one whose face orients my life and thereby grants 
it significance. In desire I discover that I am not enclosed within myself, because I am 
“always already” to and for the Other, responsible, hostage, substitute.62 
Desire and love are anathema to the therapeutic relationship, operating as they do through 
the paradigm of “the same,” where any hint of desire is reducible to the bogie-man of abuse, 
or impending abuse.63 Yet, desire and love are implicit in the daunting enormity of 
responsibility commanded by the Face. Consequently, the clinician must ensure that its 
magnetic appeal never seriously challenges her position and authority over the vulnerable 
help seeker. She must do this at almost any cost, even of her own moral convictions, despite 
the undeniable evidence of the violence before her. This is how a clinician can continue to 
violate the other even when she looks into her eyes. 
7.2.5 Daisy-May 
May, who lived alone and was about 65, tiny, grey-haired, unremarkable, and complaining, 
was telling us about the insignificant details of her past week in a defeated voice while we 
listened. My colleague and I were running a CBT64 group in the windowless meeting room 
and checking in with each member of the dozen people sitting around the table to see how well 
everyone had managed their goals for the week, before getting the session underway.  
I began to take interest in what May was saying as she started to recount actually getting 
herself out of bed several mornings in a row, having a shower, getting dressed, forcing herself 
to make and eat breakfast and not allowing herself to go back to bed and to sleep. The people 
around the table were becoming equally interested in what was a significant deviation from 
her habit of staying in bed until lunch and in her pyjamas until dinnertime. Yet, there was no 
sense of victory in her report, no pride or elation about this accomplishment or its possibility. 
At the end of the brief monologue, she stopped for a moment before looking around the room 
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to include everyone in the unanswered question she had posed herself that week. After doing 
everything the manual had said to do and making a commitment to the group, knowing 
something had to change, she was left with an unanswered question.  
“But then what?” she asked in a plaintive voice, clearly needing an answer, deserving an 
answer. “So I do all of this, I make all this effort. I’m finished reading the paper by 7:30 in the 
morning and I don’t allow myself to turn on the TV. But then what?” She searched the faces 
of her peers. “Do you know what I mean? What’s the point? I don’t know what the point is”. 
The room was silent. I met my colleague’s eyes and we shared a small bitter-sweet smile before 
looking away from each other and back to May who was waiting. Smooth as silk my colleague 
congratulated May for her significant revolution, expressing regret that we couldn’t explore 
that issue here and glossing over this important question, the only question really, by asking 
the next person for his report.  
May looked puzzled or possibly chastened by my colleague’s kindly but dismissive response 
and I watched her gaze soberly down at the table in front of her, looking still and small. When 
her neighbour started to speak, I heard my own inner voice leap to May’s defense with no 
small vehemence and conviction. “You got that right sister. You got that dead right,” I 
thought, looking at her, reading her humiliation and wanting so badly to take it away. When 
she finally looked into my face I smiled lovingly, I hoped, wanting her to catch my warmth, 
my alliance with her. But she looked away quickly, possibly imagining that I was patronizing 
her which, I suppose, I was. 
Philosopher Richard Kearney has suggested that Levinas’ view of the transcendent while 
accurate is also too austere for his taste in its namelessness and awe. “We all need creature 
comfort, and we need a name to pray to and a story to tell and to fit into when we talk about 
our relationship to the divine”.65 In this respect Vanier’s work, focused as it is on the person 
of Jesus and especially celebration, possibly balances and softens Levinas’ formidable 
transcendence. Still, Vanier’s example shows what it can mean to respond practically to the 
Face of the one who confirms me. Those working within a more secular framework may feel 
the need to weigh carefully Vanier’s conservative Catholicism against his example. Yet he 
undeniably and amply demonstrates in very practical terms what it can mean to answer the 
call of the Face. That is, to bring the Other home, bind her wounds, hold her, feed her, live 
with her, celebrate and suffer with her because he—we—cannot live without her.  
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7.3  Bringing the Other into community mental health care 
[H]erein lies possibly the main challenge when using Levinas’ ethics in science and 
research: How to maintain the radicalism of his critique of the symbolic order when 
this is to be communicated in a scientific context that expects clarification of 
statements and ideas?66 
In the remainder of this chapter, we will discuss invention and change as they relate to 
Levinas and community mental health care, and to those collaborations emerging between 
Levinasian ethics and the work of other thinkers. I draw on a sampling of these to illustrate 
the breadth of the discourse and to highlight the challenges and possibilities of “applying” 
Levinas’ a-theoretical approach.  
7.3.1 Standing up for the Other 
Nurse educator, Débora Vieira Almeida, identifies the complexity of standing up for the 
other from the opening paragraph of her timely call for a Levinasian perspective to 
humanize clinical care. Almeida contends that our difficulty in understanding humanization 
in health care stems from the absence of a theoretical framework that could allow us to 
discuss the issue at a scientific level.67 Her reference to the scientific and the theoretical 
might seem to overlook Levinas’ central project of seeing through and overwhelming the 
categorical, yet Almeida is well aware of the problem she is tackling.  
[H]ealth professionals deal with distinct dimensions in their practice: that of 
ontology, a dimension which knows and takes possession of the other (to know a 
pathology, the treatment, for example), and that of the alterity, which will never be 
understood due to being beyond the limits of comprehension of an I health 
professional. 68 
Almeida addresses the problem by proposing a theory for humanization based on a 
Levinasian model that translates the “I-other relationship in and through the act of caring”.69 
She rehearses Levinas’ I-Other relationship from the perspective of the “I-health 
professional”. Almeida wants to show how Levinas’ ethical vision could shift the clinician’s 
sense of role to one of relationship, and the notion of illness and treatment to Other and to  
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caring. In translating Levinas’ notion of “being held hostage,” Almeida also recommends 
that the “I-health professional” become the “hostage of the guarantee not to treat it as an 
object”.70 Yet, can such a guarantee be made, let alone transacted, if being held hostage is 
mediated by desire, imagination and a yearning beyond clinical reduction or its imposition?  
Almeida also posits the idea of the infinite as a type of knowledge “different from that 
which the I can grasp in the sense of dominating”. By which she presumably means, 
“knowledge which teaches humanity to the I”.71 Yet, does it or can it or, as Levinas might 
confirm, would such knowledge simply give way to its totalizing implications? In other 
words, would this simply enable me—once again—to refresh myself at the fountain of this 
wonder-full Other and continue on about my clinical business without fulfilling any larger 
responsibility to her? 
It would be unfair to judge Almeida’s attempt to bring clinical relevance to Levinas’ ethical 
vision as less than bold, yet how Levinas’ ethics are to be taught, practiced and applied 
within her theory is still in question. Almeida’s translation is relevant to clinical care and 
true to Levinas’ formulation, but her efforts fall short of illustrating how they are to be 
applied. Still, her contribution invites the clinician to consider that there is, and must be, 
another way of apprehending the help seeker which is a valuable argument in itself, if only 
in articulating an “ought” against “the way it is”.  
Research like Almeida’s leaves me to wonder if the largest part of Levinas’ seduction does 
not lie in his confirmation of the sanctity of the clinician’s desire. That is, in this “holy” 
apprehension that is so conspicuously absent in clinical literature, given the bald challenge it 
poses the reduction and the power structure behind it. But if so, then what? Almeida 
concludes: 
To conceive of the other towards the “I health professional” … demands that the 
technical and scientific knowledges of the professional be submitted to the demands 
of the other, demands that the public policies always have the purpose of serving 
Other justly, attributing a character of singularity to the concept.72  
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These noble sentiments are in perfect accord with our inquiry and we might readily imagine 
them being endorsed by the ethics committee of any community mental health centre. Yet, 
in saying as much, Almeida appears to re-iterate the obvious rather than plumbing the 
boggy depths of the reduction she is trying address, or illustrating how her theory would 
work in practice. 
7.3.2 Cultural competence under the Levinasian microscope 
It seems that the ethical integrity of any given application is accurately determined by 
simply examining it through the lens of Levinas’ “Other”. As we shall see, even an 
application theorized and construed as ethical can be revealed as another reduction in 
disguise. Social work educators Adital Ben-Ari and Roni Strier discuss this ethical tromp 
l’oeil in their examination of the growing interest in the notion of “cultural competence”. 
This is an idea emerging in clinical care and community mental health care which appears to 
reflect a Levinasian ethos.  
Cultural competence emphasises the institution’s growing awareness of the need for 
clinicians to deal more sensitively, knowledgeably and justly with difference. This includes 
the difference in people’s socio-economic and life circumstances, their culture, age, sexual 
orientation, gender, religious or spiritual practices and beliefs. The strength of this theory 
supposedly lies in its interest in recognizing and addressing the embeddedness of such 
difference in the quality of care an individual is likely to receive.73 Yet, Levinas’ work speaks 
to interests greater and subtler than these in his claim of an irreducible alterity. As 
Philosopher Jeffrey Bloechl observes, this alterity—this otherness—represents no particular 
cultural or religious framework, despite Levinas’ own Jewish heritage and scholarship. The 
moral issue always takes precedence over the cultural or epistemological.74  
Consequently, Levinas’ view does not chime with the assumption that cultural competence 
is a “necessary and sufficient condition for working effectively with differences”. Nor can it 
be “taught, learned, trained and attained,”75 as Ben-Ari and Strier have themselves 
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concluded. Cultural competence has nothing to do with my encounter with the other who 
opens me to my moral identity and ethical yearning in an event, “announcing my having 
already been found”.76 The notion of cultural competence is shown to be a fallacy and an 
essentially reductive exercise that generalizes the help seeker, even while it presumes to 
specify and honour difference for her benefit.  
This does not diminish the clinician’s need to understand and respect cultural or religious 
difference, or excuse ignorance of these subjects. To assume the ethical priority of cultural 
competence, however, is to miss the point that even the most refined understanding of 
cultural or social differences still reduces the help seeker to another category. Cultural 
competence shares nothing in common with the transcendent “trace of the who knows 
where”77 that inheres in each of us and has no generalizable parts.78 
7.3.3  It’s not about self esteem  
The possibility of sacrifice as a meaning of the human adventure! Possibility of the 
meaningful, despite death, though it be without resurrection! The ultimate meaning 
of love without concupiscence, and of an I no longer hateful.79  
Levinas’ vision illuminates the naivety of a “therapeutic” perspective that makes the 
vulnerable help seeker the centre of her own universe and a therapeutic focus on the self 
both limiting and dangerous. The need to redirect this focus could hardly be clearer, or more 
urgent, when cherished notions of what constitutes the “therapeutic” or “best practice” are 
revealed in ways large and small to be anti-social if not ludicrous. 
A colleague from down the hall, a psych nurse, comes into my office and looks around the 
room before addressing me. “Do you have handouts for your patients?” She gives me a brief 
smile but seems in a bit of a rush and doesn’t sit down to tell me what the matter is. “Uh, 
handouts?” I say, uncertainly, standing up from my chair and looking around the room to see 
if she'd seen something I’d somehow missed in my own office. “Yeah, you know, just a one-
pager. I need something on self-esteem”. “Self-esteem?” I say, echoing her question as though 
I am deaf or unfamiliar with her language. “Yeah, I’ve got a patient in with me right now 
with low self-esteem who could really do with a hand-out, just a one-pager, that’s all I need. 
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Don’t you have one?” “Ah, no, actually,” I say. She is looking at me quizzically, waiting for 
a reasonable answer that might account for such an unprofessional oversight. Perhaps she 
thinks I’m simply out of hand-outs and need to print some more. It is inconceivable to her 
that I, a therapist, would not have a tool as basic as this to give people with low self-esteem, 
given that virtually everyone who comes into this place supposedly suffers from it. It’s a term 
I never use, it’s meaningless, it’s demeaning, I hate it. 
I feel slightly flustered as I watch her walk towards the door. “Would you like me to see your 
patient?” I ask, following behind her, trying to be helpful, but realizing with a sinking heart 
that my offer may have just offended or alarmed her. “No, no, no, no”. She says quickly, 
confirming my fear, and raising her palm to stop me from continuing. “I just thought you 
might have something…” There's another pause. "Yes, well, uh, I don't," I say, stating the 
obvious. The situation is not getting any better and I don't know why I feel so sheepish. She 
looks at me appraisingly from the doorway and asks, “What do you do?” “What do I do? For 
self-esteem issues you mean?” “Yeah, what do you do for your patients?” Not having a 
reasonable answer on the tip of my tongue, and seeing just how far apart we are on this issue, 
I say the only thing that comes to mind. “I talk to them”. I might also have added, “I sit with 
them”. But I didn’t want to sound like a complete idiot. 
7.3.4 Helping the vulnerable help seeker find the Other 
Psychologist, Richard Williams, laments psychology’s lack of moral maturity and its naivety 
and failure to address the ethical in any way that could promote moral development and 
behaviour. Levinas’ work, he argues, offers an escape from psychology’s “irrelevance and 
obscurity” because it does not conflate ethics and reason.80 Moral relevance could be 
cultivated, Williams suggests, through a psychology dedicated to metaphysical questions 
related to the interests of intelligence, morality, agency, intimacy and a sense of the good.81 
Williams also affirms psychology’s legitimacy as a defensible enterprise by suggesting that 
Levinas did not refute contemporary ontology, so much as redirect it away “from its own 
excesses”. Levinas’ provisional acceptance of “phenomeno-logical/hermeneutic ontology,”82 
Williams claims, is what rescued psychology from its reductive, deterministic history. On 
this last point, I am less persuaded given the enormity of the reductive problem we are 
confronting here. Yet, I concede that any serious de-legitimization of community mental 
health care is also far enough in the future to justify examining approaches that could help 
turn the help seeker towards the Other.    
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Williams proposes one therapeutic approach based on a theory developed by Terry Warner, 
with appealing Levinasian overtones. Warner, an American businessman, philosopher and 
devout Mormon, argues persuasively for the need to understand the socially destructive 
implications of self-deception that predictably cause us to blame and misuse others. His 
perspective is sympathetic to Levinas’ in claiming that our ability to take responsibility 
liberates us from the burden of our self-deception and enables us to love the other and to see 
her as she truly is.83      
Warner offers several examples to illuminate his meaning and the most intriguing and 
counter-intuitive concerns the plight of a young woman. Wounded by her father’s life-long 
indifference, she is left feeling deeply unloved and emotionally paralysed. Spending her 20s 
going from one therapist to the next, she finally approaches her bishop who advises her to 
ask her father’s forgiveness for holding him so far outside her heart. Stunned and outraged 
by this suggestion, the young woman eventually discovers her culpability in this 
prescription. She goes to her father to ask his forgiveness without any expectation and he 
begs her forgiveness instead. This mends the tear in their relationship and the young 
woman’s bitterness is transformed, allowing her to function in the world again. The 
outcome of this drama might well be dismissed, or closely queried by a sceptical therapist, 
and with good reason. Yet, Warner cautions that his theory offers no formula or panacea. 
It is important to notice that nothing I've said implies that this girl was "bad" or 
“sinful" in her refusal to love her father. I've not even said that she should have loved 
him. The point is she felt she should. In not doing so, she was betraying a moral 
sense that was not someone else's, but her own.84  
Warner’s work suggests a creative way of coaxing the individual away from the trap of her 
self-focused and oppressive inner process to the larger picture of her inter-subjectivity that 
reveals the relational possibilities of loving and being-for-the-Other.  
Taking a different tack towards an argument for the other, philosopher Richard Cohen 
suggests that Levinas was unequivocal in flatly contradicting the psychological perspective 
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of his day that interpreted “need as lack”.85 Arguably, this view still prevails in theorizing 
our drive to control or fulfil ourselves socially, materially or spiritually. Yet, Levinas claimed 
this drive does not represent our need for satisfaction and gratification but our desire to 
escape ourselves through the transcendent. It represents “the desire for the truly other—
escape from self-enclosure”.86 Here, then, the problem of being and existence is found not in 
its lack but its surfeit.  
Cohen also suggests that Levinas’ account of responsibility could be relevant to those at risk 
of suicide, who cannot recognize the hell of their own self-absorption and despair as their 
unfulfilled desire for the other. Yet, Cohen fails to account for the efficiency of the 
institution—and even the well-intended clinician—to mediate against such a view, given the 
profound vulnerability of the help seeker to the anti-socializing impact of community 
mental health care. This is significant considering the frank insufficiency of institutional 
diagnostics, prescriptions and treatments to provide something—anything—substantial 
enough to confirm the help seeker’s sense of relatedness, responsibility or place.  
Williams’ and Cohen’s recommendations are additionally complicated by the lack of any 
clear consensus on what even constitutes “recovery,” or “mental illness”.87 Cohen, however, 
speaks volumes when he observes that mental health is “not simple conformity to social 
conventions…but responsible participation in the moral dimensions of social life, which 
may mean standing on one’s own against certain social conventions”.88 The delicacy and 
difficulty—the risk—of responding to such a moral imperative cannot be underestimated 
when the clinician stands against the cultural conventions of the institution she serves. These 
risks all too clearly articulated than when the clinician confronts by the naïve expectations of 
the vulnerable help seeker. 
7.3.5 Safe as in Church 
Please don’t talk yet… I understand… you’re beside yourself…would you like to take your 
coat off? Please sit down…that’s it. Do you want to put your purse on the floor? Would you 
                                                     
85 Cohen alludes here to Levinas’ dissatisfaction with Freud’s view of the libidinal drive that Levinas apparently 
argued had failed to suggest its “ontological origins”. R.A. Cohen, 'Book Reviews of Emmanuel Levinas (2003) on 
Escape. ', European Journal of Psychotherapy & Counselling, 7 (2005), 110.  
86 Ibid.  
87 S.J. Onken and others, 'An Analysis of the Definitions and Elements of Recovery: A Review of the Literature', 
Psychiatric rehabilitation journal, 31 (2007), 17-18.  
88 R.A. Cohen, 'Book Reviews of Emmanuel Levinas (2003) on Escape.', p. 112.  
Chapter Seven - Levinasian praxis 
174 
 
like a drink of water? Let’s take a minute shall we? Please don’t apologise…this is the place to 
let these tears go…would you like some Kleenex? Yes, I do hear you, your husband, the 
children, the job, the attempt, the whole thing… I hate to stop you from talking but I don’t 
want you say too much until you know who you are talking to. It seems like an interruption 
and you’ve waited weeks to get in here and it’s our first meeting and you’re spilling over ... 
but I work by some rules you need to understand. There will be time to talk… take some nice 
big breaths…that’s it. You’ve been crying like this for a week? But look what you’ve been 
through. You almost died. I am so sorry for your pain …  we’ll wait until you’re ready … but 
don’t talk yet… I’m trying… to protect you. 
She stops suddenly to look at me, her hand on the Kleenex she is still holding to her nose, the 
question clear in her startled eyes.  
No, no, I’m safe, of course I’m safe. Don’t I look safe? Check me out, look at me…Hi 
there!…Of course I am. But… there are things we have to talk about first, so you can decide 
what you want to tell me, but also, what you might…not want to say. Do you understand 
what I’m telling you? This is really important. Do you understand what I’m trying to say? 
The isolation, loneliness and purposelessness plaguing the “mentally ill,” point not only to 
the reductive institution and its dehumanizing Achilles heel, but also to the problem of the 
self-loathing I and the therapeutic focus on the self. From this angle, the help seeker’s 
responsibility to the other is denied through her entrancement with a reductive “therapeutic 
process” that keeps her blind to even its possibility. In sum, there should be little doubt that 
the idea of “recovery” needs to move away from the notion of remission or ideas of 
“improved functionality,” and focussed on the social.  
7.3.6 Levinas collaborates with other ethical orientations 
Levinas’ work is also emerging in collaborations with other ethical conversations and 
practices relevant to community mental health care and beyond. Two such examples are 
briefly examined here that touch on Buddhist practice and on an alternative therapeutic 
approach called “Focusing”.  
In the first example, Martyn Kovan, a Buddhist writer and ethicist, has suggested a 
collaboration of Levinasian ethics and Buddhism that he believes could help develop a 
fruitful theoretical hybrid. This could allow two differing but compatible ethical orientations 
to address their separate weaknesses and build on their respective strengths.  
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Buddhism’s rise in North America already describes an impressive and growing influence in 
psychology and medicine.89 As an ethical practice, Buddhism also supports Levinas’ project 
of uncovering and addressing the ontological roots of violence by identifying our indelible 
connection to each other.90 The Mahayana Buddhist practice of “taking all blames into one”91 
or the Theravada practice of the Brahma Viharas,92 are but two practices sympathetic to 
Levinas’ perspective of an un-substitutable responsibility for the other. Such practices are 
gaining interest in clinical literature and being developed as applications used in widely 
differing medical contexts from psychiatry to oncology.93  
Kovan is hopeful the collaboration he is suggesting will shed more light on the ambiguity of 
situations representing differing yet equally defensible ethical positions. Levinas’ work, 
according to Kovan, does not adequately address this ambiguity despite Levinas’ 
unequivocal stand on personal responsibility and our collusion in all forms of violence.94  
[V]iolence is not… the storm that destroys a harvest, or the master who mistreats his 
slave, or a totalitarian state that vilifies its citizens, or the conquest and subjection of 
men in war. Violence is to be found in any action in which one acts as if one were 
alone to act: as if the rest of the universe were there only to receive the action. 
Violence is consequently also any action which we endure without at every point 
collaborating in it.95  
Kovan seeks a nuanced answer concerning who, or what, may be more or less ethical. To 
clarify the problem, he offers a riveting analysis of a life and death situation between an 
American Buddhist peace activist and two Burmese Buddhists on opposing sides of the 
                                                     
89For examples of such work and its ambitions see: J. Kabat-Zinn, 'Mindfulness-Based Interventions in Context: 
Past, Present, and Future'.  
90 See, for example, S.G. Hofmann, P. Grossman, and D.E. Hinton, 'Loving-Kindness and Compassion 
Meditation: Potential for Psychological Interventions', Clinical Psychology Review, 31 (2011). 
91 See: P. Chödrön, Comfortable with Uncertainty: 108 Teachings (Bouler, CO: Shambhala Publications, 2008), pp. 
180-81.  
92 See one author’s argument for loving her students that shows the overlap between Levinasian inter-subjectivity 
and the Buddhist practice of “Metta”. This practice comprises loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and 
equanimity which are described as the “four abodes” of the Brahma Viharas. See: M.J. Hinsdale, 'Choosing to 
Love', Paideusis, 20 (2012). For a more comprehensive definition of each of these abodes see: C. Eppert, 
'Heartmind Literacy: Compassionate Imagining & the Four Brahmavihāras', Paideusis, 19 (2010), 21-23.  
93 See: S.G. Hofmann, P. Grossman, and D.E. Hinton, 'Loving-Kindness and Compassion Meditation: Potential for 
Psychological Interventions'. 
94 M. Kovan, 'Violence and (Non-) Resistance: Buddhist Ahiṃsā and Its Existential Aporias', Journal of Buddhist 
Ethics, 16 (2009), 46. 
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Burmese revolution.96 Each man appears to have a defensible ethical position, but how from 
a Levinasian perspective do we judge the merits of each one? Kovan argues that this 
weakness in Levinas’ ethics calls for a closer collaboration with Buddhist ethics. Our ability 
to refine and answer such questions through the collaborations Kovan suggests, are 
certainly of interest to mental health clinicians who are chronically confronted by the 
competing ethical interests of their practice.   
In another collaboration, research psychologist, Kevin Kryka, combined strategies reflecting 
Levinas’ work with that of philosopher psychologist, Eugene Gendlin, who developed a 
counselling modality called “Focussing” in the 1960s.97 Levinas and Gendlin’s work are not 
identical, but Kryka notes their similarities. Gendlin, for example, claimed the primacy of a 
“felt sense” of the pre-conceptual as something that “orders our living” but that is not 
constituted by “units of thought or feeling however familiar”.98 Gendlin also recognized the 
constraints of language, and a process of being and thinking that continually foreclose on 
the subtler but undeniable presence of an inner I. This construal mirrors a Levinasian 
perspective of an ordering principle that may seem familiar, but that ultimately precedes 
thought and feeling, and is occluded by language. A more extensive analysis is needed to 
synthesize the similarities and differences of these thinkers, but the most significant 
comparison to be made is between Gendlin’s “I” and Levinas’ “Other”. 
Using strategies informed by the work of Levinas and Gendlin, Kryka developed an 
approach to support the successful negotiation of a potentially volatile dialogue between 
Jews and Palestinians. Using Gendlin’s “First persona approach,” Kryka focussed 
participants away from the “content” of their emotionally charged historical issues towards 
                                                     
96 M. Kovan, 'Violence and (Non-) Resistance: Buddhist Ahiṃsā and Its Existential Aporias', pp. 39-40. 
97 See: E.T. Gendlin, Focusing 2nd edn. (Toronto, New York: Bantam, 2007). “Focusing” is an alternative approach 
to therapy developed by Eugene Gendlin in the 1960s that radically questioned the role of science and therapy, 
and even the validity of the therapist’s role in creating therapeutic change. Gendlin proposed an embodied 
approach to the awareness and mediation of psychological distress and self-destructive patterns of behaviour. 
Arguably, this is less a “therapy” than a subtle phenomenological practice that instructs practitioners how to 
access pre-conscious or unformed feelings or intuitions that are driving and disturbing their lives and emotions. 
The process helps an individual pay minute attention to his or her embodied responses. In my view, Focussing 
shares much in common with Buddhist mindfulness and concentration practices in its cultivation of steady 
awareness and a relaxed willingness to observe and experience the moment-to-moment response of the 
body/mind to its thoughts, feelings and sensations. The University of East Anglia is the leading academic centre 
for Focusing Studies in the United Kingdom  
98 K.C. Krycka, 'Levinas and Gendlin', Existential Analysis: Journal of the Society for Existential Analysis, 20 (2009), p. 
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the “process” of the I. He enhanced this approach by bringing in a Levinasian perspective 
that would help participants discern the “myth of equality and the totalizing impulse of Being 
and Existence”.99  
These examples illustrate collaborative possibilities between Levinas and thinkers 
sympathetic to his worldview that could encourage researchers to think creatively about 
bringing Levinasian ethics into clinical literature. As we have seen in the second half of this 
chapter, clinicians and clinical educators are pursuing research related to issues of practice 
and application by employing—or attempting to employ—Levinasian ethics. Such initiatives 
can only expand Levinas’ sphere of influence and enable those pursuing his vision to keep it 
at forefront of this emerging “therapeutic” dialogue.  
In terms of community mental health care, the problem of attempting to negotiate an ethical 
relationship with the help seeker without actually challenging the foundations of the 
institution remains unchanged and unchallenged. For, there can be no morally relevant 
praxis as long as the supremacy of the clinician’s power and authority—even her moral 
authority to assert a Levinasian ethics, is assumed.  
7.4  Conclusion 
To accept being, in other words, is to fall prey to a philosophy of success, the 
worship of the real, a fatalism without moral resources, for it boils down to saying 
that what is, by virtue of its appearance as being, is what must be.100 
In this chapter, we have explored possibilities for a “wonder-full” approach to clinical care 
based on Levinasian ethics that began with an examination of the divinizing work of Jean 
Vanier. Yet Vanier offers no fail-safe and is well aware that small spiritual communities are 
always vulnerable to danger and darkness. The emerging critique about Mother Teresa’s 
questionable financial management of donated money is but one example,101 the horror of a 
Jonestown story is another.102 Nor is there any refuge, even for L’Arche, as it confronts 
evidence that Vanier’s spiritual director, Thomas Philippe, who helped launch L’Arche, also 
abused women seeking his spiritual direction. Yet we remember Vanier’s example of 
                                                     
99 Ibid. p. 95. 
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integrity and tenderness that shows how the vulnerable other can be allowed to claim her 
place as the arbiter in a relationship, that not so much topples hierarchy as dissolves it.  
Thus, the work of the “assistant” in L’Arche homes—and perhaps the clinician in some 
unforeseen future—constitutes not therapy but covenant, not service but relationship, not 
authority but responsibility. At the centre are communion and the willingness of the helper 
to acknowledge her own fragility and submit to the moral elevation of the Other, despite the 
sacrifice involved. Vanier’s work powerfully illustrates how the vulnerable other can 
actually prohibit my antisocial behaviour by offering no alternative than a one-for-the-other 
relationship for which the help seeker is almost incomprehensibly better suited. This truth 
echoes in Levinas’ observation that “[t]he essence of discourse is prayer,” 103 because such 
“religion” can be spoken without mention of God or the sacred, and need not imply either 
mysticism or theology.104  
In this chapter, we also examined how Levinas’ vision is suggesting therapeutic approaches 
and applications aimed at protecting the vulnerable help seeker and liberating her from an 
excessive focus on the self. We considered the compelling work of Terry Warner who, like 
Vanier, employs the suffering face of Christ as the prototype for our “clinical” concern. 
Regardless of religious or spiritual orientation, this face speaks to the shocking immediacy 
of the call of the vulnerable other. It is also true that we may never respond to this call with a 
technique or application but only our limited selves, only relationship, only responsibility. 
Yet, the probability of such an ethical encounter is easily pre-empted by the secular 
“therapeutic” process. This is one that is so fraught with busy-ness and purposefulness, that 
it subordinates alterity to “empirically defined themes” and “successful therapeutic 
outcomes”.105  
                                                     
103 A debate about prayer in clinical practice was provoked by American psychiatrist Harold Koenig. Prayer is an 
exceptionally difficult notion to introduce in this context and is reduced to pragmatic therapeutic “goals” to 
justify its use, even by its most sensitive proponents. “Prayer should never be a matter of routine. The timing and 
intention must be planned out carefully with clear goals”. See: H.G. Koenig, 'Religion and Mental Health: What 
Should Psychiatrists Do?', p. 203. See two responses to this article in: C.C.H. Cook, 'Spirituality, Secularity and 
Religion in Psychiatric Practice: Commentary On... Spirituality and Religion in Psychiatric Practice', The 
psychiatrist., 34 (2010); M. King and G. Leavey, 'Spirituality and Religion in Psychiatric Practice: Why All the 
Fuss?', The Psychiatrist, 34 (2010).  
104 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other', pp. 7-8.  
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That Levinasian ethics is finding its way into clinical discourse is remarkable considering the 
threat it poses to the reductive machine. Yet the research is still in its infancy although the 
possibilities are promising and compelling if not rather daunting. As one commentator has 
noted, the “infinite and relentless burden” of Levinas’responsibility cannot be “resisted” or 
watered down simply because of its extremity or inconvenience. To oppose this 
responsibility is to oppose “otherness and its demand,” whose integrity cannot be altered or 
refuted without “promoting one or another form of disrespect”.106 Yet the opposition of the 
dominant discourse still poses an apparently insurmountable challenge to this demand. 
Even scholars attempting to remediate the most worrying aspects of a clinician’s violating, 
derogating, irrelevant and infantilizing enterprise, are still failing to censure the authority of 
clinicians themselves, or the stone wall of their endorsing institution. 
Levinas was not attempting to negotiate with 2000 years of philosophy but to replace it with 
the “single idea of absolute primacy for the ethical relation”.107 The responsibility that 
Levinas asserted places precedence on the clinician’s responsibility to the help seeker over 
all other therapeutic interests. For psychology to do less, in attempting to increase its moral 
relevance by inviting Levinas into the dialogue, is to misappropriate and misrepresent his 
unequivocal ethical stand. 
Levinas’ position is remarkable in its unimpeachable capacity to raze all prevarication or 
critique aimed at protecting one’s own position as an I connected to the institution. This is 
the defence embedded in the presumption of the pre-eminence of the therapeutic role and the 
institution and, less obviously, in the authority and priviledge preferred by the clinician. 
Curiously, this defence echoes even in the scholarship of even those whose ethical courage 
must be gratefully acknowledged for bringing Levinas into the therapeutic dialogue. Yet, 
Levinas’ vision is not panacea to which we may turn for solace and easy answers when 
confronted by our own sense of impotence within the institution.  
Simon Critchley claims that those of us who are now turning so hopefully to Levinas must 
also be vigilant lest we become his disciples rather than his critics. It is “all very nice” he 
remarks, that Levinas’ work has extended far beyond his own field of philosophy, but too 
much of this scholarship, Critchley insists, is confined to “exegesis, commentary, 
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comparison with other thinkers, and…homage”. Indeed, Critchley’s call for a “passage from 
ethics to politics”108 comes none too soon for community mental health care and it is to this 
theme we now turn in our concluding chapter. 
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 The politics of need and desire 
As I turn and find my neighbour in proximity—in the turning—who I am most 
particularly becomes definitive in the proximity as well as in my word of response. 
In this turning and finding my neighbour to whom I belong… is where I will be 
with God or without God, where I will feel bereft or liberated in a fleeting absence of 
God. Here is where values feel their value, where the important things in life stand 
out, where rituals speak in silent, life giving meaning, where one knows 
nonreflectively how to live and die.1 
8.1  Introduction 
This thesis claims that wonder can interrupt the institutional entrancement of the 
clinician by awakening her to the vulnerability of the help seeker through a 
stunning perspective that confirms a profound moral relationship. It is a claim we 
have hopefully come some way in analysing through a Levinasian interpretation of 
wonder and illustrating through the epiphanic power of autoethnography. Both 
have illuminated the devastating reduction of the help seeker within a marginalized 
clinical population that also fuels the cultural and corporate interests of the 
institution and its many stakeholders. 
In moving towards this conclusion, I have also been concerned that wonder appears 
to be a failed quantity that slides too predictably off the Teflon surfaces of 
community mental health care. That is to say, wonder still fails to enable the 
clinician to protect the vulnerable help seeker from the combined institutional 
assault of medicalization, asymmetry and dehumanization.2 Wonder may make a 
powerful moral impression but apparently not one substantial enough to destabilize 
the institution. Nor does it significantly affect the reasoning of all who maintain its 
boundaries. 
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Indeed, both inside and outside institutional walls the entrancement with the “creep 
of mental illness” is ongoing. Its territories continue to expand as it becomes ever 
more “normalized” despite the undiminished stigma that continues to anathemize 
the “mentally ill”. Moreover, the label of mental illness comes with its own 
seductive rewards, particularly for those on the lower rungs of the socio-economic 
ladder involved with community mental health care. The most obvious of these may 
be guardedly described as “humane respite,” and a constellation of social 
resources—including “free” medication—and someone who will listen no matter 
how briefly or helplessly. Sociologist Philip Strong has argued for these rewards 
although I have suggested they come at a very high price.3 
If the haunting moral plea of wonder fails to overcome the truculence of the 
dominant discourse within community mental health care, its capacity to help the 
clinician interrogate and apprehend the reductive system is unparalleled. Wonder 
does not oppose or argue so much as it contrasts, contradicts, corrects, and illuminates 
by revealing the moral relationship and exposing the clinician to an almost 
irresistible ethical invitation beyond her ken but achingly familiar. 
Nonetheless, our earnest call for the remediation of clinical reduction and clinical 
distance is not without irony. For, this wonder-full “exposure” utterly shifts the 
power dynamic by relocating the clinician below the help seeker and confirming a 
stunning proximity. Here, the clinician may discover herself—in Levinasian terms—
in a position of obeisance that very problematically melts her authorization, status 
and privilege within a hierarchy that the clinician has no intention of forfeiting. 
Indeed, none of her professional or cultural markers would ever call these into 
question. Nonetheless, this radical moral correction illuminates the fraudulence of 
the mental health clinician’s work, her institution, her education and perspective, 
and her immediate relationship with the vulnerable help seeker. Yet, the reductive 
system is so well defended that the impact of wonder may leave the clinician moved 
but also confused, hamstrung, apparently incapable of acting on the help seeker’s 
behalf. Consequently, the clinician can be left distrusting herself, feeling incapable 
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of even discerning between the Other and the reduction. That is, of discerning 
between the moral and the immoral, the responsible and the irresponsible, evidence 
of which can be found in abundance in James’ story.4  
Here lies the dissonance at the heart of this ethico-political matrix that I have 
confronted throughout this inquiry and that continually forecloses on any 
substantive argument attempting to go beyond the reduction. The consequence of 
which is found in the predictable and maddening defilement of wonder itself. This 
is discovered in the conflation of proximity and abuse, where the ethical proximity of 
the Other is conflated and confused with the threat of her violation and abuse. Yet, 
our conflation is inadequately interpreted, or ignored, even by those researchers 
arguing for greater ethical protection of the vulnerable help seeker from the 
reductive system. Nonetheless it prevails, leaving the soundest arguments for 
proximity diluted and defiled before being absorbed back into the reductive bog.  
We must also remember that Levinas conceded that the vision for which he argued 
throughout his career was beyond the reach of a change that still lies in potential. “I 
have the idea of a possibility in which the impossible may be sleeping.”5 As noted 
earlier this limitation has not stopped thinkers and researchers in growing numbers 
of fields of endeavour from trying. This includes Professor Martyn Evans’ 
thoughtful work on wonder that we examined in some detail.6 Yet, others suggest 
that Levinas’ work is too obscure to be adequately interpreted for any “purpose”.  
This inquiry appears to sit midway between these two opposing perspectives of the 
“possible” and the “impossible,” which is not to negate wonder’s power or promise 
or the value of our attempt to see beyond the obstacles in its way. Nevertheless, the 
obstacles are complex and fascinating in the context of community mental health 
care and the therapeutic relationship. These obstacles are the focus of this 
concluding analysis and of what we might described as the enslavement of a notion 
we are attempting, in some ways, to wheel up to the institutional walls like a Trojan 
horse. Yet, as we discover, wonder too is trapped in the same reduction as the help 
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seeker. The problem resides in the totalizing capacity of the reductive framework to 
colonize and defile whatever lies in its path, including those ethical strategies 
specifically aimed at its subversion. As Luce Irigaray compellingly suggests, our 
failure to adequately understand this problem is at the root of our inability to solve 
it with “secondary ethical tasks”. 
It is not a matter of changing this or that within a horizon already defined as 
human culture. It is question of changing the horizon itself – of 
understanding that our interpretation of human identity is both theoretically 
and practically wrong.7  
Like Levinas, Irigaray is not suggesting how this new horizon would be, or should 
be, practically implemented but her admonition is unequivocal and offers a very 
clear direction forward. “If we fail to question what cries out to be radically 
questioned, we lapse or relapse into an infinite number of secondary ethical tasks,” 
and such tasks, she accurately observes, will not “remove the exploitation”.8  
Connected to the obstacle of this conflation is the conscription of the help seeker as 
the mule of wonder. Here, the clinician construes her dazzled apprehension of the 
help seeker as an “experience,” a consumable that may overwhelm her with gratitude 
and awe but remains for her sole benefit. Yet, the clinician is also likely to find 
herself intimidated by the dominant discourse and tightly constrained in even 
attempting to bring a notion like wonder into the conversation. The ultimate heresy 
is to see let alone speak or act beyond the reified—concretized—self-serving 
boundaries of the clinical enterprise. For this enterprise all but refutes the sanctity of 
the clinician’s bond to the one to whom—as wonder so accurately insists—she 
belongs.  
8.2  Wonder’s enslavement 
It is not by chance that the history of Western philosophy has been a 
destruction of transcendence.9 
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8.2.1 Thou shalt not love 
I have been battling with the daughter of a chaotic and chronically suicidal mother 
who is under the care of my colleague, a nurse who has worked off and on with this 
woman for four years or more. This woman’s child, barely 21, has made it through 
the first cut of intake and been assigned to me. She is now spitting bullets in my 
office because I am refusing to support her bid for mental health care in our Centre, 
which would entitle her to receive social assistance to which she believes herself 
entitled because, as she edgily informs me, she is unwell. “You are not ill,” I 
essentially and carefully tell her. “You need an education, employment and a better 
support system, not psychiatry, antidepressants and a welfare cheque”. It takes the 
best part of an hour to finesse this message to avoid appearing unsympathetic or 
negligent to her or to my manager who this young women will likely call to 
complain about me. 
Surprisingly, my argument is supported by my team but the young woman isn’t 
having it and insists on another consultation, this time with her unemployed 
boyfriend in tow. She has no idea the suffering that lies well ahead of her, given her 
mother’s profound instability and all that has gone before. I will not add to it by 
handing her over to a system that will make it almost impossible for her to motivate 
herself towards any real autonomy or recognition of her potential. Yet, I resent her 
for trying to take advantage of a service she does not require.  
I wander down the hall to my colleague’s office to discuss the matter, feeling caught 
in the moral vice of wanting this girl to fulfil her life and annoyed by her 
presumption, but also her willingness to leverage her mother’s situation for such a 
wretched pay-off.  
I lean against the doorframe of my colleague’s office while she talks to me from her 
desk about this young woman’s mother and the role she has played over the course of 
several years with this tragically self-destructive woman and her family members. 
My colleague has been a constant, having attended this woman through many crises, 
visited her in her home and in hospital, and comforted and advised her family. It 
seems that the frequency of crises is beginning to lessen and the unstated hope is that 
my colleague’s intervention has counted for something. Curiously, my colleague 
does not express the merest hint of impatience or ambivalence towards this woman. 
Her steady and unquestionable devotion and the significance of her place in this 
family constellation seem indisputable. 
It’s risky but I ask anyway, I want to know what she thinks. “Do you love her?” I 
say. She pauses before answering. The question is unnerving, it should not be asked, 
it could mean anything, she does not like it, I have transgressed. “No, of course not,” 
she answers shortly, while I come around from another direction to clarify the 
integrity of my meaning. “No,” she protests again, looking at me, “No”. Then, 




looking down at her desk she says, “I do not love her, I am her nurse,” as though she 
might be trying out these words to test them for accuracy. And again, more 
forcefully, “I am her nurse,” she says, looking up at the wall in front of her desk long 
enough to signal that it is time for me to go. 
8.2.2 Proximity and the conflation of violation: A closed loop  
The enigma of the clinician belonging to the help seeker, of her desire and need for the 
vulnerable other, is the most radical and problematic. For it ruptures the status quo 
and opens the clinician’s awareness to ultimacy and the astonishing possibility of a 
very different kind of ethical relationship. Yet, not without the alarm being raised in 
the same instant by the spectre of violation that plagues such a notion within the 
reductive sphere. Resistance is predictable, swift and daunting. What about 
boundary violation? What about the clinician’s abuse of power? What about the 
clinician having sexual feelings for the help seeker or of even “loving” her? What 
about the danger of role reversal? What about clinical distance? Is some distance not 
required for the clinician to be of any value to the help seeker? To which I can only 
agree. 
More intriguing is why the clinician suddenly becomes such a high and imminent 
danger to the vulnerable help seeker whenever the issue of proximity is raised to 
address the issue of clinical reduction? For this risk is presumably present in every 
single clinical encounter conducted behind closed doors. Moreover, we may 
confidently assume the unquestionable ability of every educated and licenced 
clinician to fully comprehend why she is never to mis-use her power or position to 
violate the help seeker for her own gratification, sexual or otherwise. It is a rule so 
fundamental as to be elementary, redundant, even patronizing. Yet proximity, not 
power, remains the focus of concern about the boundary violations that occur so 
predictably.10 
Interestingly, gross clinical violations can be presented as though there is some 
good-enough psychological explanation why they occur and are tolerated. That is, 
without effectively shutting down the entire enterprise of mental health care as 
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currently practised institutionally or privately. That they fail to do so might support 
the argument that the great concern about “proximity” has always been a red 
herring. If proximity posed that great a threat to the help seeker, then why not 
simply eliminate the one-on-one consultative process? This could be implemented, 
or legislated easily enough with a much greater focus on group therapy models. Or, 
it could be instituted through protocols requiring assessments and therapeutic 
sessions to be transacted in the presence of family members, close friends or even 
clinicians in training. Conversely, there could be far greater emphasis placed on the 
development and legitimization of peer counselling models that have already 
proved their mettle.  
It is not my intention to problem solve so much as to demonstrate the speciousness 
of the argument. Strategies like these could buffer many problems arising from the 
intractable power differential played out in the “private” consulting room while 
providing other substantial benefits. Among them would be a relaxation of the 
stranglehold on the notion of “mental illness” as something so exceptional and 
exclusive that its care is best conducted in private.11 Such strategies could also 
lighten the financial burden of a chronically underfunded system of care, help 
shorten wait lists and allow the institution to offer more service to greater numbers 
of people.12 
Yet, arguments against the strategies I am suggesting are predictable, including the 
purported inviolability of patient confidentiality. Of course, this argument falls 
apart in the current reality of computerized patient files and a case management 
model of care. Indeed, the free-flow of patient information within the system at 
large, among team members of the mental health centre, and staff members 
providing additional resources from outside the system, certainly seems to destroy 
any notion of confidentiality capable of dignifying the help seeker.  
                                                     
11 I have argued elsewhere in this inquiry that the notion of confidentiality is for the legal protection of 
the institution and essentially meaningless to the person it is supposed to protect.  
12 An inside joke among clinicians was that patients who were wait-listed for so long that they turned 
down service when they were finally contacted, were actually better off. Such refusal for service 
occurred because the help seekers’ crises had passed or they had found other resources or were simply 
no longer interested, or possibly too disillusioned by systemic indifference to bother. 




There is also the argument upholding the centrality of the “therapeutic” relationship 
that ostensibly requires the protection of privacy for it to be properly developed and 
maintained. In an environment like community mental health care, however, any 
semblance of the “psychotherapeutic” tradition characterised by a protracted 
“relationship” with one clinician, has long since been replaced with “short-term,” 
“solution-based” and “cognitive” modalities. This is true even for those individuals 
suffering from SPMI (serious and persistent mental illness), generally viewed as 
requiring longer-term care. In addition, the help seeker is very likely to be shunted 
from one clinician to the next in the chaotic bustle of institutional care which makes 
any substantial notion of a “therapeutic bond,” tenuous at best.  
In sum, the simple strategies I have forwarded here provide but an example of how 
the institution could easily reduce the supposedly dreadful risk that looms in the 
shadow of proximity. Although, as I have re-iterated, the physical proximity found 
in the one-on-one clinical relationship is woven, without question, into clinical 
praxis.  
8.2.3  Violation “A” 
The issue of gross violation that might be identified here as violation “A,” should be 
briefly clarified to understand what is being primarily conflated with ethical 
proximity. This amounts to the imposition and toleration of the gross exploitation of 
the help seeker through an abuse of power motivated entirely by the clinician’s self-
interest and gratification. It is no more complicated than this, despite whatever 
protestations might arise concerning the impoverished or over-extended clinician 
and the many burdens she carries that might cause her to lose her way.  
[D]iscussions of boundary problems sometimes focus on the “bad apple” 
model: boundary problems and sexual misconduct occur only with a few 
bad apples, and the simple solution is to kick those persons out of the field. 
This simplistic view misses a central point of our discussion: boundary 
issues arise in all therapies and for all clinicians, apparently irrespective of 
the number of years of experience, and even for those practicing only 
psychopharmacology. The relevant question is whether the difficulties can 
be successfully surmounted.13 
                                                     
13 D.M. Norris, T.G. Gutheil, and L.H. Strasburger, 'This Couldn't Happen to Me', p. 518.  




We have seen that the straightjacketing of the reductive system limits the clinician’s 
ethical ability to subvert or work against the reductive institution on the help 
seeker’s behalf. However, we risk excusing the clinician from her unequivocal 
responsibility when we begin to enumerate the many causes of gross boundary 
violation. There is only one cause and to argue to the contrary is to deny the 
clinician’s accountability, the inadequacy of the system to protect the help seeker, 
and the primacy of the help seeker’s human rights.  
Of all the violating concerns, there is possibly none more hypnotizing or scandalous 
than sexual violation and, I would argue, it is around this violation that the clinician 
tiptoes the most carefully. Not surprisingly, there is only a modest amount of 
research on issues related to the sexual abuse of patients in the field of psychology 
as well as on love and loving in clinical practice. Pope et al. corroborate the great 
taboo of acknowledging having sexual feelings for a client and the resulting dearth 
of systematic research in this area.14 It follows that there would be a corresponding 
dearth of literature on love (proximity) in the therapeutic relationship that is not 
interpreted as counter-transference and indeed this is the case. The statistics speak 
for themselves.  
An example of the statistics on the sexual abuse of vulnerable help seekers reported 
by one group of researchers, estimates that 5% to 10% of psychotherapists engaged 
in “sexual intimacies” in the course of their work as professionals.15 Unsurprisingly, 
the occurrence of such abuse has a devastating impact on the help seeker.16 An 
earlier prevalence study found that an average of 8.3% of men and 1.7 % of women 
working as psychologists and social workers had been similarly involved with help 
seekers.17  
                                                     
14 K.S. Pope, P. Keith-Spiegel, and B.G. Tabachnick, 'Sexual Attraction to Clients: The Human Therapist 
and the (Sometimes) Inhuman Training System', American Psychologist, 41 (1986), 150-51.  
15 Ironically, the term “sexual intimacies” is here used to describe the abuse of power and trust in this 
research that is earnestly aimed at highlighting and eradicating the problem. Such terms might 
otherwise, and reasonably, imply a symmetrical relationship of mutuality, trust and consent which this 
is not. 
16 K.S. Pope, 'How Clients Are Harmed by Sexual Contact with Mental Health Professionals: The 
Syndrome and Its Prevalence', Journal of Counseling & Development, 67 (1988), 224-25.  
17 Ibid. p. 222.  




Confirming the gravity of the situation, another study demonstrated that false 
allegations related to such incidents were found in only 4% of the 958 cases where 
such abuses had been reported.18 While the authors candidly admit that issues of 
validity make it necessary for such studies to be cautiously interpreted, their work 
shows remarkably high numbers. In this large study, there was a 50% return rate on 
a survey sent to 1320 respondents in California. Of these, 647 professionals reported 
having seen at least one client who disclosed being previously engaged in “sexual 
intimacy” with a former therapist, with a total of 958 clients with such history being 
reported among them.19  
The issue is fraught, particularly when researchers like Norris et al. and Pope et al. 
have called for more and better clinical education with respect to sexual violation. 
But the reader may be excused for wondering how this industry could ever imagine 
itself fit for the task it sets itself when its own practitioners have yet to learn how not 
to heinously exploit the vulnerable help seeker in their “care”. If the “relevant” 
question really is “whether the difficulties can be successfully surmounted,” as 
Norris et al. have claimed, I would suggest it comes very late in the day and, for that 
reason, has already been unequivocally answered.20  
Whether more education would actually help is another issue beyond the remit of 
this inquiry. The main point is that even if these statistics were halved, quartered, 
such research illustrates the appalling threat posed by the clinician’s power. That 
this threat has yet to bring the practice of mental health care to its knees is 
remarkable and speaks to its own privilege. Norris et al. note that after suicide, the 
greatest numbers of malpractice suits are attributed to boundary violation and 
sexual misconduct among mental health providers.21 In returning to our conflation, 
we can begin to appreciate just how averse the clinician may be to the apprehension 
of proximity under investigation, and how easily conflated it can become with the 
                                                     
18 K.S. Pope and V.A. Vetter, 'Prior Therapist-Patient Sexual Involvement among Patients Seen by 
Psychologists', Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 28 (1991), 429.  
19 Ibid. p. 431.  
20 D.M. Norris, T.G. Gutheil, and L.H. Strasburger, 'This Couldn't Happen to Me', p. 518. 
21 Ibid.  




very real threat of violation. This is the very threat, paradoxically, that our notion of 
proximity is meant to address and subvert. 
8.2.4 Violations A, B and C 
Yecheskiel Cohen, who has written on love in the context of clinical practice, 
suggests that sexual feelings are actually less troubling for therapists to 
acknowledge and for this reason can be used as a defence against feelings of love.22 
This is a compelling argument given our Levinasian perspective of wonder that 
points beyond institutional praxis and norms and consequently beyond the 
clinician’s capacity. Contributing to the ambivalence and confusion that the 
experience of love can create in clinical work is that, “many psychological writers 
tend to identify love with sexuality.”23 Still, if love’s appeal and its attending desire 
are reduced to sexual attraction, as Cohen suggests, then our problematic conflation 
is simply reasserted.  
[T]he experience or feeling of love is not necessarily the result of drive 
energy but … another form of love, a nonerotic form…whose existence is 
difficult …to prove by … science. [E]rotic-driven love is directed toward an 
object or objects, whereby its aim arises from the wish that the object 
gratify…the subject. [N]onerotic…love is teleological…directed toward the 
object, the individual, for his or her sake, and not for that of the loving 
subject. The most characteristic form of love in this genre is that between 
parents and children.24 
Cohen’s strategic response to our problematic conflation sidesteps the misconstrual 
of desire as a sexual reduction by associating it with parental love. This solves the 
problem but unfortunately infantilizes the help seeker and maintains the dominance 
of the (parental) therapist. Nonetheless, he formulates such love as being “beyond 
science,” purposeful and, most significantly, aimed at the interests of the other rather 
than the self-gratification of the therapist. Cohen’s argument might suggest how this 
conflation could be challenged, by defining a type of relationship beyond the 
(scientific) reduction that is not inevitably or solely for the clinician’s gratification.  
                                                     
22 Y. Cohen, 'Loving the Patient as the Basis for Treatment', pp. 144-46.  
23 Ibid. pp. 140-41.  
24 Ibid. pp. 141-42.  




This is but one type of negotiation a clinician may attempt in addressing the 
conflation under analysis that points to the most feared—gross—category of 
violation described here as type “A”. Its possibility provokes the clinician’s 
hypervigilance and purportedly represents the industry’s greatest and gravest 
concern for the welfare of the vulnerable help seeker who must never be violated but 
who is, routinely and predictably. This occurs, not only through type “A” violations, 
of course, but also those violations underwritten in praxis and perpetrated in broad 
daylight as responsible and ethical clinical treatment. These type “B” violations lie 
along a very broad continuum of the ethically questionable, as we saw in Ladies’ 
shoes, where the main character was denied the right to end his own dialysis 
treatment. 25 At one end of this continuum, however, we might find the fragile 18-
year-old James being soundly humiliated in his first psychiatric consultation for 
“pretending” to have read or understood a book of Kant’s work that he carried 
around with him like an amulet.26 At the more extreme end would be my young 
friend, Julia,27 incarcerated last year and chemically subdued in a “state-of-the-art” 
Canadian psychiatric unit against her will for a week without even a formal 
assessment. When I called the hospital to appeal for her rights, her sympathetic 
nurse wanted to assure me that in this lovely new institution, Julia was privileged 
enough to have a private room with its own toilet.  
Stigma, the third type of violation—violation “C,” was examined in chapter 3 in 
some detail.28 We revisit it here to underscore a violation so appalling that even 
clinicians dread its impact on their own professional lives. Stigma represents a 
horrendous ongoing hermeneutic injustice for the help seeker, about which she is 
likely to have exceptionally little understanding in entrusting herself to the care of 
the institution. Conversely, a clinician knows full well that an admission of mental 
illness is likely to result in significant stigmatization by her own professional 
cohort.29 The aversion to mental health diagnoses among health professionals, and 
                                                     
25 See: Ladies Shoes (4.2.1). 
26 See: Chapter 2. pp. 25-26 
27 See: My flower (5.6.1).   
28 See: Stigmatization (3.6.2). 
29 See: A.J. Gray, 'Stigma in Psychiatry', Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 95 (2002), p.72. 




their concealment of mental illness in themselves and their families, apparently 
contributes to the suicide rate among medical students and young doctors.30  
Despite the ideal of the wounded healer, few mental health clinicians are willing to 
concede such vulnerability publicly.31 Stephen Diamond’s hyperbole about the 
recent “shocking and courageous public confession” of American psychologist, 
Marcia Linehan, is a case in point. Linehan, whose work with self-harming women 
brought her international recognition, spoke out about her own significant 
psychiatric history only near the end of her career because she did not want to “die 
a coward”.32 Her story made headlines in North America and testifies to the 
enormity of the fear of stigma that she avoided throughout her career.33 Linehan’s 
example also crystalizes the violation of a stigma so dreaded that rather than claim 
membership with those she treats, a clinician will hide behind the socially 
distancing manoeuvre34 of the clinical reduction to avoid the very stigma she reifies 
                                                     
30 Ibid. p. 74.  
31 In my years of education and work in this field, I have heard of only two mental health professionals 
within my “extended” workplace in British Columbia who publicly acknowledged having “mental 
illness”. Frederick Frese, an American psychologist, is one of very few clinicians to speak openly about 
his own serious and persistent mental illness in an attempt to invite other professionals to 
acknowledge their diagnoses and psychiatric histories. See: F.J. Frese and others, 'Integrating Evidence-
Based Practices and the Recovery Model', Psychiatric Services, 52 (2001), p. 1468.  
According to Frese, only a tiny minority of clinicians are willing to take this professional risk. Frese 
himself has acknowledged knowing only ten people among 137,000 members of the American 
Psychological Association to speak openly about their psychiatric histories. See: H.P. Lefley, 
'“Prosumers” and Recovery', Psychiatric Services, 64 (2013). 
32 See: S. Diamond, 'Linehan and Jung as Wounded Healers', in Psychology Today, (Dec. 30, 2011); B. 
Carey, 'Expert on Mental Illness Reveals Her Own Fight', New York Times, (Jun. 23, 2011).  
33 Linehan’s book was used in my Centre in running DBT (Dialectic Behavioural Therapy) groups for 
(mostly) women who were required to understand, and agree, with their diagnosis of Borderline 
Personality Disorder in order to be accepted into a therapy group. This diagnosis is one of the most 
derogating and damaging to the mostly female cohort to which it is attributed. See: M. Linehan, 
Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of Borderline Personality Disorder (London, New York: The Guilford Press, 
1993). 
34 The need for professionals to address this issue is briefly discussed in: N. Sartorius, 'Iatrogenic 
Stigma of Mental Illness: Begins with Behaviour and Attitudes of Medical Professionals, Especially 
Psychiatrists', British Medical Journal, 324 (2002).  
See also: O. Wahl and E. Aroesty‐Cohen, 'Attitudes of Mental Health Professionals About Mental 
Illness: A Review of the Recent Literature', Journal of Community Psychology, 38 (2010), p. 58. In one 
review discussed in this paper, 14 of 19 studies showed that while mental health professionals held 
more positive views about mental illness than the general public, some negative attitudes prevailed 
throughout. “Negative attitudes were particularly apparent for social distance measures (and) tended 
to be similar to the public in being reluctant to accept those with psychiatric disorders within their 
social and occupational circles”. 




in others.35 As we have seen, it is type “A” violations—those criminal or abhorrent 
ethical breaches of trust perpetrated for the clinician’s gratification—that tend to be 
the most readily conflated with the supposed threat of proximity. Nonetheless, 
types “B” and “C” are arguably more insidious, woven as they are so tightly into 
“ethical” praxis and authorized by the privilege of the clinician that they become 
invisible. These are violations that come in through the back door, so to speak, while 
our horrified focus remains on violation “A,” and the convenient notion that this is 
all the clinician really has to fear and avoid in her “care” of the vulnerable help 
seeker. 
8.2.5 Too much of a good thing: Another conflation 
Another perspective of our conflation emerges through the expressed concern that 
our wonder-full ethical notion could lead to unskilful practice that might harm the 
help seeker with its excess. Here the fear is raised about the clinician who with the 
best of intentions might still violate the help seeker by “over-reaching” ethically or 
emotionally.  
Birgit Nordtug offers the example of a clinician who, in using a Levinasian 
framework to treat an eating disordered population, could harmfully impose 
“limitless love and care” on the help seeker.36 As Nordtug reasonably argues, such 
an approach could dangerously stifle or smother someone from this exceptionally 
fragile clinical population. Yet, I would suggest that such an approach would be an 
unskilful response to any form of emotional or psychological suffering. More 
relevantly, Nordtug appears to have mis-interpreted Levinas’ formulation of 
responsibility as something that could be somehow imposed or forced on anyone.  
The Other is radically other than I which is why she cannot be subsumed 
under totality or egoism. Nor do I dominate her in apprehending her. She 
always transcends my ability to bring her into my possession or my own 
                                                     
35 Linehan’s late “confession” is all the more troubling because of the extremely derogating implication 
of the “Borderline Personality” diagnosis represented by the cohort with whom Linehan specifically 
worked.  
36 B. Nordtug, 'Levinas's Ethics as a Basis of Healthcare–Challenges and Dilemmas', p. 61.  




identity. The desire for the other is not based on satiation…My initial 
response is a generous impulse. It is ethical.37 
Clifton-Soderstrom’s summary statement above, neatly underscores the 
impossibility of Levinas’ ethical vision being “imposed,” which Nordtug’s 
conflation appears to deny. It is also important to remember we are not dealing with 
a binary equivalent here with the choice between distance and intrusion that might 
seem to lie at opposing ends of a continuum. This ethical responsibility is beyond 
neglect or imposition in a Levinasian formulation of wonder that finds me 
consecrated by and indebted to the help seeker through her proximity to me. 
Proximity and violation are indeed—and very problematically—conflated within the 
reductive sphere. However, they are not antithetical to one another as extremes 
located at opposing ends of a continuum because they are on different planes 
altogether.38  
If my unskilful response reflects the gross nature and methods of the legalistic and 
reductive frame in which my work is transacted, my imposition on the help seeker 
cannot be blamed on this ethical vision, but on the laws and reduction from which it 
emerges. Despite the radical clarity and draw of this ethical vision, I am still 
conditioned and constrained within the reductive sphere of my education, my 
institution and my world. All the more reason for the clinician to cling to an ethical 
vision of this wonder-full proximity and the practice of what ought to be. 
8.2.6 Beautiful Girl 
It was the second time in many months that the eating disorders therapist had asked 
me to meet with this young woman who was struggling with grief. My interest in 
grief and loss was known around the Centre and I was pleased to be asked. The knock 
came at my door. Did I have time? I did. We walked to my colleague’s office and I 
greeted the downcast young woman whose face I hardly remembered from our first 
encounter. But the story came back as she reoriented me to its details while I sat and 
gazed at the girl, this lovely young tree being felled by her own misery. She had no 
idea how perfect, how beautiful she was. She had struggled with an eating disorder 
and was still contorted by the sorrow of her sister’s tragic and unexpected death. She 
                                                     
37 M. Clifton-Soderstrom, 'Levinas and the Patient as Other: The Ethical Foundation of Medicine', p. 
452.  
38 See: E. Levinas, 'Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo. 1982', pp. 8-10.  




felt abandoned by her mother who was half demented by the loss of her dead child 
while confronting the possible horror of losing her only other child to an eating 
disorder. The abyss, this young woman believed, could neither be crossed nor 
circumvented. There was nothing to turn to but time for its distant hope, and even 
that could not be guaranteed if she believed herself incapable of enduring.  
The three of us sat together for little more than half an hour but it was long enough 
for the thing to emerge, this wordless space, deeply quiet but definite as the latch of a 
door being opened. There was no emotional outburst, no lusting after outcomes. For 
what could be said, after all, that she had not heard a hundred times in the course of 
her therapy? Pauses ensued, during which she filled in a few more spaces of the 
difficult story. My colleague and I, the witnessing women, sat grave faced, empty 
handed and disturbed by the extreme suffering of this broken girl we could not even 
hold in our arms. Yet, the opening continued to deepen through the play of our quiet 
voices, our attention, the acknowledgment of the mystery of such annihilating 
sorrow, the possibility of enduring, the preciousness of life—her life.  
At one point the room became stagey with thick sunlight that strayed through the 
cloud cover of the overcast day and fell through the office window that was 
reinforced by thick black bars. The girl’s long brown hair cascaded around her 
shoulders like a halo, its silken sheen momentarily captured by the sunlight, her tear-
stained face iconic, her young hands quiet in her lap, the tissues she held like white 
flames.  
I spoke a long while; it felt like a soliloquy memorized by heart, and told her what I 
knew and had to believe, which was little enough. But I was in the thing with her, 
we were swimming together in its vastness and the presence was all around. When I 
had finished saying what there was to be said, a moment came when the tender joy 
washed fully and finally over me, drawn up as it had been from this deep well. Then 
I said the only thing left to be said which was clinically inappropriate but wholly 
true. “Beautiful girl,” I said, as though she was my own, as though I might never see 
her again and she met my eyes. Having nothing further to say and because it seemed 
that my part was done, I wished her well, said goodbye and left the room. 
My colleague later commented on those two words she had noticed, above everything 
else, that had said more than they might seem to mean. Something about them and 
their saying had stayed with her that she wanted to explore. 
It was months later in the noisy crush of our big city fair, on the midway amidst the 
screaming rides, the flashing coloured lights, the smell of frying food, that a lovely 
young woman rushed up to greet me, smiling, waiting expectantly for me to be 
equally happy to greet her. She was only vaguely familiar but her delight showed 
how clearly she remembered me, intimately enough to greet me like some long lost 
friend. I had to ask her to remind me who she was, but even this couldn’t quell her 




joy in our unexpected reunion. Then she told me how it had all worked out, that it 
was better now, there was possibility and happiness and I had been part of that 
process and discovery for which she was so grateful.  
I walked away from our encounter dazed, incredulous to have been found here, amid 
the deafening noise and glare of a midway at dusk by this beautiful girl. In whose life 
I had played so insignificant a role, whose name I had not even remembered, but who 
had come so far to recognize and bless me.  
8.2.7 Palliation, transformation, mis-interpretation  
Throughout this thesis, the issue that has continually emerged is whether wonder 
should be understood as a refreshing palliative for the beleaguered clinician or as 
something transformational and morally galvanizing. I have suggested that 
palliation is not sufficient to transform the clinician’s perspective, fire her moral 
outrage or allow her to confront the horror of the help seeker’s plight to which she 
contributes so greatly. Yet, in the example of Beautiful Girl the question of 
transformation or palliation is transcended. This story illuminates the ineffable in a 
moment of radiance and communion that makes this question irrelevant because it 
melts the constraints of the reductive imposition, the arbitrariness of the differing 
roles of the characters, and the insufficiency of the therapeutic paradigm altogether. 
It does so to such an extent that all three characters are significantly “moved,” or 
possibly refreshed and transformed. Something happens beyond the orchestration, 
imposition or control of any of the three players. A deeply satisfying—socializing—
result occurs and not immediately, but also over time.  
Yet, I would re-assert that our Levinasian construal of wonder is no mere palliative 
nudge but a cataclysm of proximity capable of shattering the clinician’s 
entrancement with the status quo, if only briefly. Even if this cataclysm can only toss 
the clinician back up against the closed door through which even Levinas was 
unable to venture, it might at least keep her from running back through the 
institutional door of least resistance. This is the door behind which the mental 
health clinician hides and defends herself, and the status quo, from the real danger 
posed by this proximity and the help seeker’s ethical call. For this is the call that 
evokes the clinician’s overwhelming yearning and compels a reverence that utterly 




contradicts the security of her privilege and the legitimacy of the enterprise in which 
she colludes.  
In returning to Nordtug’s example of the well-meaning but intrusively 
“responsible” clinician, we confront the real possibility of the clinician’s failure to 
communicate or transact the ethical response she apprehends and intends. Such 
failure might even be predictable but Nortug’s analysis still errs in conflating 
proximity with violation. For, we could equally credit our well-meaning clinician 
for her integrity and courage in attempting to counter-balance violations A and B, 
and C, no matter what the outcome. Even if our “misguided” clinician only wanted 
to assuage her sense of professional guilt, helplessness or fear in the face of the 
suffering of an eating disordered patient, I would argue that this attempt at an 
ethical response should not be dismissed. Otherwise, we risk vilifying, diminishing 
or overlooking the morality of her desire, and of conflating violation with proximity 
yet again.   
More importantly, we risk dismissing the ethical potential of Levinas’ vision in our 
therapeutic project altogether. Nordtug concludes that the risks involved in 
employing Levinasian ethics in a therapeutic context make his work ultimately 
unsuitable for our purposes because the possibility of misinterpretation is too 
great.39 The risk, she claims, is that clinicians or theorists bringing his work into the 
therapeutic conversation are not immune to errors of interpretation or the 
temptation of making Levinas fit into their theories. But I would counter that the 
conversation with Levinas’ ethical vision has hardly begun and for that reason 
cannot—must not—be so quickly dismissed on those or similar grounds. I would 
add that none of these concerns, including the question of whether wonder is best 
understood as moral refreshment or ethical and political transformation, indicate 
that the problem lies with Levinas or the ethical construal of wonder.  
The difficulty clinicians may have, and surely will have, in learning to interpret, 
speak and practice an ethical language in and against the reductive clinical 
environment cannot mean they should not try. Moreover, great care and 
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discernment will be required in negotiating not only the risk but also the fear of 
harming the help seeker. This is always the deal breaker most likely to provoke the 
clinician’s premature dismissal of the radical ethical possibilities under 
consideration. The consequence of which will almost assuredly re-consign her to the 
proven and familiar “ethics” of the institution and praxis where the help seeker’s 
reduction is reified and her dehumanization ensured. However, the enigma that is 
my responsibility is surely never the problem, nor can I ever be finished with it as 
Levinas claims. “[A]s responsible, I am never finished with emptying myself of 
myself.”40 
8.2.8 Tigers above, below and on all sides 
When we begin to look, evidence of this conflation emerges wherever an attempt is 
made to increase the ethical integrity of practice by decreasing the distance between 
the clinician and the help seeker. How researchers stick-handle this problem is 
fascinating given the intractable nature of the conflation and the variety of solutions 
forwarded for its subversion. These “solutions” are all the more fascinating given 
the researcher’s chronic fear that any attempt to address the issue of clinical distance 
will be mis-understood as potentially violating. Whatever solution is offered must 
never appear to pose a risk to the help seeker or, more importantly, to erase the line 
that separates the clinician from the help seeker. This is the line must be constantly 
monitored and defended, ostensibly for the protection of the help seeker but 
ultimately, I am arguing, for the benefit of the system. 
In the opening vignette of this chapter, evidence of this threat is discovered in the 
stony resistance of my colleague to my query about her love for a self-harming 
patient, to whom she has been devoted for so long.41 Yecheskiel Cohen responds to 
this threat by reconfirming the clinician’s dominant role in the guise of the 
benevolent parent. But, as previously noted this can only be accomplished at the 
expense of the help seeker who now, in addition to being systemically reduced, is 
infantilized as well.42 Birgit Nordtug’s response to the threat is to deflect it by 
raising the concern of the possible violation perpetrated by the well-intended but 
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41 See: Thou shalt not love (8.2.1). 
42 See: Violations A, B and C (8.2.4). 




unskilful and over-reaching clinician, and to dismiss the possibility of proximity as 
well as a Levinasian approach to care on these grounds.43 Professor John Swinton 
has confronted the threat of conflation by forwarding the solution of friendship 
while acknowledging that his argument will likely raise the same defensive 
arguments we have already discussed here.44 Swinton’s notion of friendship leans 
heavily on Jean Vanier’s model and is both compelling and humane. But such 
friendship cannot be transferred to the enterprise of community mental health care 
where the clinician’s power is law. To imply otherwise is not only to spin our 
wheels in the kind of secondary ethical tasks Irigaray warns against, it is to deny the 
absolutely breath-taking legal power wielded by any clinician in the institution. 
Interestingly, even Clifton-Soderstrom, who speaks entirely for a Levinasian 
approach to ethical medical care, cannot resist acknowledging this conflation by 
assuring the reader that what she intends with her Levinasian orientation is not for 
the gratification of the clinician. Yet, within the reductive framework, it will be for 
her gratification and self-interest, for it cannot fail to be.  
It does not matter if the researcher assures the reader that she means proximity in an 
ethical way, a good way, intended only for the help seeker’s benefit and the 
subversion of the reductive institution. Because the frame in which this argument is 
constructed and which, ironically, motivates the researcher to urge her colleagues 
ethically forward in the first place, also requires her to continually warn them back 
again. Get close! Not too close! Because everybody knows what happens when we get 
too close. Or do we? The conflation triumphs nonetheless. For, the dominant 
discourse deflects any notion greater than itself to the default position of its own 
common denominator. This leaves even the most hallowed and radicalizing notion 
of proximity as an abuse of power in the making because there is no other frame of 
reference. This effectively pre-empts the safe passage—any passage—of even a 
notion like wonder to its moral fruition. By which we mean the larger—unknown—
ethical implications of this wonder-fully elevated vulnerable help seeker to the abject 
and ambivalent clinician who confronts her.  
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So great is the aversion to this taboo—this firewall—against proximity, that the 
clinician might actually appear to prefer the help seeker’s reduction if only to avoid 
the risk of appearing to harm her. The even greater concern for the clinician is that 
she will be seen as a threat to the institution which could cost her everything. The 
alternative is for the clinician to continue to acquiesce, to comply with the reduction 
that will deflect, defile and dilute even her most genuine efforts on the help seeker’s 
behalf while undermining her sense of integrity and trustworthiness.  
If the clinician is not to assume the wonderful clinical encounter for her own private 
and exclusive consumption, however, the proximity with which we are struggling 
will have to propel the clinician towards the work of change that will come at a 
significant personal cost. The implications are suggested in Tread lightly! For, I am 
reprimanded by my managers for commenting in my clinical notes on the distress of 
a disabled client who was being humiliated by his probation officer.45  
8.2.9 A ride on the mule of wonder  
The distrust of introspection, of self-analysis, in our psychology, is perhaps 
only a consequence of the crisis of love and religion; it derives from the 
discovery of the true nature of the social.46 
The wonder-full proximity for which we are calling in this inquiry is, on closer 
investigation, scarcely if ever absent in even the most mundane and minute 
transactions between the mental health clinician and the help seeker. It features so 
prominently, that the clinician might appear to be continually falling over the 
ethical issues it raises although these may not be immediately apparent. Yet, from 
the angle we are about to examine, the clinician’s failure to ethically respond seems 
incomprehensible. This is because, the wonder that ignites the clinician’s moral fire, 
confirms her yearning and extends its tender reception to her, is under the aegis of 
the very person she is at greatest risk of harming.  
In turning to wonder for moral authority, I discover myself under the authority of 
the least endowed for help with the task of remembering who I am so I can avoid 
harming her, and she tells me. The help seeker’s misplaced trust in me and in the 
                                                     
45 See: Tread lightly! (3.4.2). 
46 E. Levinas, 'Entre Nous: Essais Sur Le Penser-À-L'autre', p. 23.  




institution cries out for my protection. Her willingness to nakedly, and unwisely, 
bare herself in seeking a reason and respite for her pain exposes her defencelessness 
that demands I dignify and protect her. Nothing is concealed. She is terrifyingly 
innocent of the machinations of an institution about which I am all too aware and 
which she desperately needs to understand at what is likely to be one of the lowest 
ebbs of her life. The “service” and “treatment” that await her, if she is successful in 
getting through the doors of the institution, will be endured at no small cost and 
without her full understanding of what she is undertaking.47 In sum it is here, in this 
horrifying subtext, where the clinician discovers the help seeker’s authorization and 
prescription for a very different kind of dis-ease to which she may not easily 
respond, if at all.  
Herein, the enslavement of wonder is discovered again in a remarkable contortion 
of the awe-struck clinician believing that the privilege of accurately seeing the 
vulnerable help seeker is the end point of the moral vision. That is to say, that her 
experience and expression of awe are a sufficient response to the help seeker’s 
question—her plea—that remains ignored. How can we account for this astounding 
oversight? It appears related to the problem of the reduction beyond which the 
clinician cannot see, let alone imagine. Yet, if this is so, the clinician will only ever 
perceive the “Other” as a special privilege—hallowed perhaps—but meant entirely 
for her gratification.  
This remarkable convolution might seem to constitute the fatal flaw of any 
argument for wonder in clinical care, for here, the help seeker becomes the mule 
who takes the clinician to and through the wonder-full encounter. This intractable 
problem lies not with wonder but with the reductive system we wish to subvert that 
continually clones wonder to its purpose and perspective.  
In failing to recognize wonder as the unequivocal ethical relationship Levinas 
describes, the clinician unknowingly submits the help seeker to an altogether 
invisible but scandalous level of mis-use. For, having survived everything she has 
endured as a result of her reduction, the help seeker now becomes a radiant source 
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of inspiration and gratitude for the dis-spirited and de-moralized clinician. The 
echoes of which were heard in the reverential murmurs of the clinicians and clergy 
described in The Church.48 Indeed, clinicians can hardly resist sharing such 
enchanting experience even while it jars with the implications of ownership and the 
shame of “privilege”. Nonetheless, the clinician surely will find in the help seeker 
the respite to her own self-interest that she may earnestly wish to relinquish but will 
likely fail to release. Instead, the help seeker is edified through a spiritual 
“experience” that humbles and overwhelms the clinician while leaving the help 
seeker empty-handed of everything except, perhaps, the clinician’s reverential 
expression of gratitude for the “privilege” of “serving” her.  
This is the problem identified by feminist critics of Levinas’ work, especially Luce 
Irigaray, who as previously noted, attempted to correct Levinas’ formulation of the 
Other.49 His interpretation of alterity that he equated with the feminine is what 
enables the transcendence of the subject. As Irigaray has shown, this transcendence 
occurs at the expense of the feminine whose position remains subordinate and 
unchanged. We find an equivalent dynamic within the therapeutic relationship 
where this transcendence is accomplished on behalf of the clinician. Here, the 
subordinate help seeker—transfigured or luminous though she may appear to the 
reverent clinician—remains nonetheless outranked, disadvantaged and exploited.  
There is no clinical equivalent or response for this peerless reception that is 
ultimately “consumed” as a reward by the clinician for her privileged exposure to 
the vulnerable help seeker’s most compelling injury—the reduction itself! This injury 
is the one to which the clinician inevitably contributes and from which she always 
benefits. Of course, the clinician’s response also de-moralises her because it 
constricts and defiles her relationship to the help seeker before it begins. This leaves 
wonder and the clinician herself as totalized as the help seeker, bonsaied to the size 
of the very reduction she wishes to address. This is the reduction into which wonder 
must be made to fit so as to pose no threat to anyone, least of all the clinician and the 
hierarchy in which she is situated. 
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As we have seen, it is very difficult to find a clear demarcation between the different 
“types” of violation we have examined here. They bleed together, the illegal and the 
legal, the gross and the implied, the unjustifiable and the legally defended. 
Consequently there appears to be little or no difference between the violated and the 
treated, the stigmatized and the rehabilitated, the exploited and the revered. These 
violations are devastating to the vulnerable help seeker. They are also devastating to 
the clinician standing in the shadow of the institution holding a broken moral 
compass while the promise of ethical proximity is erroneously and predictably cast 
as the prime suspect of violation.  
8.3  Awareness, resistance and language 
To see, speak and act beyond this conflation, clinicians must develop greater 
awareness, but the challenges are great. Patti Lather suggests that “piercing through 
the theory and the jargon and arriving at a greater understanding of social forces” is 
something we can only achieve with advanced education.50 Still, this kind of 
education does not lead the primary interests—or inform the methods—of a 
medically driven reductive enterprise like community mental health. Instead, it 
separates the individual from her story and social context in order to accurately—
scientifically, measurably—isolate and identify pathology and predict outcomes. Any 
clinician seeking the awareness Lather describes will have to work very hard to go 
against this grain, if only to see.  
Similarly, Grace Jantzen suggests that members of oppressed groups—and those 
labelled mentally ill surely qualify, including those who represent them—must exert 
real effort to become conscious of the situation in which they are mired. This will 
not occur, Jantzen observes “by simply contemplating but by being willing to work 
for liberation,” which necessitates putting oneself in harm’s way by working for 
justice with “its concomitant risks”.51  
These are risks associated with the clinician’s moment-to-moment decision to look 
away, to endure, to keep her moral outrage and distress to herself, to decline the 
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invitation to engage on behalf of the help seeker. They are also associated with her 
professional armature, groomed by institutional indoctrination and girded by her 
authority and legal power. This armature, burnished by the entrenched practices of 
“clinical” distance enables her to apply theories, labels and acronyms to people 
enduring lives of penury, complexity and humiliation she is never likely to 
experience. Thus, can our clinician manipulate any affiliative emotion or gesture as 
a tool for her benefit.52 She is insulated from being even touched by an awareness of 
this help seeker as herself, and of something beyond that calls in this wonder-full 
language into the unknown.  
Conversely, the clinician is finely tuned to the exquisite resonance of this wonder-
full ineffability that offers such reward and consolation within the de-moralizing 
institution. The therapeutic alliance, so called, may well be the most gratifying 
aspect of this kind of work, to which Carl Rogers’ oeuvre fully attests. Professor 
Martyn Evans’ appeal for a place for wonder as moral refreshment also testifies to 
this enigmatic and ethical call, through which the clinician may become “more 
nearly complete as a result of hearing and understanding”.53 Yet, the clinician’s 
moral response to this resonance remains problematic and unresolved. Firstly, 
because it is so tightly conflated with the fear of violation but also, because there is 
no language within the reductive sphere capable of reflecting the integrity of this 
kind of consciousness.  
8.3.2 The language of proximity: A final digression 
The theme of language has recurred throughout this inquiry54 particularly in the 
context of Levinas’ work, and in the conflation under analysis given its connection 
to the thorny issue of eroticism.55 Bernard McGinn’s excellent essay on the language 
of love in mysticism provides some clarity on this issue.56 As he explains, some 
mystical writers are infamous for the language of erotic love they used to capture 
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the ineffable—a quality beyond “the usual categories of knowing and loving”.57 
Indeed, notions of desire and need, of tenderness, belonging and wonder abound in 
mystical literature to describe the union with God.58 This issue impinges sufficiently 
on our discussion to justify a few observations related to the clinician’s chronic 
anxiety about proximity.  
According to McGinn, the connection between the erotic and the evocation of the 
divine in mystical literature is still under scrutiny and not fully understood. He 
suggests, that in Christianity and Judaism this connection reflected a view of God as 
both lover and love. For example, the early influence of the Song of Songs was, 
among other interpretations, understood to describe the relationship of God to the 
individual.59 Far from representing some distant abstraction of goodness or of 
sexual sublimation, these evocations attempted to translate something both 
transcendent and deeply personal. The embodiment of such desire is not necessarily 
more important than other forms of love, McGinn cautions, but possibly more 
powerful—absolute—in its evocation and more valuable, for that reason.60 
Such language also reminds the clinician—and should remind her—that there is 
nothing “appropriate”, or “objective” or “safe” in discovering oneself reverent or 
awed in the presence of the vulnerable help seeker. Far from being neutral, this 
event announces a revolution that subordinates the clinician to the help seeker 
whose priority within the institution, as we have seen, falls below even the 
administrative staff answering the phones. This extraordinary subordination is one 
to which Levinas’ work fully attests. For, unlike the clinician’s institutionally 
assigned height that distances and reduces the help seeker, this wonder-full height 
asserts the help seeker’s proximity and alterity, or as Robert Gibbs reminds us, her 
perfection.  
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“Height stands as the dimension of perfection, largely because of the asymmetry 
and the general sense of the escape of the other from my horizon.” Levinas, Gibbs 
notes, shifted the emphasis of height to proximity in order to avoid limiting the 
transcendent to the idea of height.61 Height does not evoke ethical transcendence as 
much as the idea of closeness, the approach of the face, or the nearness of the Other 
and the responsibility this implies.62  
This proximity also refutes any notion of “mutuality” or “reciprocity,” the former 
being an integral aspect of Carl Rogers’ theory of change.63 For no mutuality can 
ever be found in this “wonder-full” transaction as an imaginary meeting point of 
“equals” discovered somewhere between the downward trajectory of the awed 
clinician, and the upward trajectory of the elevated seeker. No matter how 
“elevated” the help seeker may appear to the stunned and humbled clinician, it is 
always within the clinicians’ capacity, indeed her jurisdiction and mandate, to 
exploit and harm. Moreover, as Levinas reminds us, my responsibility is unilateral 
and always trumped by any question of reciprocity. “I am responsible without 
waiting for his reciprocity were I to die for it.”64  
Thus, the language of love, desire and need is the “language of proximity,” a 
language with a long history within the mystical canon that has subversive and 
contemporary implications for this inquiry. Yet, this language also poses a 
tremendous challenge to the clinician ever vigilant of its double meaning, given the 
problem of the conflation we have analysed. Yet, this language that Levinas 
employs in his ecstatic flight of words is one from which clinicians can also learn 
and discern. Far from representing a violating threat, it confirms an ultimate social 
bond and a unilateral responsibility that annihilates the clinical reduction. 
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8.4  Conclusion 
By virtue of its intentional structure gentleness comes to the separated being 
from the other. The Other precisely reveals himself in his alterity not in a 
shock negating the I, but as the primordial phenomenon of gentleness…The 
welcoming of the Face is peaceable from the first, for it answers the 
unquenchable Desire for Infinity“.65 
There is much to be done in bringing wonder into the clinical conversation when the 
ethical proximity of the Other is at such risk of being conflated with violation. Yet, 
the moral clarity of wonder is still unparalleled in interrogating the reductive 
scheme and illuminating the moral confinement against which Luce Irigaray rails in 
assessing the current state of affairs:  
Is not what is offered already within a horizon that annihilates my ability 
and my will? ... I am, therefore, a political militant for the impossible, which 
is not to say a utopian. Rather, I want what is yet to be as the only possibility 
of a future.66  
In working towards this unknown possibility, Levinas’ wonder-full vision shows 
the clinician the profoundly moral implications of even the slightest “clinical” 
exchange such as we find in the example of Daisy May.67 May asks the group why 
she should bother getting up in the morning when her monumental efforts to do so 
have yielded no reward and left her as isolated and ignorant as ever. In response, I 
concede my private support to May through a shared, conspiratorial glance I hope 
will assure her of my alliance. But my gesture reduces her once again because I 
allow her to be humiliated.  
In failing to publicly acknowledge May’s courage and the accuracy of her 
observation, I protect myself, the therapeutic program in which she is enrolled, and 
the institution, all at her expense. This example illustrates the ethical enormity of the 
clinician’s connection to the help seeker in even the most incidental transaction. It 
also illustrates the clinician’s blindness, insincerity and naivety in apprehending the 
defenceless help seeker whose proximity is always there and whose entreaty the 
clinician is always ignoring, running from, or unravelled by. For, as I note in the 
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story of Sharon, “I am already in up to my neck with this woman before the question 
of how I am to help even emerges”.68  
It would be unfair and untrue to suggest that such private acts of heresy are lost on 
the help seeker or not some credit to the clinician. Although, such gestures might be 
more accurately construed as apologies or confessions of moral cowardice, for the 
clinician’s privilege and power remain unscathed. This poignant truth was clarified 
near the end of my work with James in my final heartfelt attempt to liberate him 
from his institutional oppression.    
Ultimately it seemed to me that my most important task was to help James recognize 
and reclaim his place in the human community. I wanted him to grasp that we – the 
world around him—needed him to join us for his own benefit, certainly, but even 
more pressingly for ours. In one of our final meetings, logic spun on its head the day 
I carefully explained to James that the very system he had come to for help was the 
same one that created and maintained his sense of exile – both inside and outside 
institutional walls. He listened carefully, quietly, the day I played that card, placed 
the final revelation of institutional complicity in his hand. “Do you understand me, 
James? Do you understand what I’m saying?” He was so young. Yet, even with this 
confession I could not sidestep my personal role in his alienation despite what had 
been my best intentions and many attempts to subvert and resist the institution. 
Paradoxically, and painfully, my sense of guilt was further complicated by the very 
love that had emerged and driven my desire to keep him safe and help him 
understand and touch the transcendence he sought.  
Here again the help seeker—James—is conscripted as the mule for this clinician’s 
wonder. Despite accepting the ride ambivalently, even regretfully, I still ask him to 
absolve me of my guilt when I suggest that he can do more than I can do, either for 
myself or him. I am obliquely encouraging him to challenge the system by resisting 
it, by not falling prey to a reduction that I help impose. This system also rewards me 
even while it casts doubt on the value of the “metaphysical passion” James pursued 
and brought to our “therapeutic” conversations, to my great benefit and joy.  
From whatever angle we examine wonder, it seems this consecrated “welcome 
home” of the clinician by the help seeker is deadlocked, its very prohibition 
enforced by a clinical relationship and a reductive enterprise that denies and 
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distrusts even its possibility. Such is the enormity of the threat posed not to the 
vulnerable help seeker but to the clinician and the institution. For what is hidden and 
must never show is what this relationship means to the clinician. The clinician can 
only warily state what this relationship means to her for many reasons, chief among 
them the anathema of potential abuse and her daunting authority over the help 
seeker.  
Such defensiveness might arguably confirm the clinician’s unstated discomfort with 
the imbalance of power she reluctantly or ambivalently holds. Yet, if we are to heed 
Levinas’ denial of reciprocity and assert the elevation that is proximity, there can be 
no argument that the clinical relationship in community mental health care will ever 
be defensible. Indeed, the desecration of the holy Other is completed where the 
primary argument for clinical distance is upheld even less by the horror of harming 
this vulnerable help seeker than of actually loving her.  
This fatal flaw remains almost unaccountably elusive to the question raised by 
medical humanities scholar Professor Jane Macnaughton who asks “why it is that 
the humanities (including philosophy) have not managed to lay the ‘killer punch on 
medicine’s atomistic viewpoint.”69 Her question suggests the need for the reductive 
viewpoint to be somehow “out-gunned,” by all who, not incidentally, race to defend 
its primacy.  
Paradoxically, the solution resides not in a punch but in a sigh, a tender 
vulnerability, a whisper expressed in the welcoming regard of this defenseless help 
seeker. Her nobility is both instructive and inviolable despite my pathetic attempt to 
shield myself from her beauty and protect her from my violence. Above all, the 
welcome of this help seeker’s face demands a response from the clinician beyond 
gratitude and awe. By which I mean, something greater than the grotesque 
assumption that somehow, by simply noticing, feeling and articulating the “great 
privilege” of being called by the face of the other, the clinician has somehow 
morally responded to it.  
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Nor would I agree that wonder is a secondary ethical task, although our limited 
approach to its “employment”—its “application”—enforces its current diminution.70 
Macnaughton’s suggestion that the solution lies in the revisioning of medicine 
echoes Irigaray’s warning. Such revisioning must also build on analyses related to 
the difficulty we have seeing this reduction and of conceding the real personal costs of 
having to undertake what we are not yet willing to sacrifice. As it stands, the 
transcendent notion of wonder delivers much less than we might reasonably expect 
while constantly referring us back to the issue of its enslavement and exploitation 
by the clinician and the authorizing institution.  
For this reason, we must take care in promoting any definition of wonder for the 
purposes under consideration. To assume wonder’s potential as an antidote to 
clinical reduction, or refreshment from the impact of this reduction, is to miss the 
larger point. This is the point discovered in the predictable defilement of anything 
introduced into the clinical dialogue to counterbalance the status quo, no matter 
how pristine or novel. Evidence of which is continually discovered in the clinician’s 
implacability and inability—through torpor, fear, uncertainty and ambivalence—to 
step beyond her role or the confinement of the authorizing institution, into the 
relationship to which wonder calls her. We may agree that the final evidence for an 
ethics of wonder capable of surpassing the help seeker’s reduction lies tantalizingly 
close to the paradox of the clinician being found by the Face of the other. This is still 
not close enough to ensure the success of our wonder-full project, which is to protect 
the help seeker from the clinician.  
Wonder annihilates the cherished illusion that the most, and only, needful member in 
the clinical relationship is the vulnerable help seeker. This is the lie laid bare by the 
transfigured face of the help seeker who is not served first and best by the clinician 
within a hierarchy that subordinates and reduces them both. Paradoxically, the 
clinician’s recognition of her need and desire for the help seeker, as Vanier has 
shown, is the most subversive in challenging the clinical reduction and the 
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hierarchy that ratifies it. It is a powerful and persuasive notion for any ongoing 
consideration of wonder towards which Levinas’ vision continually points. It is also 
an admittedly slippery notion to grasp and sell within a hierarchy that requires the 
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